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Introduction 
The causes of the War of 1812 have produced a historio--
graphical controversy far out of proportion to the war's 
military importance. The major reason for the debate is 
that the explanations of contemporary historians have 
proved inconsistent and unsatisfactory.1 Those who had 
participated in the war in a military or political capacity 
generally agreed that the United States went to war to 
protect its maritime commerce and neutral rights against 
the predatory policies of Great Britain-policies which not 
only destroyed United States commerce, but insulted na-
tional honor and threatened the country's international 
prestige.2 Historians, in the late nineteenth century, 
although on occasion intimating that other factors may 
also have played a role, accepted this maritime interpre-
tation.3 
Early in the twentieth century, historians looking at the 
distribution of the congressional vote for war began to 
have doubts about the validity of the maritime interpreta-
tion. They were impressed by the strong support in the 
Mississippi Valley and the opposition of the Northeast. 
A war supported by the West, the nation's noncommercial 
area, and fanatically opposed by New England, the na-
tion's commercial center, could not have been fought 
2 Pennsylvania and the War of 1812 
exclusively for the protection of seamen's rights and com-
merce.4 
Soon numerous monographs and books appeared which 
attempted to analyze other factors which might have 
prompted the nation to go to war. Most of these tried 
to explain the West's support. Land hunger, fear of a 
British-supported Indian uprising, economic depression, 
and an exuberance of youthful patriotism were advanced 
as possible causes.~ When it was pointed out that the 
West, however valid its reasons, and however strong its 
support for the war, had neither the votes nor the influence 
1 Reginald Horsman, "Western War Aims, 1811-1812," Indiana Maga-
zine of History, LIII (January, 1957), 1-18. For an excellent survey of 
the historiographical controversy to 1942 see Warren H. Goodman, "The 
Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXVIII (September, 1941 ), 171-87. 
2 H. M. Brackenridge, History of the Late War Between United States 
and Great Britain (Philadelphia, 1844); Charles J. Ingersoll, Historical 
Sketch of the Second War Between the United States and Great Britain 
(Philadelphia, 1845). 
3 Henry Adams, The War of 1812, ed. H. A. DeWeerd (Washington, 
1944); John B. McMaster, History of the People of the United States, 
III (New York, 1892); Richard Hildreth, The History of the United 
States of America from the Adoption of the Federal Constitution to the 
End of the Sixteenth Congress, II and III (New York, 1874); Hermann 
E. von Holst, The Constitutional and Political History of the United 
States, I (Chicago, 1881); James Schouler, History of the United States 
of America Under the Constitution, II (New York, 1882). 
4 D. R. Anderson, "The Insurgents of 1811," American Historical As-
sociation, Annual Report, I ( 1911 ), 167; Howard T. Lewis, "A Re-
Analysis of the Causes of the War of 1812," Americana, VI (1911), 506-
16, 577-85. 
5 Louis M. Hacker, "Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812: A 
Conjecture," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, X (March, 1924), 
365-95; Julius W. Pratt, "Western War Aims in the War of 1812," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XII (June, 1925), 36-50; George 
R. Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi Valley Preceding the 
War of 1812," Journal of Political Economy, XXXIX (August, 1931 ), 
471-505; Reginald Horsman, "Who Were the War Hawks?'' Indiana 
Magazine of History, LX (June, 1964), 121-36; Norman K. Risjord, 
"1812: Conservatives, War-Hawks and the Nation's Honor," William 
and Mary Quarterly, 3d series, XVIII (April, 1961), 196-211; Bernard 
Mayo, Henry Clay, Spokesman of the New West (Boston, 1937); Charles 
M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Nationalist, 1782-1828 (Indianapolis, 1944). 
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to bring about a declaration of war, an effort was made 
to posit an alliance between West and South based on 
complementary imperialistic ambitions and common eco-
nomic depression. 6 
The inevitable result has been the acceptance of all of 
these factors as having played some role in developing 
war sentiment. This is, in effect, a multicausal solution 
which suggests that without the maritime controversy the 
war would not have occurred.7 The most recent study of 
the causes of the War of 1812, Roger Brown's The Repub-
lic in Peril, accepts all of the causes which other historians 
have advanced8 and asserts that these factors were impor-
tant because their very existence threatened the United 
States' republican experiment. The seeming inability of 
the United States to protect its frontiers against Indian 
uprisings, and to protect its economy against the maritime 
depredations of the two European belligerents tended to 
prove the dire predictions of the post-Revolutionary War 
Cassandras who had warned that republican institutions 
could not long endure persistent pressure. The United 
States went to war to protect the reputation of republi-
canism. 
To Brown, the important characteristic of the vote for 
war was not its sectional, but its partisan character. All 
the Federalists voted against war; a preponderant majority 
6 Julius W. Pratt, The Expansionists of 1812 (New York, 1925); 
Margaret K. Latimer, "South Carolina, Protagonist of the War of 1812," 
American Historical Review, LXI (July, 1955), 914-30. 
7 Reginald Horsman, The Causes of the War of 1812 (Philadelphia, 
1962); Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United 
States, 1805-1812 (Berkeley, 1961); A. L. Burt, Great Britain, the United 
States and British North America from the Revolution to the Establish-
ment of Peace After the War of 1812 (New Haven, Conn., 1940). 
8 Brown denies the existence of a definable or identifiable group of 
war hawks, The Republic in Peril (New York, 1964), 44-47. See also 
Roger H. Brown, "The War Hawks of 1812: An Historical Myth," 
Indiana Magazine of History, LX (June, 1964), 137-50. 
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of Republicans voted for it.9 Brown argues that the 
Republicans, determined to show the world that republi-
canism could succeed and that a republican government 
could protect the national interest, brought about a 
declaration of war. To prove his thesis, he examines the 
attitudes and positions of Republican congressmen, ad-
ministration officials, and local Republican leaders. 
While Pennsylvania Republicans were concerned with 
the reputation of republican institutions, concern for the 
welfare and unity of the Republican party was a more 
immediate and pressing consideration. As American policy 
continued to drift, Pennsylvania Republicans feared that 
the administration's failure to take effective action to 
protect American rights might cause the people to seek 
new leadership. They pressed for a declaration of war to 
insure the Republican party's success in the elections of 
1812. 
Republicans believed that the Federalist opposition had 
little faith in republican institutions and that if the repub-
lican experiment were to be successful the Republican 
party must be in power. Events in the four years pre-
ceding the declaration of war indicate a resurgence of 
Federalist strength. The Republicans attributed this to 
the Federalist assertions that the nation's ambiguous 
foreign policy, deteriorating economy, and weak frontiers 
could only be saved by a return of Federalists to power. To 
prevent further growth of Federalist strength, to retain 
power in their hands, and thereby to assure friendly 
direction of the republican experiment, the Republicans 
took the nation to war. Pennsylvania, "The Keystone of 
the Democratic Arch," provided the largest vote in favor 
of war and gave willing and constant support to its 
prosecution, and both nationally and domestically was 
9 Brown, The Republic in Peril, 45. 
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more steadfastly Republican than any other state in the 
Union. None of the studies of the causes of the war gives 
more than passing attention to Pennsylvania, but an 
understanding of the factors which motivated Pennsyl-
vania's representatives to vote for war sheds light on 
Republican attitudes. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Expansion as a 
Cause for War 
In 1890, Henry Adams suggested in his History of the 
United States, that the traditional maritime interpretations 
of the War of 1812 did not adequately explain the causes 
of that conflict. By 1902 the maritime interpretation had 
been sufficiently challenged to enable Woodrow Wilson 
to assert that the grounds for war were singularly uncer-
tain. This uncertainty led students to an intensive, and 
as yet incomplete search for new and different explana-
tions.1 
Aware of the fact that most support for the war came 
from the West and the South, historians attempted to 
ascertain the factors which prompted these areas to favor 
war with Britain. Early explanations of western motives 
stressed expansionist desire for Canada, fear of British 
intrigue among the Indians, and a highly developed sense 
of national honor among settlers on the frontier. Different 
historians, selecting for emphasis various of these factors, 
produced a variety of combinations and explanations for 
the war and a major historiographical controversy devel-
oped concerning them. 2 
The issues in this controversy were clearly drawn, how-
ever, between those who argued that desire for Canada 
Expansion as a Cause for War 7 
was based on land hunger, and those who argued that 
desire for Canada resulted from the westerner's conviction 
that the British incited and supplied the renewed Indian 
uprisings on the frontier. The revival of Richard Hil-
dreth's contention that the conquest of Canada was a 
method of carrying on the war, not a cause of it, further 
complicated the issue.3 
The most detailed study of western causes, Julius W. 
Pratt's The Expansionists of 1812 temporarily settled the 
question of expansionist desire for Canada as a cause 
of the war. This study won general acceptance for 
the contention that British intrigue among the Indians, 
not land hunger, was the primary motive in the West's 
desire for war. Pratt realized that the West did not have 
enough votes or influence to bring about a declaration of 
war. He also had to explain the South's equally strong 
support. He asserted, but never proved satisfactorily, that 
the South wanted Florida as much as the West wanted 
Canada, and for much the same reason: fear of Anglo-
Spanish intrigue among the Indians. He then posited a 
western-southern alliance in which congressmen from the 
two sections agreed to bring on a war through which each 
section could satisfy its ambitions: "There is good evidence 
1 Henry Adams, History of the United States of America During the 
Administrations of Jefferson and Madison (New York, 1889-1891 ), IV, 
340, 307-15, VI, 237-43; Woodrow Wilson, A History of the American 
People (New York, 1902), III, 214. 
2 Howard T. Lewis, "A Re-Analysis of the Causes of the War of 1812," 
Americana, VI ( 1911 ), 506-16, 577-85; D. R. Anderson, "The Insur-
gents of 1811," American Historical Association, Annual Report, I 
(1911), 165-76; Louis M. Hacker, "Western Land Hunger and the War 
of 1812: A Conjecture," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, X (March, 
1924), 365-95; Julius W. Pratt, "Western War Aims in the War of 
1812," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XII (June, 1925), 36-50. 
3 Richard Hildreth, History of the United States of America (New 
York, 1880), VI, 31~. Reginald Horsman, "Western War Aims, 1811-
1812," Indiana Magazine of History, LIII (January, 1957), 16; A. L. 
Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British North America (New 
York, 1961 ), 310. 
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that before the declaration of war, northern and southern 
Republicans came to a definite understanding that the 
acquisition of Canada on the North was to be balanced 
by the acquisition of the Floridas on the South."4 
Most historians who concern themselves with the west-
ern causes of the war include western Pennsylvania as a 
part of the West, but say little about that state's role in the 
drive for war. The question of whether fear of the Indians, 
a drive for Canadian land, or acquiescence in a sectional 
bargain existed in Pennsylvania must be answered if that 
state's support for the war is to be understood. 
Pratt's contention that there was no mention of desire 
to annex Canada in order to add to agricultural acreage 
is valid. Of the newspapers consulted, only two issues 
mention annexation. There were only two items, and 
these were three years apart. In January 1809, the Pitts-
burgh Commonwealth reprinted an article from the Boston 
Centinel which advocated the annexation of Canada in 
order to weaken England and "add to the power and 
revenue of the United States."5 Three years later, at a 
Fourth of July celebration the Commonwealth reported a 
toast "to Canada, may it soon be counted as another star 
in our political hemisphere." This toast was made after 
Madison had sent his war message and war sentiment 
had been greatly aroused. 6 The Commonwealth and other 
Pittsburgh newspapers report twelve other celebrations 
of that Independence Day at none of which were such 
annexationist sentiments expressed. The same is true of 
other reports of Fourth of July celebrations in the Wash-
ington Reporter, the Carlisle Gazette, the Philadelphia 
Aurora, the Pennsylvania Gazette, and the Pennsylvania 
Republican and Dauphin Guardian, both of Harrisburg. 
There is, however, a great deal of evidence to the con-
4 Julius W. Pratt, The Expansionists of 1812 (New York, 1925), 13. 
5 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Jan. 25, 1809. 
6 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, July 17, 1812. 
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trary. Some members of the Pennsylvania congressional 
delegation opposed annexation on the floor of the House, 
and none ever spoke in favor of it. John Smilie, the dean 
of the delegation in terms of age and years of service, 
announced that "we should be justified in carrying [a war] 
into the enemy's territory only in order to bring it to a 
speedy conclusion." William Findley, a representative 
from western Pennsylvania, opposed taking any territory 
"unless it became necessary in our own defence." William 
Milnor, Adam Seybert of Philadelphia, and Joseph Lefever 
all spoke against annexation. 7 
If they mentioned it at all, the newspapers also opposed 
annexation. In a widely reprinted article opposing naval 
expansion, the Aurora argued that a navy is an offensive 
weapon "calculated to extend territory," and asked, "Do 
we want to extend our soil when we already have more 
than we can cultivate?"8 The Federalist Pennsylvania 
Gazette opposed annexation on the grounds that republi-
can governments have no business undertaking a war of 
"plunder and rapine," and warned that any attempt to 
capture Canada would faiP Even after the declaration 
of war it is difficult to find annexationist sentiment. 
In June 1812, the House passed a resolution authorizing 
the president to issue a proclamation assuring the citizens 
of Canada protection of their "lives, property, and reli-
gion" if it should become necessary for the United States 
to invade their territory. The normally united Pennsyl-
vania delegation opposed the measure 10 to 6, with two 
members not voting. In the Senate, where the House 
resolution was defeated, both Pennsylvania senators voted 
against it.10 
7 Annals af Congress, lOth Cong., 2d sess., 1360; 11th Cong., 2d sess., 
1514, 1519; 12th Cong., lst sess., 609, 813. 
s Philadelphia Aurora, Oct. 11, 1811. 
9 Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia), Oct. 1, 1811; Pennsylvania 
Republican (Harrisburg), April 7, 1812. 
10 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., lst sess., 323, 607. 
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Pratt's statement that land hunger could not have been 
a cause for war because there was abundant unsettled 
land awaiting cultivation also proves true for Pennsyl-
vania. There was a great deal of unsettled land available 
in the westernmost counties of the state. Erie, Butler, 
Venango, Warren, and Crawford counties each had a 
population of less than nine thousand and the average was 
less than forty-five hundred.11 Much of this land was in 
the hands of speculators, but it was available to farmers. 
The reports of the state auditor and treasurer show that 
the state sold large amounts of land in the six years pre-
ceding the war. These were sales of relatively small lots, 
usually between $0.80 and $1.00 per acre, and never in 
excess of $1.25 per acre.U 
Expansion was thus unnecessary for Pennsylvania farm-
ers because small farms were profitable and land was 
available. A Pittsburgh traveler marveled at the "great 
farms of 230 acres which produced 11,000 bushels of 
wheat" he had seen on a trip through Ohio and IndianaY 
The average in Warren County was between 100 and 150 
acres, and most farms had less than 100 acres. Warren 
County was sparsely settled and farms were smaller in the 
southern and eastern counties. John Kraus made a yearly 
profit on a 75-acre farm in central Pennsylvania.14 
Pratt's thesis that land hunger was not responsible for 
war sentiment in Pennsylvania is corroborated by a review 
of the situations existing in that state, but similar study 
does not support his contention that preoccupation with 
the Indian danger and suspicion of hostile British support 
of the Indians explain the West's desire for war with 
11 Pennsylvania Senate ]oumal, 1810-1811, appendix I (Harrisburg, 
1834-1837). 
12 Income from the sale of state lands can be found in table II, page 38, 
below. 
13 Cramer's Pittsburgh Almanac (Pittsburgh, 1811 ), 51-52. 
14 John S. Schenck, ed., History of Warren County, Pennsylvania ( Syra-
cuse, 1887), 127-30; John Kraus, account books, 1806-1809. 
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England.15 Some Pennsylvanians expressed fear of the 
Indians, but they did not always connect Indian uprisings 
with British intrigue. Others denied that they felt threat-
ened at all. The Wyoming Massacre of 1788 marked the 
end of serious Indian problems in the state, and the last 
recorded Indian murder in Pennsylvania west of Pitts-
burgh occurred in 1790. Other histories of the state, as 
well as histories of other counties, indicate that there was 
little concern with the Indian menace until the summer 
of 1807.16 
News of the Chesapeake incident produced reports of 
Indian murders, all of which suggested an alliance be-
tween the British and the savages. The Pittsburgh Com-
monwealth, which had earlier supported a toast "to our 
Indian brethren" began to carry reports of Indian depre-
dations, noting murders in Fort Wayne, Detroit, and 
Florida. 
Between the end of July 1807 and the end of January 
1808, the Commonwealth carried more reports of Indian 
incidents than it had in the two previous years. The re-
ports, however, do not blame the British for the incidents. 
The only indication that Benjamin Brown, the editor, 
even considered this possibility was an article reprinted 
from the Philadelphia Aurora calling for the annexation 
of Canada in order to end Indian hostility.U 
Other newspapers, which also increased their coverage 
of Indian affairs after the Chesapeake incident, empha-
sized the connection between the Indians and the Brit-
ish.18 The Carlisle Gazette stated that a traveler from 
15 Pratt, "Western War Aims," 50. 
16Henderson Bausman, History of Beaver County (New York, 1904), 
166-69; Howard M. Jenkins, Pennsylvania, Colonial and Federal (Phila-
delphia, 1903), II, 187; Catherine E. Reiser, Pittsburgh's Commercial 
Development (Harrisburg, 1951), 4. 
17 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Sept. 16, 1807. 
18 Pittsburgh Gazette, Aug. 4, Oct. 13, Dec. 5, 1807; Washington 
Reporter, Aug. 16, Sept. 9, 1807, Jan. 4, 1808; Carlisle Gazette, Aug. 9, 
Aug. 16, 1807; Dauphin Guardian, Sept. 8, Oct. 6, 1807. 
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Detroit reported that the prevailing opinion of the British 
was that there would be war. He accused the British of 
generously supplying and keeping ready about three thou-
sand warriors who would undertake a general massacre 
when war was declared.19 The Guardian warned that the 
first effect of war with Britain would be a savage frontier 
war against Indians supported by the British. The Aurora 
published reports that the British were pouring men and 
arms into Canada. With every increase in the British 
force, there was a proportionate increase in Indian activity 
on both the northern and southern frontiers. The editor, 
William Duane, told his readers that the nation would 
never be free of Indian wars until the British were driven 
from the continent. 20 
However, the evidence refuting Pratt's thesis is strong. 
The number of incidents on the frontier did not increase 
in the summer and fall of 1807, nor did British aid to the 
Indians increase in the period. 21 The heightened interest 
in Indian affairs and the efforts to connect the British with 
the Indian uprisings are more indicative of a rush of anti-
British feeling resulting from the Chesapeake affair than 
of a growing fear of the Indians. 
Although the press became more concerned with the 
Indians, other evidence indicates a continuing lack of fear 
of the Indians. The debates in the state legislature exhibit 
no fear for safety of the state's frontiers. The senate did 
receive one petition from a militia division in the western 
part of the state requesting increased protection from the 
Indians. Neither the petition nor the senate debate men-
tion any British influence among the Indians. The senate 
did pass a bill for the "defence of the northern and western 
19 Carlisle Gazette, Jan. 8, 1808; Dauphin Guardian, Sept. 15, Oct. 20, 
1807; Harrisburg Times, Sept. 28, 1807. 
20 July 1, July 9, 1807. 
21 Reginald Horsman, The Causes of the War of 1812 (Philadelphia, 
1962), 159, 169-71. 
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frontier" by a very narrow margin, but the house did not 
even consider it. 22 In the same session the Pennsylvania 
house denied a petition from the citizens of Erie County 
asking to be given arms to defend themselves against the 
Indians on the grounds that the danger was "remote." 
Again, neither the petition nor the house debate refer to 
an Anglo-Indian alliance. 23 In every session after 1805 the 
Pennsylvania legislature passed resolutions approving the 
conduct of foreign affairs by the national government. 
Every one of these resolutions listed grievances against 
England, but only the resolution passed in December 1812 
mentioned the Indians as a grievance. 24 
In Washington, William Findley was the only represen-
tative from Pennsylvania who mentioned Indian troubles 
during the Tenth Congress. Arguing against postponing 
consideration of a bill to increase the military establish-
ment, he stated that on the northwestern frontier "the 
alarm is considerable and the danger apparent." As proof 
he cited the previously mentioned bill passed by the state 
senate. In this speech he did not try to implicate the 
British.25 
By the end of February 1808, when excitement over 
the Chesapeake incident abated, concern with the Indian 
problem subsided also. From the spring of 1808 until 
the summer of 1811 there were few references to Indian 
hostilities in the Pennsylvania press. Most of these were 
simply reprints from western and southern newspapers. 
As news of the Wabash confederation drifted eastward, 
interest in Indian affairs surpassed the 1807 level by the 
summer of 1811. Republican newspapers made no effort 
to explain the renewed Indian hostility, concentrating 
22 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1807-1808, pp. 231-32, 274. 
23 Pennsylvania House Journal, 1807-1808, pp. 181-82. 
24 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1812-1813, p. 46. 
25 Annals of Congress, lOth Cong., 1st sess., 1521-22. 
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instead on a review of the "friendly," "just," and "honor-
able" Indian policy of Jefferson and Madison. 26 
Federalist newspapers, which devoted more space to 
Indian uprisings, made a distinct effort to blame the 
administration. The Federalist press contended that the 
Indians had not been treated fairly, and that there was 
justification for their hostility. These papers provided 
vivid pictures of the devastation and brutality of Indian 
warfare, suggesting that the situation would worsen if 
the United States declared war against them or against 
Great Britain.27 Neither Republicans nor Federalists tried 
to associate the British with the resurgent Indian uprisings 
during the summer and early fall of 1811. This attitude, 
of course, changed drastically with news of the battle of 
Tippecanoe. 
The Republican press blamed the entire affair on the 
British and echoed the sentiment of the Aurora that there 
could be no security against the savages until the British 
were driven from Canada.28 The Federalist press at-
tempted to explain away the evidence of British aid by 
arguing that British weapons had been planted among the 
Indians by Americans in order to create further excitement 
and agitation against Great Britain. Another explanation 
was that Indian hostilities had been incited by greedy 
land speculators who knew that the Indians would be 
defeated and driven from their land. 29 
William Findley explained that he would vote in favor 
of the increase in the military establishment proposed by 
the foreign relations committee because the situation on 
26 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Aug. 7, 1811; Carlisle Gazette, July 29, 
1811; Washington Reporter, July 23, 1811; Pittsburgh Mercury, July 23, 
1811; Philadelphia Aurora, June 18, June 23, July 22, 1811. 
27 Pittsburgh Gazette, Sept. 29, Oct. 23, Nov. 6, 1811; Pennsylvania 
Gazette (Philadelphia), Sept. 9, Sept. 23, Oct. 17, Nov. 16, 1811. 
28 Philadelphia Aurora, Dec. 14, 1811. 
29 Pittsburgh Gazette, Dec. 19, 1811, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, July 24, 1812; 
Pennsylvania Gazette, Jan. 15, Jan. 22, Feb. 5, July 9, 1812. 
Expansion as a Cause for War IJ 
the frontier demanded it. Admitting that "we have at 
present no such explicit proof [as in 1794] that the Indians 
... are acting as British allies, yet we have as much proof 
as the nature of the case can afford." It should be noted, 
however, that of the six other Pennsylvania representatives 
who spoke in favor of the report, not one supported it on 
similar grounds. Findley said that threats of taking 
Canada were improper. 30 
By the end of 1811 concern with the Indian problem 
again subsided and there were few reports of Indian 
hostility until April 1812. In that month the press began 
to devote considerable space to Indian massacres, the 
coverage growing more complete in May and early June. 
Still, there was no attempt to link the renewal of the Indian 
wars with the British in Canada.31 Evidently, the re-
newed Indian activity was considered a part of the inter-
mittent frontier war rather than the result of British ag-
gression and intrigue.32 
It could be expected that the British would have been 
blamed for the Indian war during this period even if no 
evidence existed to prove it. The fact that they were not 
indicates that the people were more concerned with the 
Indian than with any alleged Anglo-Indian alliance. Even 
the governor of Pennsylvania reflected this attitude. In 
his general orders for the drafting and organization of the 
fourteen thousand militia which the president had ordered 
into federal service, the governor devoted a great deal of 
attention to maritime grievances, but only one sentence 
to the Indian menace.33 
The Washington Reporter, one of the few important 
newspapers between Pittsburgh and the Ohio border, pro-
30 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 499-502. 
31 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, April28, May 19, June 9, June 23, 1812; 
Pittsburgh Gazette, March 20, April 17, June 12, 1812. 
32 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, May 2, May 5, 1812. 
33 Pennsylvania Archives, 2d series, XII, 557. 
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vides a good index to shifting attitudes toward the Indians. 
More than any other Pennsylvania newspaper, it reprinted 
articles reporting Indian incidents from Ohio and Indiana 
newspapers, but it took little cognizance of these events 
in its own columns. The Reporter was a prowar newspaper 
and never missed a chance to list United States grievances 
against England or demand that the United States protect 
its rights, honor, and independence. Every catalog of 
American grievances includes impressment, blockades, the 
orders-in-council, and specific maritime incidents. With 
the exception of a few issues after the Chesapeake affair, 
and again after the battle of Tippecanoe, neither the 
Anglo-Indian alliance nor Indian hostility is included in 
the Reporter's lists from 1806 to June 1812. 
The Cumberland Register followed a similar pattern. 
Archibald Laudon, its editor, published a work entitled 
"A Selection of Some of the Most Interesting Narratives of 
Outrages Committed by the Indians in Their Wars with the 
White People." He advertised it constantly in his paper, 
published portions of it in some of which he accused the 
British of inciting the Indians during the 1790s and carried 
regular dispatches about current Indian attacks. Not once 
in the years 1808 to 1812, did he connect Indian uprisings 
on the frontier with British intrigue or hostility. It seems, 
then, that before the war concern with British intrigue 
among the Indians was not an overriding concern with 
Pennsylvania. 
As soon as the war began, however, stories of past and 
present Indian atrocities became numerous and evidence 
was produced to prove that Indian hostilities had been 
instigated by the British. The Pittsburgh Commonwealth, 
commenting on the savagery with which the Indians 
waged war, insisted that "every man ... well remembers 
that for many months preceding the declaration of war 
our western border had witnessed similar scenes [of de-
struction] and the fact was established that even in peace 
Expansion as a Cause for War I7 
a price was paid for these murders by the British. 
Every schoolboy knows that the encouragement of these 
butcheries was one of the causes instead of being an effect 
of war." It warned that only a victory under the leader-
ship of President Madison could bring peace to the fron-
tier. Those who demanded the election of Clinton in the 
naive belief that the signing of a peace would end the 
atrocities had forgotten the past. Peace on the frontier 
could only be assured by driving the British from Can-
ada.34 
Richard Rush, comptroller general of the United States 
in the early part of the war, spoke strongly to his friend 
Charles J. Ingersoll: "I would not make peace while a 
single vestige of impressment or the Indian question 
remained unsatisfied. . . . What a magnificent provocation 
and justification of war they present! What are the N ookta 
sounds, the Falkland Islands . . . the taxation without 
representation-aye even this-what the three pence a 
pound on tea, all the questions and entanglements about 
limits, ceremonies, navigations, trade, burning ships at 
sea, monopolies and all the other puny causes . . . com-
pared with the naked enormity of these two."35 British 
use of Indian savages, Rush insisted, presented new prob-
lems in America's relationship with England. He felt that 
this was a question which required perfect understanding 
before negotiations were begun: "I mean the employment 
of the Indian force .... My language then would be to 
Britain disavow explicitly this act of your deputies in 
Canada and give us the most absolute guarantee that it 
will never be done in the future." Until such a guarantee 
were received the United States would be forced to con-
34 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Oct. 6, 1812. See also the Philadelphia 
Aurora, Nov. 11, 1812; Carlisle Gazette, Dec. 2, 1812; Washington Re-
porter, Oct. 11, 1812, for similar statements. 
35 Richard Rush to Charles J. Ingersoll, Dec. 20, 1812, Charles J. 
Ingersoll Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Here-
after cited as Ingersoll Papers. 
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tinue the war.36 Correspondents of Jonathan Roberts, 
another representative from Pennsylvania, and the Penn-
sylvania press expressed similar sentiments after the 
declaration of war. 
Another reason for taking Canada was produced after 
hostilities began. Referring to the Henry37 attempts to 
foment civil war in New England, the Carlisle Gazette 
demanded "the severing of Canada from the British em-
pire." The editorial maintained that if Canada were to be 
used as a base for sowing dissention among the states it 
could not be allowed to remain under British rule. In a 
letter complaining of congressional immobility Edward 
Fox told Jonathan Roberts that the Henry affair was "a 
most fortunate discovery," because "the actual fixing of 
interference of the British government must put ours on 
a strong ground." Joseph Burke wrote Roberts concerning 
the Henry affair: "Until within a very few days I would 
not permit myself to believe that there was any danger 
of a war with England ... at this time but I confess that 
my opinion is now verging to the contrary side." Roberts, 
himself, felt the papers Henry mentioned were "ample 
proof of the consummate perfidity and iniquity" of the 
British government.38 The resolutions of the Pennsylvania 
legislature cite the attempt "to kindle dissatisfaction, dis-
36 Rush to Ingersoll, Nov. 15, 1812, Ingersoll Papers. 
37 Henry was alleged to be a British agent sent to New England to 
persuade Federalists to detach the area from the United States. Failing 
to do that he sold his papers to the Republican administration under 
circumstances that are still mysterious. Madison then used the incon-
clusive information bought from Henry to attack the Federalists and 
referred to it in his war message. Henry Adams contended that this 
incident was not significant in the development of war sentiment, but 
the evidence indicates that at least in Pennsylvania, the Henry dis-
closures aroused some indignation. See Adams, History, IV, 179-84. 
38 Carlisle Gazette, March 20, 1812; Philadelphia Aurora, July 2, 1812; 
Dauphin Guardian, Dec. 18, 1810; Edward Fox to Jonathan Roberts, 
March 18, 1812; Joseph Burke to Jonathan Roberts, March 20, 1812; 
Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, March 14, 1812. The Roberts 
correspondence is found in the Jonathan Roberts Papers, Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Hereafter cited as Roberts Papers. 
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cord, rebellion, and civil war" by use of "secret emmisaries 
sent from Canada" as a cause for war. The governor 
also alluded to the "discord sown amongst our people 
by an accredited agent of the British government" in his 
general orders to detached militia.39 Neither the legisla-
ture nor the governor mentioned this incident in their 
prewar pronouncements. 
British intrigue among the Indians or desire to drive the 
British out of Canada for other reasons did not become a 
cause of the war until after it was declared. The Anglo-
Indian connection and British possession of Canada were 
used by the Republicans as political issues to discredit the 
Clintonians in the presidential campaign of 1812, and as 
an excuse for continuing the war after one of the avowed 
cause for declaring it, the orders-in-council, had been 
removed. 
Pratt also suggests that British competition in the fur 
trade played a role in developing prowar sentiment, the 
hope being that with the British expelled from Canada, 
United States interests would gain complete control of the 
fur trade.40 Around the turn of the century Pittsburgh had 
been a major center of the fur trade. Colonel James 
O'Hara was successful in the business, getting most of his 
pelts from the IndiansY At that time complete control 
of the fur trade would have been welcome to the citizens 
of Pittsburgh. One of his western factors told O'Hara 
that he hoped "England might be driven from this 
trade."42 As fur traders moved to more fruitful areas west 
of the Mississippi, Pittsburgh lost its position as a major 
39 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1812-1813, p. 46; Pennsylvania Ar-
chives, 2d series, XII, 557. The most detailed account of the Henry affair 
is in "The Henry-Crillon Affair of 1812" in Samuel Eliot Morison's By 
Land and by Sea (New York, 1954), 265-86. 
40 Pratt, Expansionists of 1812, pp. 27, 188. 
41 Joseph McFerron to Col. James O'Hara, June 20, 1802, Denny-
O'Hara Papers, Western Pennsylvania Historical Society, Pittsburgh. 
Hereafter cited as Denny-O'Hara Papers. 
42 McFerron to O'Hara, Nov. 8, 1800, Denny-O'Hara Papers. 
20 Pennsylvania and the War of 1812 
center of the trade, and by 1810 furs ceased to play an 
important role in the city's economy. Neither Cramer's 
Pittsburgh Almanac, nor the Pittsburgh Directory listed 
fur trade as an important business, and there was no 
mention of it in the press or the speeches of Pennsylvania 
congressmen.43 Evidently, the fur trade was no longer 
important to the state's economy, nor was it a factor in 
determining attitudes towards war. 
Historians studying other sections of the country, or the 
development of American attitudes have also been dis-
satisfied with Pratt's explanation. They account for the 
prominent position Canada held in the correspondence, 
speeches, and newspapers of the day by reviving Hil-
dreth's suggestion that an attack on Canada was to be a 
method of fighting the war, not an object of iU4 Many 
Pennsylvanians who had no desire for more land and no 
fear of the Indians favored an attack on Canada as a tacti-
cal objective. In the available correspondence of the 
period, this theme is more prevalent than any other. 
Soon after the Chesapeake incident, Jesse Higgins wrote 
Jonathan Roberts that if Britain did not disavow the action 
and assure American rights, the United States would have 
to fight. "The principal means of annoyance in our power 
is the seizure of Canada and sequestration of British 
debts."45 Findley's speech opposing an attack on Canada 
concludes that offensive operations are the best way to 
carry on defensive war. The nation had been attacked 
from Canada before, he warned the House, and might 
well be again. If the appropriation for increasing the 
militia and the regular force were not passed the presi-
43 Cramer's Pittsburgh Almanac, 1811, also 1812, 1813, 1814. 
44 Hildreth, History, VI, 313-14; Horsman, Causes of the War of 1812, 
184; Roger H. Brown, The Republic in Peril (New York, 1964), 119; 
Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British North America, 309-
10; Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War (Berkeley, 1961), 426. 
45 Jesse Higgins to Jonathan Roberts, July 19, 1807, Roberts Papers. 
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dent would be unable to use national force to prevent 
invasion. 46 Later in the session Findley returned to the 
same argument. After being asked to explain a vote he 
had cast in 1794 in favor of naval armaments in view of 
his present opposition to naval expansion, Findley told 
the House that in 1794 he had favored expansion of the 
navy and opposed expansion of the army because the most 
likely enemy, France, could only be attacked at sea. Now 
(1810) the situation was reversed. The United States, 
he claimed, was unfit to match the enemy at sea, but could 
inflict great harm on Britain simply by marching its army 
over the Canadian border.H Similarly Senator Andrew 
Gregg wrote William Jones that he opposed war, but that 
if it must come, he considered Britain the enemy because 
it was the first and greatest aggressor and because the 
United States had power to retaliate by attacking Canada 
and harassing Britain's commerce.48 
In the winter and spring of 1812 demands for an attack 
on Canada increased and, after war was declared, they 
became even more insistent. Arguing in favor of the 
report of the foreign relations committee, Jonathan Rob-
erts supported an increase in the regular force because 
he felt an attack on Canada would be effective, and his 
opinion was supported by constituents and friends in 
Pennsylvania. John Connelly, a Republican member of 
the Pennsylvania legislature, wrote that he approved of 
Roberts' opposition to naval expansion because no matter 
how large a navy the United States constructed it would 
never match England's. A large army, on the other hand, 
would be essential if the nation were to attack Great 
Britain in Canada, where it was most vulnerable. James 
46 Annals of Congress, 11th Cong., 2d sess., 1519. 
47 Annals of Congress, 11th Cong., 2d sess., 1528. 
48 Andrew Gregg to William Jones, April 10, 1810, William Jones 
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Hereafter cited 
as Jones Papers. 
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Evans, a member of the Pennsylvania House of Repre-
sentatives, informed Roberts that many legislators saw no 
way to fight the war except by an attack on Canada.49 
Discussing demands for a war against France as well as 
England, William Jones told Roberts that "even if the 
aggravations of the two powers were so equal that a 
feather would turn the scale, practical considerations 
would point to that foe whose commerce contiguity of 
territory and internal resources we can most effectively 
assail." Great Britain qualified on these points.50 
The Philadelphia Aurora summed up the opinion of the 
press when it told its readers that they should not "in-
quire or calculate how many millions the conquest of 
Canada will put into the treasury of the U.S." Rather, 
they should ask "what injury this conquest will do our 
enemy ... and what we may gain by a restoration . . . 
at the conclusion of a peace."51 Richard Rush wrote 
Ingersoll that the capture of Canada was "the path of 
safety, honor, popularity, triumphs." The victory of our 
arms in Canada would greatly retrieve "the honor lost in 
years of docile submission."52 The Pittsburgh Mercury 
announced that "the road to a lasting and honorable peace 
lies through Canada."53 
Defending his party against Federalist attacks that the 
Canadian campaign had turned the war from a defensive 
to an offensive one, Charles J. Ingersoll argued that a good 
offense had always been the best defense, and that the 
fact that we had undertaken offensive operations did not 
49 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 502-506; Connelly to 
Roberts, Feb. 26, 1812, J. Evans to Roberts and Abner Lacock, March ?, 
1812, Roberts Papers; Newman Dorland, "The Second Troop of Phil-
adelphia City Cavalry," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 
XLIX (January, 1925), 182n. 
50 William Jones to Jonathan Roberts, May 27, 1812, Jones Papers. 
51 Philadelphia Aurora, July 8, 1812. 
52 Richard Rush to C. J. Ingersoll, Dec. 20, 1812, Ingersoll Papers. 
53 Pittsburgh Mercury, Jan. 21, 1813. 
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necessarily mean that we were engaged in offensive war. 
The object had not been territorial aggrandizement, but 
tactical and strategic advantage. The attack on Canada 
was the best way to "make our mighty foe sensible of 
American power."54 
While the evidence is not conclusive, it strongly sug-
gests that the portion of Pratt's thesis which deals with 
Canada and the Indians does not apply to Pennsylvania. 
Yet, many Pennsylvanians who would not go to war to 
acquire Canada did believe that if a war had to be fought, 
an attack on Canada promised the best possibility of 
bringing it to a swift and victorious conclusion. 55 
Pratt's second major proposition, that southern desire 
for Florida made possible a prowar alliance between 
southern and western congressmen, has been generally 
repudiated. A close study of Pennsylvania sources sub-
stantiates this repudiation. There is simply no evidence 
that desire for Florida, or acquiescence in a sectional 
bargain in any way prompted Pennsylvania's support for 
the war. During the war there was some sentiment for 
taking Florida to deny Britain a strategically important 
possession, but this was a tactical consideration, not a 
cause of the war.56 There was no mention of Florida in 
connection with war against Britain before the war. 
There was, however, a very real desire for Florida in 
Pennsylvania, but the desire was not a motivation for war. 
Pennsylvania congressmen strongly supported Madison's 
occupation of West Florida in October 1810, and in a 
54 C. J. Ingersoll, Historical Sketch of the Second War Between the 
United States and Great Britain, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1845-1849), II, 
17-18. 
55 See Connelly to Roberts, April 25, May 21, May 26, 1812, Fox to 
Roberts, April 19, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
56 Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British North America, 
306; Horsman, "Western War Aims," 15; Margaret K. Latimer, "South 
Carolina, Protagonist of the War of 1812," American Historical Review, 
LXI (July, 1955), 927. 
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later session of the Eleventh Congress voted in favor of 
legislation authorizing him to take East Florida. 57 Fifteen 
of the state's eighteen congressmen invariably voted with 
the administration. In all, twenty-seven ballots were taken 
on the Florida question in a secret session, and on each 
one the delegation split 15-3, with Milnor, Jenkins, and 
Heister (the last two were the only Federalists in the 
delegation) always voting with the minority. 58 When 
this debate was made public the Republican press in 
Pennsylvania unanimously approved the decision of Con-
gress and the votes of the state's Republican representa-
tives. This strong support for occupation and eventual 
annexation of the Spanish possession only reflects loyalty 
to a cherished Republican dream for possession of the 
Floridas and cannot be produced as evidence as a cause 
for the war. It was but another effort to take Florida 
which occurred concurrently with other factors which 
were bringing on war. 59 
Briefly, then, it can be stated that Pratt's thesis does not 
apply to Pennsylvania because neither desire for Canada 
or Florida nor fear of the Indians prompted Pennsylvania's 
support for the war. 
57 Annals of Congress, 11th Cong., 3d sess., 369-70, 1117. 
58 The House debate can be found in the Annals of Congress, 11th 
Cong., 3d sess., 1117-47. 
59 Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British North America, 
306-10; Isaac Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813 (Baltimore, 
1918 ). 
CHAPTER TWO 
Economic Depression as 
a Cause for War 
Julius Pratt's analysis of the factors which prompted the 
West and the South to support the War of 1812 left so 
many questions unanswered and created so many new 
problems that new approaches had to be found. The 
revisionist interpretation concentrated more on economic 
than political factors. 
George R. Taylor broke new ground in two articles 
describing economic conditions on the frontier. He con-
cluded that "western agriculture suffered . . . a severe 
economic depression in the years just before the war, 
and this depression was an important factor in determin-
ing the support which the frontier gave first to the 
embargo and nonintercourse, and finally to war."1 Al-
though he draws very little of his evidence from Pennsyl-
vania sources, he includes the western part of the state 
in his frontier. 2 
Taking her cue from Taylor, Margaret K. Latimer 
studied economic conditions in South Carolina and con-
cluded that war sentiment in that state resulted from a 
disastrous depression in the price of cotton which the 
planters blamed on Britain's commercial restrictions. She 
strongly implied that her findings could be applied to the 
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whole cotton South and further intimated that it was not 
a political alliance, but the common bond of economic 
disaster that united western and southern congressmen 
behind the administration's foreign policy and drove 
Madison to demand war.3 
This economic interpretation has received better treat-
ment from historians than Pratt's theories. Two of the 
most reputable histories of Pennsylvania uncritically ac-
cept this economic analysis and apply it to the entire 
state.4 However, close study of economic conditions in 
Pennsylvania reveals that the state, including the western 
counties, did not suffer a depression between 1808 and 
1812. On the contrary, most indications are that the 
period was one of increasing prosperity, thus Pennsyl-
vania's support of the war cannot be attributed to eco-
nomic depression. 
In his Early Western Pennsylvania Politics Russell 
Ferguson cites antiembargo articles and editorials from 
the Pittsburgh Gazette to prove that the prices dropped 
and economic conditions reached depression levels. The 
Gazette, however, was a Federalist newspaper and its 
editor, John Scull, might well have had partisan reasons 
for opposing the embargo. 
In the spring of 1807 hemp sold for six dollars per 
hundredweight. After the passage of the embargo the 
price rose to seven dollars per hundredweight. A variety 
1 George R. Taylor, "Prices in the Mississippi Valley Preceding the 
War of 1812," Journal of Economic and Business History, III ( 1930-
1931), 471. 
2 George R. Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi Valley 
Preceding the War of 1812," Journal of Political Economy, XXXIX 
(August, 1931), 475, 481. 
3 Margaret K. Latimer, "South Carolina, Protagonist of the War of 
1812," American Historical Review, LXI (July, 1955), 914-30. 
4 Russell J. Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics (Pittsburgh, 
1938), 202-203; Sanford W. Higginbotham, The Keystone of the Demo-
cratic Arch: Pennsylvania Politics 1800-1816 (Harrisburg, 1952), 258. 
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of factors, from normal seasonal swings to changes in 
demand, can account for this change, but the price rise 
indicates that hemp cultivators in western Pennsylvania 
were not adversely affected by the embargo. Cursory 
glances at the price of hemp from the passage of the 
embargo to the declaration of war show that it remained 
high throughout the period and rose sharply during the 
war. 5 Other farm staples show a similar price stability. 
Barley sold at fifty-three cents per bushel throughout 
1800, 1807, 1808, fell to forty-seven cents per bushel in 
September 1808, and remained at that price until April 
1809.6 After that date there are no quotations of prices, 
but the Pittsburgh Point brewery advertised in local 
papers that it would pay high prices for barley. 7 While 
the price of barley did drop after passage of the embargo, 
it was still a marketable product. Furthermore, there is 
no indication that the embargo can be blamed for the 
declining price. Barley was not a major export crop and 
could only be indirectly affected by the vicissitudes of 
American trade. Timothy Pitkin does not mention barley 
as an export item in his statistical compendium. 8 The 10 
percent decline in the price of Pennsylvania barley is 
slight compared with the price declines in the Mississippi 
Valley, and did not cause a depression for barley growers. 
Rye sold for nearly forty-five cents per bushel both 
before and after the embargo, and remained at that price 
until June 1812 when it reached fifty cents. It remained 
5 Pittsburgh Gazette, April 14-28, 1807, Dec. 7, 1808-April 12, 1809. 
For other quotations of the price of hemp, see Pittsburgh Commonwealth, 
June 18, 1807, Jan. 23, 1808, July 13, 1810, Jan. 21, Jan. 28, 1813; 
Washington Reporter, July 9, 1807, Jan. 5, 1810, Feb. 17, 1813. 
6 Pittsburgh Gazette, Aug. 26-Nov. 4, 1806, Aug. 18-Nov. 17, 1808, 
Jan. 12-April12, 1808. Compare with Sept. 14, 1808-March 22, 1809. 
7 Ibid., Dec. 20, 1810, Nov. 23, 1811; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, 
Jan. 21, 1812, for example. 
8 Timothy Pitkin, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United 
States of America (New Haven, 1835). 
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at fifty cents for most of the war period. There were, of 
course, fluctuations, but these were seasonal changes and 
show no relationship to political events. In fact the rise 
to fifty cents per bushel so soon after the passage of the 
ninety-day embargo in April 1812 seems to indicate that 
the status of America's commerce did not have a detri-
mental effect on the price of rye. 9 This figure must be 
used with caution, however, because rye prices are not 
cited regularly before 1812, and there are not enough 
figures to establish a definitive price schedule. 
Prices for shelled corn and wheat followed a similar 
pattern. Corn, which sold for forty-two cents in the sum-
mer and fall of 1807, remained at that price after the 
embargo until the spring of 1812 when it rose to forty-
five cents. By summer it sold for fifty cents per bushel.10 
Again, there is no relationship between the price of corn 
and the passage of commercial legislation except that 
significant price rises followed passage of the ninety-day 
embargo and the declaration of war. 
Wheat fluctuated from seventy to seventy-five cents 
per bushel through the summer of 1807 to May 1811 
when it dropped to a low of sixty-seven cents. The price 
remained depressed until June of 1812 when it rose to 
seventy-five cents and after the war, it rose to one dollar 
per bushel.U 
The prices of staples in western Pennsylvania remained 
high because there was an adequate domestic market 
9 Pittsburgh Gazette, Sept. 9, 1807, Jan. 3, 1808, March 16, 1810, Jan. 
24-June 5, 1812; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, June 16, 1807, Jan. 24. 
1808, May 16, 1810, June 15-0ct. 6, 1812. 
10 Pittsburgh Gazette, Aug. 14, Nov. 11, 1807, Feb. 3, 1808, March 16, 
1809, Jan. 24-March 13, March 20-June 5, Sept. 11-Nov. 4, 1812; Pitts-
burgh Commonwealth, June 12-Aug. 18, Sept. 1-Nov. 4, 1812. 
11 Pittsburgh Gazette, Aug. 14, 1807, Nov. 11, 1807, Jan. 23, 1808, 
Oct. 19, 1810, Feb. 1, Feb. 8, Feb. 15, 1811, Jan. 24-June 5, June 12-
July 31, Aug. 8-0ct. 2, 1812; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Sept. 7, Nov. 4, 
1807, Feb. 11, 1808, July 15, 1811-June 9, Sept. 1-0ct. 6, 1812. 
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for themP What could not be sold in Pittsburgh could 
be easily disposed of in Ohio, Kentucky, and TennesseeY 
The Pittsburgh area also served as an entrepot for much 
trade with the upper Mississippi Valley.H Obviously, the 
farmers of western Pennsylvania were not adversely 
affected by the commercial legislation of Jefferson and 
Madison. 
The same is true of the rest of the state. An index of 
wholesale commodity prices in Philadelphia which was 
based on a study of twenty commodities provides in-
teresting figures. The index fluctuated from a high of 125 
in January 1807 to a low of 115 in May, June, and July 
of that year, reaching 120 in the two months preceding 
the embargo. Wholesale commodity prices declined pre-
cipitously in the first half of 1808 reaching a low of 103 
in August. They began to rise the same month and con-
tinued rising to a high of 142 in February 1811. The 
index remains relatively high until after the declaration 
of war, when it begins to soar, reaching 186 in December 
of 1813 and 200 a year later.15 Other statistical studies 
substantiate these figures. 16 Stock market prices quoted 
in Paulson's American Daily Advertiser show surprising 
stability (see table I). There were, of course, minor 
fluctuations, but these are in no way related to political 
or international events connected with the administra-
12 Cramer's Pittsburgh Almanac, 1809, pp. 34-38, 1810, pp. 52-58; 
Erasmus Wilson, Standard History of Pittsburgh (Chicago, 1898), 148; 
J. M. Riddle, Pittsburgh Directory (Pittsburgh, 1815), 140. 
13 Wilson, Pittsburgh, 152-59. 
14 See Denny-O'Hara account book, Jan. 1809, May 1810, Feb. 1811; 
O'Hara to Reed, July 16, 1810; O'Hara to McFerron, Jan. 26, 1811, 
Denny-O'Hara Papers; Neville Craig to Isaac Craig, April14, 1809, May 
6, 1811, April 29, 1812, Isaac Craig Papers, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh. 
15 Arthur H. Cole, Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United States 
1700-1861 (Cambridge, 1938 ), 140-41. 
16 Anne Bezanson, Robert Gray, and Miriam Hussey, Wholesale Prices in 
Philadelphia 1784-1861 (Philadelphia, 1936), 350, 354; Pitkin, Statistical 
View, 53-54, 119-20, 125-26. 
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<! ;:1 0 Cl ....... ....... 
U.S. Gov. 6% Certificates lOB~ 102~~ 102 lOU 103 
U.S. Gov. 3% Certificates 64~~ 65 65 66 66 
U.S. Gov. 8% Certificates NQ NQ NQ NQ NQ 
Bank of the United States 126 127~~ 825§ 127 129 
Bank of Pennsylvania 142 142 142 141 141 
Bank of North America 149 147 147 150 150 
Bank of Philadelphia 133 NQ 129}~ 133~~ 134 
Water Loan 104 104 NQ 104 104 
Schuylkill Bridge 75 72* 72 73 74 
Delaware Bridge PAR PAR PAR PAR PAR 
Lancaster Turnpike 86 87* 83~~ 80 82 
0 0 0 
r-1 0 r-1 0 r-1 
00 r-1 00 r-1 00 
r-1 00 r-1 00 r-1 r-1 r-1 
0 cO r-: r-1 
r-1 r-1 ll':l r-1 
Security d 13 .g tl <:.) 0.. CD o:l <! 0 Cl ....... ....... 
U.S. Gov. 6% Certificates 104 103~~ 103~~ 104 104 
U.S. Gov. 3% Certificates 67 65* 64~~ 65 66 
U.S. Gov. 8% Certificates NQ NQ NQ NQ NQ 
Bank of the United States 131 115 111 113 120 
Bank of Pennsylvania 142 140 140 140}~ 140 
Bank of North America 150 146 146 146 149 
Bank of Philadelphia 136 137 133 132 135* 
Water Loan 105 104 104 105 104 
Schuylkill Bridge 75 75 75 75 75 
Delaware Bridge PAR PAR PAR PAR PAR 
Lancaster Turnpike 85 87 87 88 90 
t Listed "uncertain" 
§ This figure is correctly transcribed. It is obviously a misprint. 
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tion's efforts at economic coercion. There are some indica-
tions that the volume of business done on the Philadelphia 
exchange varied with political events, but this did not 
affect the prices of stocksP These figures show that while 
there was a sharp decline in the price of the most com-
mon commodities sold in Philadelphia immediately after 
the enactment of the embargo legislation, the economy 
adjusted quickly, reached or surpassed preembargo levels 
within a year, and did not react adversely to subsequent 
commercial restrictions. 
Less systematic, but no less accurate information, bears 
out this contention. Summarizing the information con-
tained in his many charts, Pitkin asserts that prices for the 
most important products of the Middle Atlantic states 
actually increased after the embargo. Using Pitkin's 
figures and many that have come to light since, Norman 
Risjord shows that the value of these products nearly 
doubled in 1810 and 1811.18 
The account books in the Denny-O'Hara papers show 
that the volume of business grew constantly. From the 
fall of 1807 to the outbreak of the war the number of 
sales and the variety of products sold increased steadily. 
Particularly interesting is the increasing volume in such 
items as cloth, gloves, stockings, ladies' gloves, silk, silk 
ribbons, and buttons. This would imply that the people 
in the Pittsburgh area had the money with which to buy 
these items which, at the time, were considered luxury 
items. The constantly rising volume of wood, nails, tools, 
and farm implements indicates that there was a growing 
amount of building and improvement. At the same time, 
17 For comments on the business done on the exchange, see Vaux to 
Jonathan Thompson, Oct. 15, 18ll, Thompson Collection, Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania; John Cox to Vaux, Aug. 28, 18ll, Vaux Papers, 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
18 Pitkin, Statistical View, 95, 105, ll9-20, 125-26, 128-31. Norman 
K. Risjord, "1812: Conservatives, War-Hawks and the Nation's Honor," 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3d series, XVIII (April, 1961), 204. 
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prices remained relatively stable. Three pairs of plain 
gloves cost $3.37Yf on April 8, 1810; one pair of gloves 
was sold for $1.15 in January 1814. On July 7, 1810, one 
scrubbing bucket and one scrubbing brush cost $1.81. 
The price was the same in February 1813. A scrubbing 
brush alone was $0.50 in April 1810; $0.52 in May 1814. 
The price of cloth varies from a low of $0.87Yf for a 
quarter yard in April 1810, to a high of $1.27 a quarter 
yard in June 1811. But the entries in the account books 
do not indicate the type of cloth involved in these trans-
actions, and the difference in prices probably indicates a 
difference in quality rather than higher prices for cloth. 
For example, the account of Peter Colt carries a sale of a 
quarter yard of cloth at $0.91 on April2, 1810, and a sale 
of one yard at $4.22 on April13, 1810. Whiskey remained 
at a steady $0.40 per gallon from 1807 to 1813. 
The account books show that most transactions were 
cash and that all accounts were usually paid in full. The 
managers made some loans to cover purchases, but these 
were small loans to established customers and were 
always paid promptly.19 The Daybook of Beeson's Store 
in Pittsburgh also indicates a lively and profitable business. 
The very fact that it opened and prospered after the 
passage of the embargo is a strong indication that eco-
nomic conditions were generally good.20 Another general 
store prospered in Pittsburgh, but complete records are 
not available before 1813. It is known that it was in 
operation in 1808 and there is no reason to doubt that it 
was prosperous before the war. 21 
The newspapers of western Pennsylvania carry numer-
ous advertisements of new stores opening and soliciting 
19 Denny-O'Hara account book, 1807 to 1812, Denny-O'Hara Papers. 
20 Daybook of Beeson's Store, Armour Collections, Western Penn-
sylvania Historical Society. 
21 Dunbar Furnace Daybook, Armour Collection, Western Pennsylvania 
Historical Society. 
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business. All promise to pay high prices and to sell at 
reasonable rates. In 1811 and 1812 many of these adver-
tisements state that the stores would sell only goods of 
domestic manufactures thereby "satisfying the wishes of 
patriots" and "encouraging such manufactories by pro-
viding an outlet for their goods." The many notices of 
the opening of new iron foundries, nail factories, cotton 
mills, fulling and carding mills show that domestic manu-
facturing did increase after 1810.22 The number of cotton 
spindles rose steadily from 160 in 1806 to 294 in 1810 
and 822 in 1814.23 
Cramer's Pittsburgh Almanac announced in 1807 that 
"the town is growing rapidly and prospering greatly," as 
can be seen in the erection of factories. "[It] has an 
extensive glass factory ... a factory of cotton ... an air 
furnace ... several nail factories, two extensive breweries 
whose beer and porter is equal to that so much celebrated 
in London." Copper and tin factories, two rope walks, a 
paper factory and the first steam grist mill in the country 
would soon be added to the area's growing industrial 
base. 24 The next year Cramer promised that "we will 
see all heavy articles manufactured among ourselves. . . . 
There is at least $20,000 worth of hardware sold out of 
our stores which ought to be made on the spot." Other 
signs of growth to which he pointed with pride were 
building statistics. These facts, indicate a rather steady 
rate of economic development which could not occur 
during a period of depression. A similar conclusion can 
be reached from figures describing the economic condi-
tions in central and eastern Pennsylvania. 
22 See Washington Reporter, July 11, Sept. 14, Nov. 5, Nov. 12, Dec. 
10, 1811, Jan. 27, 1812; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Feb. 7, Feb. 28, 
March 7, April 21, June 16, July 14, 1811, Feb. 15, 1812. 
23 J. N. Boucher, A Century and a Half of Pittsburgh and Her People 
(New York, 1908). 
24 Cramer's Pittsburgh Almanac, 1808, p. 57. 
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John Kraus was a typical farmer in central Pennsylvania 
who left some revealing account books. His gross income 
rose from $1,441.80 in 1806 to $1,705.08 in 1809. The 
increase of $137.00 from 1807 to 1808 is the greatest 
annual increment. Some of the details of this account are 
very informative. In 1806 Kraus earned $88.14 for market-
ing grain. In 1807 sale of grain earned $94.17, rising to 
$99.26 in 1808 and $103.04 in 1809. The account books 
do not tell how much or what kind of grain was sold, but 
the figures show that there was a profitable market. 
Kraus also earned money by carding wool and selling 
cotton and wool and yarn, with an annual increase in 
profit. A sign of his prosperity is the fact that he borrowed 
sums of money every year except 1807, generally using 
the money for improvements or equipment. In 1809 he 
bought an additional 15 acres increasing the size of his 
farm from 75 to 90 acres. 25 
Figures found in county histories further strengthen the 
impression of economic prosperity. Between 1800 and 
1810 the area of cleared land in Somerset County grew 
from 27,756 to 48,874 acres. The number of cabins in-
creased from 836 to 901, while the number of houses 
grew from 413 to 499. There was a marked increase in 
the number of gristmills, sawmills, and fulling and carding 
mills, as well as an increase in the amount of livestock.26 
Figures for Bradford County indicate similar conditions. 27 
In Delaware County in eastern Pennsylvania farmers had 
many incentives "to improve their lands and thereby 
increase their products" in the prewar period. "The people 
[of our county] were in a prosperous condition." Farmers 
found ready markets for their crops, and "many new mills 
25 The account book for 1809 is published in the Perkiomen Region, 
XII (April1934), 84-88. 
26 William H. Koontz, History of Bradford and Somerset Counties, 
Pennsylvania, 3 vols. (New York, 1906), II, 176-78. 
27 Ibid., 184-89. 
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were established and profited greatly by ... the demands 
of the citizens in Philadelphia and other places."28 Other 
county histories provide similar examples of prosperity 
for farmers. 29 The standard history of Philadelphia com-
ments that "everywhere in Philadelphia the germs of great 
industrial enterprise were taking root. . . . Philadelphia 
was becoming an industrial and commercial metropolis."30 
Reporting on his visit to Philadelphia in 1806 John Melish 
said he was impressed with the importance of manu-
facturing in the city and its overall prosperous appear-
ance. When he returned in 1811 he was impressed by the 
rapid progress the city had made. "Many new important 
manufactures had been established and flourished in an 
eminent degree."31 In 1811 he reported from Pittsburgh 
that manufactures were as well established as in the east-
ern parts of the state. He estimated the manufactures of 
Pittsburgh at more than $1 million annually. This, he 
calculated, resulted in "a capital accumulation of $700,000 
annually to be invested [in] further expansion of manu-
facturing."32 The correspondence of Matthew Carey, noted 
Philadelphia bookseller, contained many complaints that 
"the sale of books is so bad we can scarcely muster as much 
28 George Smith, History of Delaware County, Pennsylvania (Phila-
delphia, 1862), 351-53. 
29 See, for example, I. H. M'Cauley, Historical Sketch of Franklin 
County, Pennsylvania (Chambersburg, 1878); Samuel E. Bates, History 
of Erie County (Chicago, 1884); Joseph Bausman, History of Beaver 
County, Pennsylvania (New York, 1904); Alfred Creigh, History of 
Washington County (Harrisburg, 1871); William H. Egle, History of the 
Counties of Dauphin and Lebanon in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
(Philadelphia, 1883). 
30 John Scharf and Thomas Westcott, History of Philadelphia, 3 vols. 
(Philadelphia, 1884), I, 510-36. 
31 John Melish, Travels Through the United States of North America 
in the Years 1806 and 1807, and 1809, 1810, and 1811, 2 vols. (Phila-
delphia, 1815), I, 153, II, 3. 
32 Ibid., II, 55-57. Alexander and Phillips to Carey, Aug. 9, 1808, 
Lea and Febiger Collection, Pennsylvania Historical Society. See also 
Carey's account books in the same collection. 
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money as will pay our paperman." But the account books 
indicate a different situation. Each year Matthew Carey 
published an increasing number of books and pamphlets 
which he sold all over the country, and each year he made 
substantial profits. 
The economic posture and activity of the state govern-
ment and the comments of political leaders provide more 
evidence which deny depression. Every year from 1805 
to 1814 the state had a handsome surplus (see table II). 
During this decade expenditures were rising annually, 
and the surplus indicates that the state's income was 
rising more rapidly than its expenditures. By far the 
largest source of income was from sale of lands, not only 
indicating that land was available, but that it was desir-
able. 
The messages of the governors also paint pictures of 
prosperity. In December 1805 McKean informed the leg-
islature that "the prosperity of Pennsylvania conspicuously 
displays the industry ... of her citizens and surpasses the 
most ardent expectations" of the government and the 
people. The following year, he repeated this sentiment 
in his message. The legislature expressed gratification at 
the image of prosperity which the governor had repre-
sented, taking it as "proof . . . of the policies of the 
government . . . and the benefits of republican institu-
tions." The years after 1808 were also prosperous ones 
for the state.33 In his first annual message the newly 
elected governor, Simon Snyder, congratulated the state 
on its prosperity. Remarking favorably on the increase 
in construction, the large increase in cleared acreage, and 
the progress being made in bridge and turnpike con-
struction, he placed particular emphasis on the develop-
ment of manufactures. 
33 Higginbotham, Keystone, 220. 
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TABLE II-State Income and Expenditure, 1805-1812 
Year 
1805 
1806 
1807 
1808 
1809 
1810 
1811 
1812 
Year 
1805 
1806 
1807 
1808 
1809 
1810 
1811 
1812 
Year 
1805 
1806 
1807 
1808 
1809 
1810 
1811 
1812 
Receipts 
369,522.61 
380,549.49 
327,367.17 
341,735.95 
594,190.05 
636,015.18 
449,935.15 
498,959.75 
Expenditure 
229,582.30 
309,826.01 
236,071.94 
295,495.39 
312,139.95 
594,389.78 
389,889.22 
308,960.74 
MAJOR SOURCES OF INCOME 
Land Sales Tavern Licenses 
63,712.46 21,003.60 
66,140.02 21,645.72 
47,243.92 15,118.28 
40,009.26 
318,129.49 
93,644.42 29,373.49 
137,235.82 29,515.46 
125,125.28 26,417.76 
MAJOR EXPENDITURES 
Surplus 
139,940.31 
70,723.48 
91,295.23 
46,239.56 
282,050.10 
41,625.40 
60,045.93 
189,998.91 
Duties on Sales 
at Auction 
18,349.21 
26,689.24 
17,602.62 
29,882.64 
33,635.22 
53,706.67 
54,045.45 
55.713.91° 
Government Militia, Arms, Special 
Expenses and Ordnance Appropriationsi 
141,066.62 
140,530.34 
152,816.59 
13,348.74 
14,497.75 
7,966.39 
14,000.00 
124,401.36 
18,483.46 
Figures are not available for this year 
149,282.02 11,883.60 82,544.15 
130,774.15 8,916.62t 
155,196.26 7,300.21 t 
162,646.32 10,223.84t 
164,171.21 
71,229.26 
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Our mills and furnaces are greatly multiplied; new 
beds of ore have been discovered, and the industry 
and enterprise of our citizens are turning them to the 
most useful purposes. Many new and highly valuable 
manufactories have been established, and we now 
make in Pennsylvania, various articles of domestic 
use for which, two years since, we were wholly de-
pendent upon foreign nations. 
We have lately had established in Philadelphia 
large shot manufactories; floor-cloth manufactories; 
and a queensware pottery, upon an extensive scale. 
These are all in successful operation, independent of 
immense quantities of cotton and wool, flax and 
hemp, leather and iron, which are annually manu-
factured in our state.34 
In his next message, Snyder informed the legislature 
that the state "continued to prosper" despite the oppres-
sive orders of Great Britain and France and the com-
mercial restrictions of the federal government. He sug-
gested to the legislature that our dependence on Great 
Britain for manufactured goods lay at the root of the 
nation's problems and proposed that the legislature pass 
laws to encourage domestic manufactures. Every opening 
message included similar statements congratulating the 
34 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th series, IV, 677. 
NOTES FOR TABLE II 
0 This surplus was pledged for building ships to be turned over to 
the national government. 
f Expenditures followed by this sign are for militia exclusively. 
i The special appropriation of 1809 was "for purchase of stock." 
There is no indication of what stock. The special appropriation for 
1811 is for "improvements and purchase of stock." The special appro-
priation for 1812 is divided as follows: $38,461.00 for improvements 
and $32,768.26 for "expenses consequent to the declaration of war." 
(These figures are compiled from the annual reports of the state treasurer 
and state auditor which can be found as appendixes to the Senate journal 
for the appropriate year.) 
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state on its prosperity, and the care the legislature had 
taken to foster manufacturing. 35 
In letters to his brother, Matthew, Jonathan Roberts, 
a member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 
often expressed satisfaction at the state's economic growth 
and surprise that the commercial legislation passed by 
Congress did not hinder it. His later letters indicate that 
he believed the embargo had helped by forcing the United 
States to build up its productive capacity. 36 Thomas 
Rogers told Roberts that in spite of their defeat in the 
congressional elections, Federalist farmers were content 
because of the high price of wheat. 37 William Findley 
received information from Manuel Eyre expressing satis-
faction at his own and his friends' prosperity. He hoped 
that something could be done for the commercial interests 
so they could share in the prosperity. 38 On the eve of the 
war Stephen Girard wrote to one of his captains, "New 
manufactures are establishing daily and making great 
progress." If the trend continues "there will be little 
demand for foreign merchandise."39 
The figures of manufacturing and internal improve-
ment companies chartered by the state are another indi-
cation that money was available and that people were 
willing to invest their capital in commercial enterprises 
(see table III) . 
All of these facts indicate that Pennsylvania, unlike the 
West and South, did not suffer an economic depression 
35 Pennsylvania House Journal, 16th sess., 1805-1806, pp. 14-15, 17th 
sess., 1806-1807, p. 18, 19th sess., 1808-1809, pp. 23-24; Pennsylvania 
Archives, 4th series, IV, 671-73. 
36 Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, March 7, May 19, 1808, Jan. 
14, 1810, July 6, 1811, Roberts Papers. 
37 Rogers to Jonathan Roberts, Oct. 1, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
38 Eyre to Findley, Jan. 12, 1812, Gallatin Papers, New York Historical 
Society. 
39 Stephen Girard's Letter Book #13, Letter #81, Stephen Girard 
Papers, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia. 
Economic Depression as a Cause for War 4I 
TABLE III-Commercial Charters Granted by Pennsylvania, 
1805-1812 
No. of No. of No. of 
Companies Shares Shares No. of 
Year Chartered Authorized Sold Buyers 
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS COMPANIES 
1805 2 900 805 140 
1806 1 600 600 54 
1807 1 700 613 182 
1808 7 4,100 3,997 1,502 
1809 1 250 201 47 
1810 3 2,000 1,274 290 
1811 11 6,000 5,768 1,985 
1812 6 3,100 3,093~ 644 
MANUFACTURING COMPANIES 
1807 2 500 500 14 
1808 4 800 800 11 
1809 9 1,750 1,750 37 
1810 11 1,600 1,600 28 
1811 14 2,100 2,100 31 
1812 29 3,400 3,400 47 
In most cases buyers bought two or three shares. Twenty shares is 
the other most common figure. In one case there was a buyer who bought 
seventy-one shares, another one bought forty shares; these were the two 
largest single blocks sold. In every case in which an internal improve-
ment company did not sell the number of shares it was authorized to sell, 
the state bought the unsold number at par value. (Figures compiled 
from Pennsylvania Archives, 9th series, IV, V, VI.) 
in the period following the embargo. However valid the 
Taylor-Latimer hypothesis may be for the Mississippi 
Valley and the South, it does not explain western Penn-
sylvania's support for the war. The application of this 
hypothesis to the entire state is quite unwarranted. 
Most of the West's economic problems resulted from 
certain peculiar characteristics of its economy, and as 
Taylor himself states, "the bubble of 1805 would soon 
have burst ... even without the embargo and non-inter-
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course" from the "underlying weaknesses in the immediate 
situation."40 
The economy of the Mississippi Valley was not at all 
integrated. The area could not possibly consume all the 
agricultural goods it produced; it could not manufacture 
the most essential tools or other finished goods its farmers 
needed. It depended almost entirely on foreign markets 
to dispose of its own production and had to import virtu-
ally all of its manufactured goods. This, as Taylor shows, 
made the area prey to every shift in the foreign policy 
of either belligerent, or of the national government. Since 
the only reasonable port of exit was New Orleans, it gave 
dealers there a stranglehold on the entire valley's economy 
which they used with great advantage to themselves, 
especially when temporary, local conditions created a 
glut on the market. The South had to contend with all 
of these problems, as well as those created by the one-crop 
nature of its agriculture. 
Pennsylvania farmers did not have to contend with any 
of these problems. Virtually no part of western Pennsyl-
vania's prosperity depended on foreign commerce. The 
rapid progress of manufacturing in that state created 
local centers of industry which consumed virtually all the 
locally produced agricultural goods and manufactured 
not only the basic necessities, but even some of the lux-
uries. Farmers in western Pennsylvania found a ready 
outlet for their goods in Pittsburgh. In 1815, Pittsburgh 
breweries alone consumed from twenty to thirty thousand 
bushels of grain. From the steady increase in the number 
of gristmills, it can be assumed that production of grain 
and meal also increased. Cramer's Pittsburgh Almanac 
states that "much whiskey was produced" providing an-
other outlet for Pennsylvania farmers. Bacon and ham 
40 Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent," Journal of Political Economy (August, 
1931), 474. 
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were also produced in "large quantities." This would 
indicate that there was significant hog production, pro-
viding yet another outlet for grains. In 1810 Pittsburgh 
had two glass factories, two cotton mills, a button factory, 
an iron grinding mill, and forty-four weaving looms.41 
These factories produced ahnost all the manufactured 
goods needed in the area, and shipped large quantities of 
manufactured goods to Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. 
Wilson estimated that in addition to the $1 million profit 
which Pittsburgh's manufacturing enterprises netted, trans-
portation enterprises and its location as the gateway to 
the northwest produced another $1 million.42 Trade with 
the upper Mississippi Valley was another lucrative source 
of income. 
What was true of Pittsburgh, was even more true of 
Philadelphia. Victor Clark places Philadelphia second 
only to New York in industrial development in 1810. 
Balthasar Meyer states that Philadelphia and Baltimore 
provided an accessible domestic market for all the agri-
cultural staples produced north of the Potomac and east 
of the Appalachians.43 
The manufacturing census of 1810 showed Pennsyl-
vania leading the Union in the quantity and diversity of 
industrial products, with the heaviest concentration in 
the Philadelphia area. 44 That census estimates the state's 
production at $33,691,676-slightly more than 19 percent 
of the national total. At the same time, commercial 
interests in the state were declining slowly. In 1789 
Pennsylvania provided 20 percent of the nation's tonnage 
41 Cramer's Pittsburgh Almanac, 1809, pp. 34-38; 1810, pp. 52-58; 
Wilson, Pittsburgh, 148; Riddle, Pittsburgh Directory, 140; Catherine 
Reiser, Pittsburgh's Commercial Development (Harrisburg, 1951), 11-16. 
42 Wilson, Pittsburgh, 152-59. 
43 Victor Clark, History of Manufacturers in the United States 1807-
1860 (Washington, 1916), 428; Balthasar Meyer, History of Transporta-
tion (Washington, 1917), 572. 
44 American State Papers: Finance, II, 746-63. 
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in foreign trade; by 1816, the figure had dropped to less 
than 10 percent indicating further that conditions in the 
export market were of little concern to Pennsylvanians. 
Thus, it was not the dictates of economy that led to the 
Pennsylvanians' decision to support the war. 
CHAPTER THREE 
The Nation's Honor 
and the Party's Welfare 
Bradford Perkins, Roger Brown, Reginald Horsman, and 
Norman Risjord contend that the sectional and economic 
interpretations of the causes of the War of 1812 associated 
with Julius Pratt and George Taylor contain unproved 
assertions and irreconcilable internal inconsistencies. How-
ever accurately these theories might explain the motives 
of the West or the South, most recent historians assert 
that they cannot be extended to explain the sizable war 
vote of the Middle Atlantic states. In an effort to explain 
why the nation as a whole went to war, rather than any 
particular section, recent historians have sought a broad, 
unifying factor, which could explain the vote of all sec-
tions. This search has brought them full circle to a 
reemphasis on diplomatic relations and maritime griev-
ances. Without denying that other factors were present, 
these historians generally accept the proposition that "the 
only unifying factor, present in all sections of the country, 
was the growing feeling of patriotism, the realization that 
something must be done to vindicate the national honor."1 
In spite of subtle differences among themselves as to 
which maritime and diplomatic factors were most impor-
tant, and why they reached a climax in the summer of 
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1812, there is general agreement that Americans genuinely 
felt that "national honor was suffering from British action 
at sea."2 
A search through the correspondence, newspapers, 
speeches, and works of the period shows that considera-
tions of national honor, prompted by the nation's diplo-
matic and maritime experience from 1807 to 1812, con-
vinced many Pennsylvanians that war was necessary. 
The people of Pennsylvania and their representatives 
wanted to avert war. They supported every measure of 
commercial coercion, commended every effort to negoti-
ate a settlement, and accepted gratefully every temporary 
relaxation of tensions, hoping it would become permanent. 
When commercial coercion failed, when negotiations 
proved futile and tensions continued to mount, Penn-
sylvanians gradually accepted the necessity of defending 
the nation's rights by force of arms. 
Pennsylvanians who wrote about the war shortly after 
its close strongly support this contention. Describing the 
mood of congressional Republicans at the opening of the 
Twelfth Congress, Jonathan Roberts recorded in his 
memoirs, "we met under a decided impression that if 
negotiation further failed, War must be declared. Embar-
go and non-intercourse had been tried and failed, no 
other honorable course seemed open."3 Charles Ingersoll, 
a prominent Philadelphia Republican and wartime con-
1 Norman K. Risjord, "1812: Conservatives, War-Hawks and the Na-
tion's Honor," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d series, XVIII (April, 
1961 ), 204. For other recent studies stressing maritime causes and 
national honor see A. L. Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British 
North America (New York, 1961); Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: 
England and the United States, 1805-1812 (Berkeley, 1961); Roger H. 
Brown, The Republic in Peril: 1812 (New York, 1964); and Reginald 
Horsman, The Causes of the War of 1812 (Philadelphia, 1962). 
2 Reginald Horsman, "Western War Aims, 1811-1812," 1ndiana Maga-
zine of History, LIII (January, 1957), 9. 
3 Philip S. Klein, "Memoirs of Senator Jonathan Roberts," Pennsyl-
vania Magazine of History and Biography, LXI ( 1938), 446-47. 
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gressman, often referred to the War of 1812 as the Second 
War for Independence. Britain's policy "had brought the 
existence of the United States as an independent nation 
into question." After all peaceful efforts had failed to win 
recognition of our rights, war was the only recourse.4 
Henry Brackenridge, a leader of the Republican party in 
Pittsburgh, characterized Britain's policy as "illegal and 
insulting" and concluded that "nothing was to be expected 
from any ... arrangement on the part of our enemy; that 
nothing short of a change in her general policy would 
suffice and nothing but a war could effect this change."5 
Most of the Pennsylvania congressmen who voted for 
war had sat in earlier sessions and had supported the more 
pacific methods of commercial retaliation. Their conver-
sion in the spring of 1812 reflects a gradual change in 
the opinion of their constituents, brought about by the 
realization that the efforts to preserve our rights by meth-
ods short of war had failed; that only two alternatives 
remained to the nation: war and national honor, or 
continued peace and national humiliation. What hap-
pened in the five years from 1807 to 1812 to create this 
state of mind? 
The military stalemate in Europe led each of the bel-
ligerents to intensify its efforts to fight the war by restrict-
ing the commerce of the other. The British orders-in-
council and the French decrees made practically all 
United States shipping subject to seizure and confiscation 
by Great Britain or France. 
The initial response of the American government was 
to protest violations of American rights and to appeal to 
both belligerents for redress of grievances. The appeal 
4 Charles Ingersoll, Historical Sketch of the Second War Between the 
United States and Great Britain (Philadelphia, 1845), 41; see also 
William Meigs, The Life of Charles]. Ingersoll (Philadelphia, 1897), 68. 
5 H. M. Brackenridge, History of the Late War Between the United 
States and Great Britain (Philadelphia, 1844), 50. 
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proved ineffective and by 1806 the administration decided 
on more direct methods. Senator Andrew Gregg of Penn-
sylvania introduced a stringent nonimportation measure 
which would prohibit the importation of most goods from 
Europe. After long debate and serious divisions among 
congressional Republicans, a much more limited nonim-
portation measure was passed. Gregg opposed the emascu-
lation of his bill on the grounds that strong measures 
would show American determination better than half 
measures and might force the belligerents, especially 
Britain, to respect American rights. This was the first 
step in the American effort to use economic pressure 
against the European belligerents.6 Neither belligerent 
was willing to yield, a major incident seemed inevitable, 
and finally occurred on June 22, 1807, when the H.M.S. 
Leopard fired on the U.S.S. Chesapeake in American 
waters, boarded her, and took off four men alleged to be 
British deserters. 
Many Americans considered the Chesapeake incident a 
more serious offense than impressment from merchant 
vessels or interference with American commerce. They 
saw in it the culmination of years of Anglo-American 
disagreement, a direct attack on the nation's sovereignty, 
and demanded that the government take vigorous action 
to defend the nation's rights. 
According to William Duane, editor of the Aurora, the 
Chesapeake affair was not an accident, but a premeditated 
hostile act indicating complete disregard not only of our 
neutral rights, but of our national honor and indepen-
dence. He told his readers that they were already involved 
in war, and that it did not begin with the Chesapeake 
incident. It was but the "last outrage" in a series which 
6 Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., lOth sess., 771-72; Herbert Heaton, 
"Non-Importation, 1806-1812," Journal of Economic History, I ( Novem-
ber, 1941), 178-98; Brown, The Republic in Peril, 17-19. 
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began in 1793. From that time, at least, Britain's policy 
had been marked by a determined effort to wreck our 
commerce, to deprive us of our territory, and to destroy 
our independence. During this whole period our govern-
ment had followed a commendable policy of neutrality 
and forbearance but "to submit longer ... will be but 
sinking ourselves in disgrace and inviting the scorn and 
degradation of the power that has assailed us." The 
American people, Duane urged, must suppress party feel-
ings and "pledge support to the administration in what-
ever method it should choose to assert our rights, defend 
our independence, and redeem our honor."7 
Duane demanded a special session of Congress to which 
he recommended a "total suspension of intercourse" as the 
only measure which "will secure the American people 
from national disgrace and personal plunder." Such a 
measure would be effective enough to reduce the British 
to terms within six months. If the United States did not 
take this, or similar vigorous action, the country "should 
proclaim to the world that the liberty with which . . . 
the toils of our fathers made us free [is] not worth defend-
ing or enjoying."8 
The citizens of Philadelphia agreed with Duane. A 
public meeting, attended by more than six thousand 
people, unanimously approved resolutions condemning 
"the outrage" committed by the Leopard, calling it "an 
act of such consummate violence and wrong, and of so 
barbarous and murderous a character, that it would de-
base and degrade any nation ... to submit to it."9 The 
Federalist Pennsylvania Gazette also reported this meet-
ing and approved of its resolutions. The British, it sug-
gested, may be justified in retrieving deserters from 
7 Philadelphia Aurora, June 30, July 7, 1807. 
B Ibid., June 29, 1807, Jan. 6, 1808. 
9 Ibid., July 7, 1807. 
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American merchant vessels, but nothing can justify "the 
insult to our sovereignty" implicit in an attack on a mili-
tary vessel. Zachariah Paulson referred to the incident 
as an "unexampled outrage" which "tells us that we have 
a second Independence to gain from Great Britain." He, 
too, reported and approved of the public meetings.10 
Both Republican and Federalist papers were particu-
larly impressed by the nonpartisan character of the meet-
ing. Noting that the chairman was a Republican and 
the secretary a Federalist, both editors praised everyone 
for suppressing party differences to "the needs of the 
nation's honor" and promised to support any administra-
tion effort to "avenge this outrage." Michael Leib, who 
became one of the leaders of the antiadministration 
Republicans, and an opponent of the war, described the 
meeting as a sight "which the Gods themselves might 
have looked down on with delight." The Federalists, he 
wrote, asked to participate in the sponsorship of the 
meeting, "that it might evince to the world the perfect 
accordance of the public in reprobation of british [sic] 
outrage .... Distinction of sect seemed to be forgotten in 
national feeling and support of the administration."11 
The Carlisle Gazette reported similar nonpartisan meet-
ings in central Pennsylvania. Two sets of resolutions 
reported on July 10 were exactly the same as those 
adopted at the Philadelphia meeting. Other meetings 
expressed similar sentiments and pledged the people "to 
make any sacrifices and endure any hazards to which 
the quest for retribution would lead." The editor praised 
"the patriotism, loyalty and energy" of the citizens, "with 
whose sentiments we heartily agree." 
10 Pennsylvania Gazette, July 9, 1807; Paulson's American Daily Ad-
vertiser, July 1, 1807. 
11 Philadelphia Aurora, June 29, June 30, July 2, July 3, July 4, 1807; 
Pennsylvania Gazette, July 2, July 9, 1807; Michael Leib to C. H. Rodney, 
July 2, 1807, Gratz Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
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One correspondent minced no words. The attack on 
the Chesapeake was absolute proof "of the determination 
of the British to dragoon us into submission." He de-
manded resolute action by the government, and if that 
failed to secure the people's rights, he wanted war. Toasts 
drunk at Fourth of July celebrations reveal a similar 
temper. They invariably condemn the British and the 
attack on the Chesapeake and then point to the "heroes 
of '76" as examples of the energy "with which threats to 
our independence must be met." Like their forefathers, 
the celebrants pledged their "lives ... fortunes . . . and 
sacred honor" to defend the independence they had 
won.12 Editorially, the Gazette called for "coercive 
measures stronger than mere remonstrance," and for war 
if these did not secure their rightsY The Dauphin Guard-
ian also carried reports of protest meetings throughout 
Dauphin County. Many of these urge immediate and 
forceful retaliation and pledge to support the administra-
tion in any action it might take to "avenge" this outrage. 
"A citizen" warned that if measures of retaliation were 
not taken immediately, "America had better at once 
deliver up her independence." The Federalist Harrisburg 
Times also referred to the incident as an "outrage" but 
warned against making it a cause for war. Citing London 
newspapers and parliamentary debates to show that there 
were many in Britain who were shocked by the Leopard's 
actions, the editor David Wright assured his readers that 
Britain would admit her error and be willing to make 
amends. 
The same attitude appeared in the press in western 
Pennsylvania. The Pittsburgh Commonwealth described 
the incident as "a violent and unjustifiable insult upon 
12 Carlisle Gazette, July 3, July 10, July 17, July 24, 1807. 
13 Carlisle Gazette, July 10, July 17, 1807; Dauphin Guardian, July 7, 
July 14, July 21, 1807; Harrisburg Times, Sept. 21, 1807. 
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the dignity and honor of the country." The Washington 
Reporter called it an "outrage" and an "insult." The 
Federalist Gazette saw in it "a threat to our indepen-
dence" and demanded "immediate apology and repara-
tion." It joined the Republican papers in praising the 
nonpartisan composition of protest meetings, and advised 
that "domestic divisions must be submerged when the 
existence of the nation is at stake." The editor pledged 
his life and fortune "in support of any action" taken by 
the government "to prevent further insults."14 
Pennsylvania politicians echoed these sentiments. Mter 
a reading of the Declaration of Independence, the General 
Assembly unanimously resolved "to die free men rather 
than submit to become vassals of Great Britain," and 
warned that "the cup of injury might be made to over-
flow." It praised the pacific efforts of the past and pledged 
itself to "sustain the measures of the general government 
. . . at the hazard of everything dear and valuable to 
men." The governor told the legislature that the attack 
on the Chesapeake had excited "public sensibility beyond 
forbearance" and left them "no alternative but war or 
degradation" if Britain did not repudiate the action and 
make adequate reparations. The General Assembly ap-
proved of these sentiments and expressed its complete 
confidence in the administration. If the measures taken 
by the federal government did not secure the rights of the 
United States, they agreed that the honor and safety of 
the county left no alternative but war.15 
In ·washington, John Smilie asserted that "wherever 
our armed ships are, there is our jurisdiction." Any attack 
on them is a direct attack on the United States which 
14 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, July 8, July 29, Aug. 4, Aug. 12, 1807; 
Washington Reporter, July 14, July 21, Aug. 4, Aug. 11, 1807; Pittsburgh 
Gazette, July 7, July 14, 1807. 
15 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1807-1808, pp. 53, 82-83, 89-91, 119; 
Pennsylvania House Journal, 1807-1808, p. 73. 
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requires immediate retaliation.16 In a heavy "!-told-you-
so" tone, Andrew Gregg wrote William Jones that if his 
stringent nonimportant measure had been adopted and 
enforced the tragedy might have been averted. When he 
heard of the incident, he "took it for granted that Con-
gress would be called for the purpose of adopting some 
retaliatory measures .... That sentiment was general. All 
parties ... seemed to be united in a spirit of resistance." 
He did not want war, but hoped that effective commercial 
legislation would be passed.U 
More than any other previous incident, the attack on 
the Chesapeake roused the anger of the American people, 
and convinced them that measures stronger than remon-
strance and protest were necessary if the United States 
were to win respect for its rights from the European 
belligerents. They did not insist upon immediate hostili-
ties, but they did demand more direct and forceful action. 
As a first step, Jefferson ordered all British warships 
from American waters.18 The Pennsylvania press approved 
of this action as a precautionary measure, to be followed 
by more forceful action when Congress convened. "The 
course pursued is as vigorous as ought to have been 
expected," argued the Carlisle Gazette. Those who con-
demned the action as too weak were themselves "rash 
and precipitate." True, the attack on the Chesapeake 
was an act of war and it could have been construed as such 
and acted on accordingly, but it was not advantageous 
to do so. "It is the interest of the people and therefore 
the duty of the government to avert so great a calamity 
as war." The president's action adequately asserted 
American rights and would prevent similar incidents in 
the future, yet it left the door open for explanation and 
reparation. If the British failed to make proper satisfac-
16 Annals of Congress, lOth Cong., 1st sess., 811. 
17 Gregg to Jones, Aug. 4, 1807, Jones Papers. 
18 American State Papers: Foreign Relations, III, Nov. 19, 1807. 
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tion and give "acceptable assurances" for the future "more 
vigorous action can be taken later."19 
By the time Congress convened in November 1807 
England had not only failed to make reparation for the 
Chesapeake affair, but had continued her depredations 
on American commerce and her impressment of seamen 
from American ships. Transmitting documents showing 
the increased dangers to which American commerce was 
exposed "from the maritime pretensions of Great Britain 
and France," the president recommended to Congress 
adoption of an embargo as a protective measure for 
American shipping and as a retaliatory measure.2° Four 
days later Congress passed the embargo act.21 
At a public meeting in Philadelphia, William Jones 
praised the embargo as "a wise precaution" which pro-
tected United States ships and men against seizure and 
exerted enough pressure on the belligerents to ensure 
that they would soon be forced to respect United States 
rights. The meeting then passed resolutions approving 
the administration's efforts "to protect the nation's rights 
and preserve peace" and approved of the embargo as "an 
honorable alternative to war."22 
On the whole, the people of Pennsylvania supported 
the policy of commercial restriction as an honorable alter-
native to war and as an effective weapon to secure their 
rights. 23 The mounting evidence in the succeeding years 
19 Carlisle Gazette, July 17, July 24, 1807. See also Philadelphia Aurora, 
July 16, July 21, July 23, 1807; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, July 18, July 
25, Aug. 2, 1807; Washington Reporter, July 16, July 23, 1807; Dauphin 
Guardian, Aug. 2, Aug. 25, 1807, for similar statements. 
2o American State Papers: Foreign Affairs, III, 25. 
21 Annals of Congress, lOth Cong., 1st sess., 1222. 
22 Philadelphia Aurora, Oct. 3, 1808. Similar meetings and resolutions 
were reported in other parts of the state. See Pittsburgh Commonwealth, 
Oct. 7, Oct. 14, 1808; Carlisle Gazette, Sept. 19, Oct. 2, 1808; Washing-
ton Reporter, Sept. 14, Sept. 26, Oct. 6, 1808. 
23 Sanford Higginbotham, Keystone of the Democratic Arch: Pennsyl-
vania Politics, 1800-1816 (Harrisburg, 1952), 238. 
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that commercial restrictions were not achieving their 
intended goals, the growing hostility and intransigence 
of Great Britain, and the increasing difficulties which 
maintenance of the policy created for the Republican 
party disillusioned many Republicans. They had sup-
ported the system as an alternative to war but came to 
the conclusion that commercial measures were not enough; 
that war was the only solution to the nation's problems. 
During the year that the embargo was in effect Penn-
sylvania Republicans supported it in the face of mounting 
Federalist opposition. It became the chief issue of the 
state elections of 1808. Federalists pointed to the meas-
ure as evidence of Republican subservience to France, 
and demanded a Federalist victory "to restore the com-
mercial habits which have been unconstitutionally . . . 
infringed upon." A Federalist victory, they argued, would 
also restore prosperity "to our pauperized common-
wealth."24 
The election results indicated popular support for the 
embargo. Republicans increased their majority in the 
state legislature and increased by one their domination 
of the state's congressional delegation. The Republican 
candidate for governor, Simon Snyder, who had lost the 
election of 1805 by five thousand votes to another Republi-
can, won a resounding victory in 1808. He amassed the 
largest vote of any candidate for that office since 1790 
and was the first Republican to carry Philadelphia since 
1800.25 
Of the four Pennsylvania congressmen who had voted 
against the embargo, three were reelected from tradi-
tionally Federalist districts. Of the four Republicans who 
had not voted on the embargo, three were defeated at the 
24 Pennsylvania Gazette, Aug. 8, Aug. 15, 1808; Pittsburgh Gazette, 
Aug. 10, Sept. 7, 1808. 
25 Pennsylvania Manual, 1953-1954, p. 91. Higginbotham, Pennsyl-
vania, 174-75. 
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polls. The one who was reelected, Benjamin Say of 
Philadelphia, had been absent in the early part of the 
session, and his abstention was probably not taken as a 
sign of defection. 
These heartening results and the seeming failure of 
negotiations made some Pennsylvania Republicans aggres-
sive. In an effort to placate American sensibilities the 
British government had sent a special envoy, George 
Rose, to settle the affair. But his instructions were so 
narrow and his demands so great that the negotiations 
collapsed almost immediately. 26 
At the beginning of the discussions no one was very 
hopeful. Duane felt that England might be willing to 
settle the Chesapeake affair but that this would not be 
enough to warrant repeal of the embargo. Any settlement 
short of a complete recognition of our neutral rights and 
abandonment of impressment would only be temporary. 
"So long as Britain claims the right, whether she exercises 
it or not, our national honor and independence is not 
secure." He warned the people against allowing the 
negotiations to weaken their indignation. Britain had 
always followed the policy of committing an outrage, 
extending negotiations until passions cooled, and then 
refusing to make reparations. Other Republican news-
papers in the state expressed the same sentiments. 27 
Andrew Gregg wrote William Jones that he did not 
believe George Rose would give adequate satisfaction, 
and hoped the administration would not be duped into 
accepting anything less than complete satisfaction.28 John 
26 A good account of the Rose mission is available in Irving Brant, 
]ames Madison: Secretary of State, 1808-1809 (Indianapolis, 1953 ), 409-
18. 
27 Philadelphia Aurora, Feb. 2, Feb. 3, Feb. 5, March 7, 1808. See 
Carlisle Gazette, Feb. 5, Feb. 12, March 4, 1808; Pittsburgh Common-
wealth, Feb. 13, Feb. 20, March 5, 1808. 
28 Gregg to Jones, Feb. 8, 1808, Jones Papers; see also William Findley 
to Joseph Hiester, April 9, 1808, Gregg Collection, Library of Congress. 
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Connelly and Jesse Higgins expressed similar sentiments 
in their letters to Jonathan Roberts, then a representative 
in the state legislature. 29 When the talks were discon-
tinued in the spring and the Chesapeake affair remained 
unsettled, some Republicans began to demand measures 
more vigorous than embargo. Duane viewed the failure 
of the negotiations as evidence of Britain's disinclination 
to adjust relations between the two countries and, more 
ominously, of her unwillingness to accept the indepen-
dence of the United States. If the embargo is not con-
tinued and "our rights are not vigorously asserted," he 
wrote, "the nation will revert to a position even lower 
than colonial dependence." Not only England, but other 
nations, will trample on our rights and "American inde-
pendence will become a fiction."30 William Jones regarded 
Rose's mission as "a temporizing maneuver" and its failure 
as a further example of "British arrogance." The attack 
on the Chesapeake was an act of war, and failure to 
respond to it as such had been read as a sign of weakness. 
He expressed faith in the embargo and demanded that it 
be continued until the end of the current session of 
Congress. He hoped that that body would use the time to 
prepare for war, and if American rights were still ignored 
when Congress adjourned, he favored an open declaration 
of war. He did not want war but believed it was "possible 
for a free, peaceful and virtuous people to prize the 
blessings of peace and depreciate the horrors of war 
[with] too much sensibility." Failure to act "after repeated 
insults" made Congress and supporters of the embargo 
"objects of derision." The failure of the Rose negotiations 
proved that the embargo was not a strong enough 
measure and more would be required "to protect the 
29 Connelly to Roberts, March 1, 1808, Higgins to Roberts, Feb. 19, 
1808, Roberts Papers. 
so Philadelphia Aurora, Feb. 26, March 3, March 4, 1808. 
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honor and independence of the country." Jones told a 
meeting called to protest New England opposition to 
the embargo that it had been intended only as a temporary 
measure which "must be superseded either by peaceful 
enjoyments of our rights and independence, or their 
maintenance at the point of the sword."31 
In February and March all the Republican papers 
carried letters and editorials decrying the unwillingness 
of the British to settle the Chesapeake affair, warning that 
Britain would never grant us our rights until "we win 
them again on the field of battle" and urging the govern-
ment to take vigorous action. Federalists blamed the 
failure of the negotiations on the intransigence of the 
administration. 32 
The Pennsylvania legislature, which had approved the 
embargo as "a wise pacific and patriotic measure calcu-
lated to exact ... observance of our rights without resort 
to the horrors and dislocations of war" in its 1808 session, 
adopted in the following year a resolution pledging to 
support the government if war should become necessary 
to "protect our rights and defend our honor."33 
In 1808 Governor McKean praised the "impartial, 
respectful and conciliatory" policy of the Federal govern-
ment. The unwillingness to resort to war, even though 
there was adequate justification, would be a lesson to the 
world and would prove that republican governments can 
protect their rights by peaceful means. 34 
A year later Governor Snyder commended the "firm-
ness and dignity" with which the administration ''has 
sought . . . atonement for acknowledged injuries, and 
31 Jones to Macon, Nov. 16, 1808, Jones to Giles, Feb. 5, 1809, Jones 
Papers; Philadelphia Aurora, Jan. 18, Jan. 23, Jan. 25, 1809. 
32 Washington Reporter, Feb. 24, 1808; Harrisburg Times, Sept. 29, 
1808. 
33 Pennsylvania House Journal, 1807-1808, p. 91, 1808-1809, pp. 14-16, 
54-55. 
34 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th series, IV, 649-51. 
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security for unquestionable rights." Its efforts had been 
met "with indifference ... or derision." He thought that 
now, however, "every candid mind ... perceives that the 
independence of America must be maintained (as it was 
achieved) by the active patriotism and valor of her sons." 
No burden demanded by continued embargo or war could 
possibly compare "to the loss of national independence 
to be incurred by tame submission to the orders" of a 
European sovereign.35 
In an effort to ease tensions, and perhaps hoping to buy 
time to allow the consolidation of opposition to the em-
bargo, the British government appointed a new minister, 
David Erskine, to negotiate a settlement. Pennsylvania 
Republicans were not very optimistic. Duane contended 
that Britain had never consented to any concessions in 
the past, and there was no reason to believe that she 
would now. This was but another effort to lull the 
American people into forgetting an outrage without 
removing any grievances. 36 The Washington Reporter 
warned its readers not to expect too much from the 
negotiations. "Our honor will be redeemed on the field, 
not at the table," the editor told the readers. Jesse Higgins 
told Roberts that no one expected Erskine to make any 
new propositions and Jones informed Gregg that his hopes 
were not aroused. 37 
When the negotiations resulted in an acceptable agree-
ment, the press grudgingly admitted that it had been 
wrong. The eastern press accepted the agreement, al-
though Duane warned that it should not be considered 
permanent. Britain had been forced to make concessions 
for tactical reasons, he argued, and would revert to her 
old practices when the situation in Europe changed. The 
35 Pennsylvania House Journal, 1808-1809, pp. 19-22. 
36 Philadelphia Aurora, Aug. 22, Aug. 26, 1808. 
37 Washington Reporter, May 8, 1809; Higgins to Roberts, Dec. 14, 
1808, Roberts Papers; Jones to Gregg, Jan. 14, 1809, Jones Papers. 
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Federalist papers saw the agreement as an admirable 
conversion in the Republican administration, and as 
evidence of a desire by the British to establish friendly 
relations. Jacob Elder, the editor of the Guardian, was 
elated at the agreement. He headlined the news, "REPUB-
LICAN TRIUMPH AND ENGLAND HUMBLED." The favorable 
agreement, he argued, was the result of the embargo and 
Republican "firmness."38 
The western press did not accept the agreement quite 
so readily. The United States had given up too much 
and had received too little in return. Britain had not 
renounced its right to interfere with our trade, she had 
merely agreed to suspend the practice. Erskine had made 
no concessions on impressment, a practice "degrading to 
the honor of any independent nation that submits." When 
our "ardour to defend our rights" cools, Britain will forget 
the agreement and renew its violations.39 
Britain's repudiation of the agreement killed whatever 
good feelings its negotiation had aroused and was seen as 
a further insult to our honor and as evidence that Britain 
could not be trusted. The appointment of Francis James 
"Copenhagen" Jackson to replace Erskine intensified the 
situation.40 By refusing to ratify the treaty, Evans wrote, 
Britain has lost the confidence of all parties in the 
United States. They have now sent that villain Jackson 
who prepared the scaffold for innocent thousands at 
Copenhagen to America to practice infamy and fraud 
upon us."41 Duane called the repudiation "an affront to 
38 Philadelphia Aurora, April 29, May 2, 1809; Carlisle Gazette, April 
30, May 7, 1809; Pennsylvania Gazette, May 1, May 8, 1809; Dauphin 
Guardian, April 25, May 2, 1809. 
39 Washington Reporter, May 8, May 15, 1809; Pittsburgh Common-
wealth, May 9, May 16, 1809; Carlisle Gazette, May 10, 1809. 
40 Jackson had delivered the ultimatum that preceded the bombard-
ment of Copenhagen and the destruction of the Danish fleet. His 
appointment to the United States had been successfully opposed by 
Rufus King in 1801. See Perkins, Prologue to War, 220. 
41 Evans to Roberts, Aug. 3, 1809, Roberts Papers. 
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our honor"; the appointment of Jackson "an insult to our 
sensibilities." He began to advocate military preparations, 
the arming of merchant vessels, and if these measures 
failed, an outright declaration of war. Others were even 
more demanding. The repudiation of the Erskine agree-
ment made an immediate declaration of war unavoidable 
"unless customary insult has rendered us callous to na-
tional honor."42 The Washington Reporter concluded that 
neither negotiation nor commercial measures were ade-
quate weapons with which to defend the nation's rights. 
"We ought either to resent our wrongs in a manly way, 
or cease to publish our disgraces .... Let us either behave 
like an independent people or lay aside their character 
[and] petition his sacred majesty, George III to restore 
[us] to the fold. Let us act the part of Americans or . . . 
Britains. Away with words, words, words, negotiations, 
and half-measures."43 
Stating that "the conduct of Great Britain, and the 
insolence of her minister plenipotentiary, Francis J. Jack-
son, has produced a crisis that has excited publick feeling 
and anxiety to such an unexampled height that the repre-
sentation of the freemen of the commonwealth cannot 
hesitate to accord with . . . the wishes of their con-
stituents," the state legislature renewed its pledge to 
support whatever action the federal government intended 
to take and expressed "resentment against the govern-
ment under whose orders the rights, dignity, and honor 
of the United States have been violated and insulted." 
The legislature pronounced "the violation on the part of 
Great Britain of a solemn agreement ... to be ... evidence 
of hostility and disregard for our rights."44 
42 Democratic Press, Aug. 16, 1809, cited in Higginbotham, Pennsyl-
vania, 242. 
43 Philadelphia Aurora, May 4, July 21, Dec. 14, 1809; Washington Re-
porter, May 7, 1809. 
44 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1809-1810, pp. 104-105, 
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The governor called the conduct of Great Britain "a 
contemptuous disregard for solemnly and publicly plighted 
national honor which could not fail to arouse the resent-
ment of the people ... whose indignation has been greatly 
and justly heightened by the haughty and indecorous 
deportment of the present British minister." He regretted 
that the pacific measures of the administration had "not 
effected the object contemplated" but was grateful that 
they had excited "in every American's bosom, a fixed and 
determined resolution to support the general government 
in its patriotick efforts to maintain the honor, indepen-
dence and just rights of our country."45 He was so sure 
that repudiation of the Erskine agreement would lead to 
war that he ordered the adjutant general of the state 
militia to "do everything in [his] power to place the state 
of Pennsylvania in a situation to defend itself and con-
tribute its full portion towards the defence of the just 
rights of the U. S." This order was sent because "the 
pleasing prospect of a Speedy and honorable adjustment 
of the disputes [had] vanished."46 
The repudiation of the Erskine agreement and the 
appointment of Jackson did not bring war. Instead, there 
were continued efforts to win our rights by exertion of 
commercial pressure and negotiation. Nonintercourse fol-
lowed embargo and was itself replaced by Macon's bill 
No. 2. Nothing seemed to help. Relations continued to 
deteriorate, and the anger of the people continued to 
mount. 
Two events helped to clear the air. On May 16, 1811, 
John Rodgers, commander of the U.S.S. President over-
took the H.M.S. Little Belt, forced her to strike her colors, 
and retrieved American sailors who had previously been 
impressed. Public reaction was immediate and favorable. 
45 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1809-1810, pp. 10-12. 
46 Pennsylvania Archives, 9th series, IV, 2733. 
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This was justified reprisal, but not provoked hostility. 
More such action would bring about a redress of our 
grievances much more readily than protest and ineffectual 
legislation. If England considered this attack an insult, 
it should note how often the United States has been in-
sulted in a similar manner. America has tried embargo, 
nonintercourse, protest and negotiation, argument and 
threat, and has never retrieved one impressed seaman. 
"One fusillade has retrieved a dozen. Is there a lesson to 
be learned?" If the attack on the Little Belt gives England 
cause for war, how much more cause has that nation 
given the United States in the past five years?47 
The incident momentarily changed relations between 
nations. The British demanded reparations from America, 
which had been denied satisfaction for the attack on the 
Chesapeake five years before, and could now say no. The 
administration could take a strong stand. "The Little 
Belt-President clash," in Perkins' words, "helped breed 
the psychological setting for war."48 
Shortly before the Little Belt clash Napoleon seemingly 
repealed the French decrees insofar as they affected 
American commerce. Senator Gregg admitted that Napo-
leon's actions embarrassed the government because there 
"is some suspicion of her sincerity." However, he ex-
plained that many members of Congress believed that as 
a result Britain would repeal her orders. "But, if Britain 
fails . . . our government is pledged to put the non-
intercourse system into operation."49 Pursuant to the pro-
visions of Macon's bill No. 2, President Madison opened 
trade with France, and imposed nonintercourse against 
47 Washington Reporter, June 3, June 10, 1811; Pittsburgh Common-
wealth, June 4, June 11, 1811; Pittsburgh Gazette, June 4, 1811; Carlisle 
Gazette, June 4, 1811; Philadelphia Aurora, May 23, June 7, June 8, 
1811; Harrisburg Republican, Dec. 31, 1811; Dauphin Guardian, June 4, 
July 6, 1811; Binns to Roberts, June 9, 1811, Jones Papers. 
48 Perkins, Prologue to War, 273. 
49 Gregg to Samuel Stewart, Feb. 23, 1811, Gregg Collection. 
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Great Britain. That nation rightly refused to believe that 
the French decrees had, in fact, been repealed, and 
refused to modify her orders in council which had al-
legedly been passed in retaliation against the French de-
crees. The impasse led to another round of negotiations 
between the United States and Great Britain. 
Republicans in Pennsylvania insisted that the adminis-
tration must make no concessions to Augustus J. Foster, 
the new British minister. They also accepted at face 
value, as did President Madison, Napoleon's assertion that 
the French decrees had been repealed. Why does Britain 
offer to adjust the Chesapeake affair just now, Rogers 
asked Congressman Roberts. Did Foster fear that the 
president might stir Congress to action and hope that 
this concession would dampen his ardor and the determi-
nation of Congress to demand recognition of all our rights? 
Did he hope to give the Federalists renewed hopes and 
new arguments "to prevent us from taking effective action 
to defend our honor?" "If they had really been anxious 
to do us justice they would have adjusted at least four 
years ago," and would return all American citizens on 
British ships, "a condition we must demand if we are to 
regain our lost honor." vVhen Tripoli enslaved our sailors 
"we did not hesitate or negotiate; we should not now."50 
Duane not only opposed concessions, he opposed even 
negotiation as a sign of weakness. The independence of 
the nation, he wrote, is not negotiable. "A nation which 
can tamely endure such aggressions as we have borne 
from Great Britain is not independent." Our ineffectual 
efforts to secure our rights by methods short of war "gave 
such a blow to our character . . . [that] the government 
has become an object of derision at home and abroad." 
Doubt had been cast on the "ability of Republican govern-
ment to protect its citizens and property, and enforce its 
50 Rogers to Roberts, Nov. 17, 1811, Roberts Papers. 
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laws." Negotiations with Foster would be useless, Duane 
continued. The British minister came only because the 
reimposition of nonintercourse against Britain, consequent 
upon French repeal of her decrees, had disrupted Britain's 
economy. He did not come to make concessions, but to 
buy time for the British faction to sow dissention and 
force the administration to reopen trade with our enemy. 
This nation should expect no concessions from Britain 
and should not accept any. We should know from experi-
ence that Britain could not be trusted to keep her engage-
ments. "Let him learn on this mission that the govern-
ment can demand its rights ... that the people have honor 
and pride ... and are willing to defend them."51 
Britain's failure to amend her orders-in-council follow-
ing repeal of the French decrees provided another theme 
for the Republican press. Britain, the Aurora contended, 
had used the European war as an excuse to harass our 
commerce and threaten our independence because "she 
views us as her great rival in commerce and trade and 
considers every interest of her inhabitants centered in 
the destruction of our national independence."52 Britain 
had justified her orders-in-council on the grounds of 
retaliation against French decrees. Now that the French 
had repealed their decrees, the British refused to repeal 
their orders. The real reason for the British orders was 
their fear of American growth in commerce and manu-
facture and their goal was to stop that growth before our 
competition became too serious. 53 A writer to the Pitts-
burgh Commonwealth concluded that from the debates 
in Parliament "it is apparent that Britain means to destroy 
51 Philadelphia Aurora, March 29, April 13, Aug. 2, 1811; Washington 
Reporter, April15, April 22, May 5, May 19, 1811; Pittsburgh Common-
wealth, April 7, April21, May 4, May 18, 1811; Carlisle Gazette, April17, 
May 14, 1811. 
52 Philadelphia Aurora, May 9, 1811. 
53 Carlisle Gazette, Aug. 23, 1811. 
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us."54 In our effort to preserve the peace, the correspon-
dent asserted, we had sacrificed the liberty and lives of 
our seamen, the property of our citizens, and had played 
into the hands of the British whose obvious goal was to 
destroy our commerce. "Worst of all our national honor 
is annihilated."55 
In a widely reprinted letter a correspondent to the 
Aurora argued that repeal of the French decrees had 
made the decision for the United States. England's 
refusal to repeal its orders, he stated, proved that its aim 
was the destruction of America. He felt that indepen-
dence, honor and patriotism demanded war.56 
Pennsylvanians had obviously despaired of peaceful 
coercion. Many agreed with Duane that "we have re-
ceived injuries the endurance of which has dishonored 
the national character which can now be retrieved only 
by recourse to arms."57 With him, they looked to the 
Twelfth Congress, about to convene in Washington, for 
direction, and urged it to take effective action. 
The Washington Reporter exhorted Congress to be done 
with "stratagems and tricks" which had gained the nation 
nothing but the odium of the world. The time had come 
when "we must give up our magnanimous policy" and 
take the "strong action necessary to preserve our honor, 
rights and independence." "Forbearance and conciliation 
have been carried by our government to their utmost 
limits," began an article in the Carlisle Gazette. "Every 
expedient compatible with the maintenance of our honor 
and independence has been resorted to. . . . Further for-
bearance can scarcely fail exposing us to the imputation 
54 Aug. 19, 1811. 
55 Philadelphia Aurora, Aug. 8, 1811. 
56 Philadelphia Aurora, Sept. 9, 1811; Benjamin Rush to Thomas Jef-
ferson, Dec. 17, 1811 in The Letters of Benjamin Rush, ed. Herbert But-
terfield (Princeton, 1951 ), 1111. 
57 Philadelphia Aurora, Oct. 19, 1811. 
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of pusillanimity." These sentiments "will animate Con-
gress (as they animate the conduct of every American)." 
In an article entitled "A Message to Congress," the Pitts-
burgh Commonwealth stated, "our honor is pledged ... 
and is too precious to be sullied" by efforts to preserve 
"peace at the cost of honor."58 Richard Leech informed 
Roberts that "the preservation of our Republican institu-
tions-of our country's peace and honor" depended on 
the actions of the Republicans in Congress. 59 Governor 
Snyder told the state legislature that "we have not only 
exhausted the cup of forbearance, but tasted that of 
humiliation . . . our only hope of having our wrongs 
redressed and our rights respected ... is by an appeal 
to the last resort."60 
With these admonitions from their constituents and 
state officials, Pennsylvania's delegation, consisting of 
seventeen Republicans and one Federalist, listened to the 
president's message. Presenting evidence of Britain's 
"hostile inflexibility in trampling our rights," Madison 
urged Congress to put the "United States into an armor 
and an attitude demanded by the crisis and correspond-
ing with the national spirit and expectations."61 
Whether this message was really stronger than his 
earlier communications and presaged the request for a 
declaration of war is a debatable point. 62 The people of 
Pennsylvania read it as a more militant message. On 
reading it Leech perceived "that strong measures are 
expected to be pursued and so far as I am able to see it is 
right ... a continuance of a policy too amiable ... may 
have a tendency to break and destroy that spirit of 
indignation so necessary to preserve the honor of the 
58 Oct. 14, 1811. 
59 Leech to Roberts, Nov. 8, 1811, Roberts Papers. 
60 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th series, IV, 763. 
61 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 11. 
62 Perkins, Prologue to War, 296-98. 
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nation .... Our policy therefore ought to be marked by 
a decision that cannot be mistaken."63 Jones told Senator 
Gregg that "Congress must honor the request of the 
president and prepare the nation to protect its honor 
and assert its rights" by resort to war if necessary.64 The 
Pittsburgh Commonwealth noted "a general coincidence 
of opinion on the subject of the president's message ... 
the whole body of republicans have rallied round the 
administration and with one voice send forth their accla-
mation. . . . Let congress systematize the plans delineated 
by the president." When Britain learns that the United 
States is "preparing to exact that justice at the cannon's 
mouth which [has been] in vain solicited by sacrifices and 
concessions" it will either guarantee our rights or they 
will be "wrested from her on the field."65 "Even at this 
late hour," a correspondent wrote to the Washington 
Reporter, the American government will "act with the 
firmness and decision which they appear so long to have 
been destitute of and retrieve that national character 
which . . . seems to have been almost extinguished."66 
Because the president intimated in his message that war 
was probable, a member of the Pennsylvania House 
introduced resolutions supporting the administration, and 
pledging the state to contribute willingly whatever should 
be asked of it by the nation. 67 Governor Snyder inter-
preted the message to mean that "a last appeal must be 
made to arms" to protect the rights, honor, and indepen-
dence of the nation. 68 
63 Leech to Roberts, Nov. 8, 1811, Roberts Papers. 
64 Jones to Gregg, Nov. 11, 1811, Jones Papers. 
65 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Nov. 25, 1811. 
66 Washington Reporter, Dec. 27, 1811. See also Pennsylvania Republi-
can, Dec. 24, 1815; Dauphin Guardian, Dec. 23, 1816. 
67 The resolutions are in Pennsylvania House Journal, 1811-1812, p. 42. 
The speech from which the quotation is taken is in Niles Register, Dec. 
28, 1811, pp. 297-99. 
68 Speech by the governor quoted in Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Dec. 
6, 1811. 
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In response to the message, the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, of which John Smilie was a member, issued a 
report asserting that "we have borne with injury until 
forbearance has ceased to be a virtue."69 Defending the 
report and the committee's recommendation for increases 
in the military establishment, committee chairman Porter 
stated that "all hopes of accommodating our differences 
with Great Britain by negotiation must be abandoned." 
Reciting a long list of grievances, he concluded that 
Britain's conduct toward us was not regulated by a sense 
of justice, "but solely by a regard to our probable for-
bearance." On the basis of this conclusion, the committee 
unanimously declared that "on the ground of mere pecu-
niary calculation, a calculation of profit and loss, it would 
be to our interest to go to war." But the subject presented 
itself to the committee from another point of view, "and 
that was as regarded the character of the country." Com-
paring our situation to that of a young man who, if he did 
not defend his honor when it was first attacked, "might 
safely calculate to be kicked and cuffed" the rest of his 
life, Porter concluded that "we should clearly understand 
and define those rights we ought to support, and should 
support them at every hazard."70 
This speech was printed in its entirety in every Republi-
can newspaper consulted, and the editors of two news-
papers which were not consulted spoke favorably of it 
in their correspondence. 71 Editorially, the press empha-
sized the second part of the speech. Hopefully, the Re-
porter suggested, Congress's "concern for the nation's 
honor will be matched by an equal concern for its de-
fences." The Pittsburgh Commonwealth hoped that "hon-
orable sentiments will be followed by honorable action." 
69 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 373-77. 
70 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 415. 
71 Binns to Roberts, Nov. 14, 1811, Higgins to Roberts, Nov. 18, 1811, 
Roberts Papers. 
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Advocating a quick declaration of war to defend the 
nation's "rights and honor," the Pittsburgh Mercury head-
lined its editorial on the committee's report and Porter's 
speech "How sooN?" These newspapers complimented 
Smilie for his role in the formulation of the report, and 
for his and Adam Seybert's speeches urging support of 
it.72 
The Republican majority in Congress enacted the pro-
posals of the Foreign Affairs Committee by immense 
majorities. Of the six resolutions the one with the least 
support carried by a vote of 110-22; that with the most 
support, 120-8. In both instances the Pennsylvania dele-
gation, including the Federalist, James Milnor, voted 
unanimously to support the preparedness recommenda-
tions of the committee. On the four other resolutions, 
there were never more than three Pennsylvanians in 
opposition, though there were some who did not vote. 
On two proposals to amend the resolutions the Pennsyl-
vania delegation voted 17-0-1 with the majority to defeat 
one, but split 9-8-1 on the proposal to allow merchant 
ships to arm in self defense. 73 Obviously, the Pennsylvania 
delegation had interpreted the president's message as a 
request for war preparations. Manuel Eyre felt "gratified 
... at such majorities in supporting the government in a 
manly attitude to defend and protect the rights and honor 
of our country; the stronger your measures and the more 
war-like your determination, the more probable that 
peace on honorable terms will result."74 During the 
remainder of the session Pennsylvania Republicans ap-
proved of every strong measure taken by Congress on a 
variety of grounds, but considerations of national honor, 
72 Washington Reporter, Dec. 11, 1811; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, 
Dec. 2, Dec. 26, 1811; Pittsburgh Mercury, Dec. 3, Dec. 17, 1811. 
73 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 419-20, 545, 546, 547, 565. 
74 Eyre to Findley, Jan. 12, 1812, Gallatin Papers, New York Historical 
Society. 
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the national character, or the nation's independence 
always loomed large. 
In the debate on the war tax measures, Seybert denied 
the right of congressmen to vote against a particular tax 
because it fell disproportionately on his constituents. 
The United States was about to engage in a war not to 
protect its commerce, but "to maintain our honor, liberty, 
and sovereignty as a nation," he told the House. The 
demands of the nation should take precedence over local 
inconveniences. 75 The Reporter grieved at the failure of 
the House to levy a tax on imported salt. It did not like 
the tax, but, given "Congress's determination to fight for 
our rights," it could not see how the House could refuse 
the ways and means. "The argument of unequal operation 
will apply to any tax," and therefore must defeat any 
measure. "When the honor and independence of the 
nation is at stake, legislators ought not to be moved by 
considerations of a local nature."76 Thomas Rogers wrote 
Jonathan Roberts that he was dissatisfied with the slow 
pace in Congress: "We have suffered and suffered until 
forbearance has been pronounced cowardice and want of 
energy." The people, he felt, were ready for war, and he 
maintained that "their honor, as well as their property 
have been assailed." Congress must act "while national 
indignation remains high."77 
In response to the public clamor and the president's 
request, Congress, on April 4, 1812, imposed an embargo 
on American shipping to last for ninety days. Republi-
cans in Pennsylvania approved, seeing it as a precaution-
ary measure, as the last step before a declaration of war. 
75 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 1116. The tax in question 
was on distilleries, and would have fallen heavily on Pennsylvania. 
76 Washington Reporter, March 9, 1812. For similar statements see 
Pittsburgh Commonwealth, March 17, Pittsburgh Mercury, March 19, 
Carlisle Gazette, March 11, Philadelphia Aurora, March 7, 1812. 
77 Rogers to Roberts, March 22, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
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Speaking in favor of the bill Adam Seybert asserted that 
he felt pledged to go to war, and favored the embargo as a 
maneuver to give shipping time to prepare and as a final 
warning to the belligerents. Smilie favored the embargo 
because "we must have war unless Great Britain relents," 
and he had always believed that "embargo must precede 
war .... The embargo is intended as a war measure."78 
Pennsylvanians approved of the embargo and the decla-
ration of war which presumably would follow. The Aurora 
called it a "harbinger of manly contest for essential rights 
perseveringly trampled upon by the British government." 
War will "cut deeply; but will be cheerfully and gloriously 
borne in preference to a grovelling and dastardly submis-
sion to national dishonor." Duane urged Congress to make 
adequate provision for enforcement because even at the 
brink of war there were still those "who place personal 
profit above the honor and independence of their coun-
try."79 
The Pennsylvania Republican approved of the embargo 
because Britain was vulnerable only by a cessation of 
commercial intercourse. The Carlisle Gazette supported 
the embargo on similar grounds. The embargo, it argued, 
"is not war and does not inevitably lead to war. But it 
must lead either to war, or to an honorable adjustment 
with the belligerents." The measure "gives notice that 
the period has arrived [in] which the manifold wrongs 
we have received must be redressed." The Gazette con-
cluded "it would be dishonorable if, without a redress 
of our wrongs, war did not follow the expiration of the 
embargo." No other alternative is left, "every other 
expedient has been tried and failed."80 
78 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 1592. 
79 Philadelphia Aurora, April 2, April 4, April 6, April 7, 1812. 
80 Carlisle Gazette, April 7, 1812; Harrisburg Republican, April 7, 
1812; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, April 8, April 15, 1812; Pittsburgh 
Mercury, April 9, April16, 1812; Washington Reporter, April 7, April 14, 
1812. 
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In their strong concern for the nation's honor, Jonathan 
Roberts's correspondents expressed a similar approval 
of the embargo as a measure preparatory to war. Richard 
Leech wrote, "I have always been of the opinion that 
this nation could not be dragged into a war and that 
nothing but the maintenance of their rights and liberties 
could engage the people's consent." But he felt that at this 
time the "crisis has arrived and however great the calami-
ties which may be apprehended . . . they will, I think, 
be incomparably less than those which would arise from 
submission to a base, deceitful and insulting foe." His 
brother Matthew, most of whose letters are nonpolitical, 
informed Roberts that "the circle I am acquainted with 
have pretty much made up their mind to ... a war. Our 
condition cannot be worse than it has been and it is to 
the representatives of the nation we now look. ... I think 
that that government which is found too weak for the 
protection of the property and honor of its citizens will 
be found to [sic] weak and unworthy of their support." 
Rogers congratulated Roberts for his support of the 
embargo and urged quick legislation to make ready for 
battle. The American people "have done everything 
which human prudence could devise to avert war," he 
said, and were prepared to defend their honor. In a 
similar vein, Eyre told Roberts, "I feel with you the 
extent of the insults heaped upon us by Great Britain 
and would yield no more." He urged Roberts to call for 
war before the embargo expired, or the people would no 
longer believe in war. 81 
As the session of Congress continued the people became 
more impatient with the dalliance of their representatives. 
Few believed that Britain's policy would change or that 
any measure but war would be effective. Edward Fox 
81 Leech to Roberts, April 7, 1812, John Roberts to Roberts, April 12, 
1812, Rogers to Roberts, April 20, 1812, Eyre to Roberts, April 19, May 
2, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
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informed Roberts that there were two general grounds 
for war: to obtain commerce "free and independent" and 
"to establish a national character." On the basis of Brit-
ain's past actions we had ample grounds for war. If 
Britain were allowed to continue its practices, it "in effect 
recolonizes the United States. If then the objects of war 
are to establish a national character, and if that can be, 
even in reasonable probability, established by war the 
suffering and expense of blood and treasure . . . should 
... never once be brought into calculation."82 A constitu-
ent who labeled himself a "simple farmer" told Roberts, 
"it is the general wish and sentiment in the neighborhood 
[Spread Eagle, Pennsylvania] that Congress will now go 
on ... in order to have their insulted country's rights 
respected. We know that everything of a pacific nature 
has been tried but without effect."83 Major Isaac Ander-
son, who had served in the militia during the revolution 
and viewed "with regret the war approaching the con-
fines of our horizon," could see no alternative. "What 
could have been done by the United States ... during a 
painful, may I not say, shameful negotiation .... We have 
been alternately cajoled and amused by promises falsely 
made till the forbaring [sic] spirit of our country has 
been exhausted and at last driven to the wretched alterna-
tive of war or a situation worse than colonial subjuga-
tion."84 Another constituent expressed his wish "to live 
at peace . . . but not to give up our rights as an inde-
pendent nation."85 
His regular correspondents described a growing feeling 
for war in the state. At Roberts's request Rogers had 
taken a "trip in the country" to ascertain the climate of 
opinion. In his report he stated "the people are ready to 
82 Fox to Roberts, May 4, 1812 (two letters). 
83 Edward Stiles (?) to Roberts, May 30, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
84 Anderson to Roberts, May 13, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
85 William Slade to Roberts, May 11, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
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support any measure ... to retrieve our lost honor. They 
anxiously wish and expect a declaration of war .... Never 
was there more unanimity among the people." The "honor 
and interest of our country demands [sic] an immediate 
declaration of war. The people looked for it."86 John 
Binns told Roberts the people were convinced war was 
necessary to "pluck up our drowning honor." The longer 
Congress hesitated, "the feebler becomes the democratic 
party."87 After the House had passed a declaration of 
war, Rogers expressed hope that the Senate would second 
their efforts and "save the Honor of our country." He 
told Roberts that if either of Pennsylvania's senators 
voted against the war "things will go badly with them."88 
In a further effort to prepare for war, the president, 
pursuant to a law passed in April 1812, ordered 100,000 
state militia detached to federal service. The governor's 
general orders of May 12, 1812, calling up the 14,000 
requested from Pennsylvania, reflect the attitude of the 
state. 
The revolution had scarcely been completed, said the 
governor, when the nation we had defeated began to 
invade our rights on the pretext of military necessity. 
The real reason was their "commercial jealousy and 
monopolizing animosity." The nation had endured these 
wrongs so long "that our motives have been mistaken and 
our national character misrepresented. Our forbearance 
had been called cowardice. Our love of peace a slavish 
fear of the dangers of war .... All means which wisdom 
and patriotism could devise have been in vain resorted to. 
The cup of patience-of humiliation and long suffering 
has been filled to overflowing." Reminding the people 
of the honor with which Pennsylvanians had fought in 
the revolution, he urged every citizen to act "as if the 
86 Rogers to Roberts, May 16, May 24, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
87 Binns to Roberts, May 3, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
88 Rogers to Roberts, June 14, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
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public weal, the national honor, and independence, rested 
on his single arm."89 
The response was gratifying to the governor. The 
14,000-man quota was filled by volunteers. The letters 
offering the services of militia companies provide a further 
insight into the attitudes of the people. Many are straight-
forward offers to serve, but many volunteers prefaced 
their offers with lengthy explanations. 
Captain Henry Jarrett, commander of a volunteer com-
pany from Lower Nazareth township, stated that his troop 
decided to volunteer because "our country is insulted by 
foreign nations." The "accumulated insults heaped upon 
us by the British" must be avenged, and "the rights and 
liberties which were secured to us by the heroes of '76" 
must be regained. 90 The need to protect the rights for 
which the nation's forefathers fought and died, or to prove 
that Americans were not the "degenerate sons of gallant 
sires" are recurrent themes in these letters. 91 Some com-
panies volunteered because it was their duty to defend 
the "only free government in the world" and the principles 
of republicanism.92 
On the day Congress declared war John Grayson gave 
himself up "in mind and body to be a soldier in the service 
of my country's honor while the war lasted." Many must 
have done the same because "before many days plenty of 
volunteers had signed for filling the company and many 
were excluded."93 
89 Pennsylvania Archives, 2d series, XII, 531-33. There is a slightly 
different version of these orders in Pennsylvania Archives, 9th series, IV, 
394-96. 
90 Jarrett to Snyder, June 2, 1812, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d series, 
XII, 541. 
91 Samuel Agnew to Snyder, May 14, 1812, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d 
series, XII, 553. 
92 Walter Lithgow to Snyder, undated, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d 
series, XII, 543. For other similar letters see ibid., 545-83. 
93 Autobiography of John Grayson, dated March 9, 1867. A typed 
copy of the manuscript is held by James 0. Kehl at the University of 
Pittsburgh. 
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At a meeting in Washington, Pennsylvania, 1,200 Re-
publicans resolved that "the only efficient remedy for the 
protracted and aggravated evils which afflict our country 
will be found in a prompt, vigorous, open war not for the 
limited and impoverished commerce of the moment, but 
for our inprescriptible rights of sovereignty .... These are 
the legitimate and inevitable causes of war."94 In Carlisle 
a similar group resolved that "the cup of forbearance is 
full and the period has arrived when it becomes necessary 
to vindicate hour [sic] honor as a nation and regain that 
independence for which our fathers died."95 Obviously, 
by the summer of 1812, Pennsylvania Republicans had 
become convinced that, in the words of Roger Brown, 
there was "no other option" but war or complete sur-
render.96 
When Congress finally did declare war the action was 
justified on the grounds of national honor, and similar 
considerations were used to support continuation of the 
war after the orders-in-council, the express grievance for 
which war had been declared, had been repealed. 
In a Fourth of July oration Richard Rush averred that 
after every effort to protect its rights by peaceful means 
the nation had "determined on appealing to the sword, 
not on the ground of immediate pressure alone, but on the 
still higher one that longer submission . . . holds out a 
prospect of permanent evil, a prospect rendered certain 
by the experience we have ourselves acquired, that for-
bearance . . . has not only invited a repetition, but an 
augmentation of trespasses increasing in bitterness as well 
as number." Any one of more than a dozen incidents could 
have been counted "an insult to our sovereignty and honor 
[each] in itself a cause for war."97 
94 Washington Reporter, June 8, 1812. 
95 Carlisle Gazette, June 12, 1812. 
96 The phrase is the title of chapter two of his Republic in Peril. 
97 Printed in the Philadelphia Aurora, July 24, July 25, 1812. 
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The editor of the Pittsburgh Mercury argued that 
Britain's intransigence and the failure of all our "pacific 
efforts" had left the nation but two alternatives. "We 
must either abandon the ocean or manfully assert and 
demand our rights. . . . Our government has chosen the 
latter. To have done otherwise would have been a 
cowardly surrender of the rights which God and Nature 
gave us."98 Every Pittsburgh newspaper published the 
resolutions of over four thousand patriots who approved 
"of the manly and dignified ground which the government 
of the United States has assumed in manifesting its 
determination to maintain those rights by the sword, a 
just respect for which it has failed to preserve by nego-
dacion [sic]. "99 
To a publicly posed question, "Whether the war recently 
declared be necessary and expedient," Congressman Abner 
Lacock stated that the answer "will depend entirely on 
the worth and value we may attach to our present form 
of government and our national independence." Further 
"forbearance and submission to British insult and injury," 
he assured his listeners, "would have been an absolute 
surrender of national independence." Continued negotia-
tion and forbearance "has been construed . . . into cow-
ardice." "Nothing remained but resistance or submission. 
The former has been chosen as an evil infinitely less in 
itself than absolute surrender of national sovereignty."100 
Denying the Federalist argument that "by repeal of the 
orders-in-council, the cause of war was extinct," Duane 
argued that there were many other causes for war not the 
least of which were "the many insults to honor," among 
which he named Britain's unwillingness to negotiate and 
failure to abide by her agreements. From here it was but 
98 July 9, July 16, 1812. 
99 Pittsburgh Mercury, Sept. 24, 1812; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, 
Sept. 25, 1812; Pittsburgh Gazette, Sept. 26, 1812. 
too Pittsburgh Mercury, Aug. 13, Aug. 20, 1812. 
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a short step to the argument that "the prince's repeal is 
so well guarded by conditions and whereas's" that it was 
hardly a repeal at all. But, even accepting the repeal at its 
face value, there was no assurance if the declaration of 
war were repealed, that the orders would not be re-
imposed.101 The war must be continued to ccprove that 
republicanism will prevail ... that government based on 
the will of the people can protect their rights even against 
the most determined tyrant."102 Jonathan Roberts had writ-
ten to William Jones in the same vein. The war must be 
fought to a military conclusion ccto prove republican gov-
ernment capable of waging war."103 
The Republican press viewed the presidential election 
in similar terms. The major question, as they saw it, was 
<<whether the principles of the declaration of independence 
will be prostrated . . . or cherished and upheld by the 
people; whether a war for national sovereignty and inde-
pendence-a war for our republican form of government 
. . . shall receive the countenance and support of the 
people."104 
The Aurora took the overwhehning Republican victory 
in Pennsylvania elections as proof that the people ap-
proved of the war and were determined to fight to main-
tain cctheir rights, their freedoms and the independence 
of their nation." It was also proof that a government 
based ccon the will of the people can rely on the honor 
of the people."105 
As late as August 1813, Republicans argued along the 
101 Philadelphia Aurora, Aug. 11, Aug. 13, Aug. 20, 1812. 
102 Philadelphia Aurora, Sept. 3, 1812. The Pennsylvania Republican 
Aug. 25, 1812, expresses the same sentiments. 
103 Roberts to Jones, Sept. 17, 1812, Jones Papers. Roberts had ex-
pressed similar sentiments much earlier. See Annals of Congress, 12th 
Cong., 1st sess., 502-506. 
104 Carlisle Gazette, Oct. 12, 1812. See also Philadelphia Aurora, Oct. 
13, Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Oct. 9, Pittsburgh Mercury, Oct. 8, Wash-
ington Reporter, Oct. 7, Pennsylvania Republican, Oct. 27, 1812. 
105 Philadelphia Aurora, Oct. 21, 1812. 
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same lines. To the Federalist charge that war was 
declared because of Republican antipathy to Britain, the 
Commonwealth replied that "the republicans had a com-
plete ascendency in the country . . . more than eleven 
years before war was declared." During that time every 
effort was made to avert war. When these efforts failed 
"no alternative remained but resistance by force of arms 
or submission to insufferable and endless injury and 
outrage." 
The Commonwealth said that the Federalists knew that 
"Republicans were willing to make every sacrifice for 
peace except the honor and independence of their coun-
try." The Washington Reporter asserted in the same 
month that "this is a war primarily in defence of our rights 
and honor, liberty and independence."106 
What emerges from this recitation of changing attitudes 
is not a finely articulated program proposed by any one 
group intent on war for a single purpose, but a broad 
judgment, informed by common sentiments, that preserva-
tion of the nation's independence and honor demanded 
war. 
106 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Aug. 4, 1813; Washington Reporter, 
Aug. 30, 1813. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Pennsylvania and 
Economic Coercion 
The military stalemate in the Anglo-French war prompted 
each nation to enact measures aimed at destroying the 
other's economy. The effect of the British orders-in-coun-
cil and the French decrees was to make most American 
trade subject to confiscation by one or the other bellig-
erent. The initial response of the American government 
was to protest the violations of American neutral rights 
and to appeal to both governments to modify their com-
mercial legislation.1 
Diplomatic efforts proved unavailing. When British 
violations of American rights increased substantially in 
the spring and summer of 1806, the American government 
was ready to consider more direct measures to persuade 
Britain to change its policy.2 These measures took the 
form of economic legislation designed to deprive Great 
Britain of its American market and of American raw 
materials, on which, it was generally believed, Britain's 
economy depended. From the first retaliatory measure 
proposed in Congress to the outbreak of the war in June 
1812, Pennsylvania Republicans supported the adminis-
tration's efforts at economic coercion. The debate on the 
82 Pennsylvania and the War of 1812 
nonimportation bill of 1806 contains, in general, all the 
arguments which Pennsylvanians adduced in support of 
economic coercion during the next six years. 
When he introduced a bill providing that there should 
be no imports from Great Britain until satisfactory ar-
rangements were made between the United States and 
Britain, Representative Andrew Gregg, who as a senator 
in 1812 was only a moderate supporter of the war, 
defended the measure as an alternative to war. Britain's 
attacks on American rights were so great, he asserted, 
that they "may be considered as sufficient cause on which 
to ground a declaration of war." However, he was un-
willing to resort to war "until other measures which we 
have in our power are tried."3 John Smilie and Joseph 
Clay of Pennsylvania supported Gregg's resolutions on 
similar grounds in lengthy speeches during the subsequent 
debate.4 
After two months of intermittent discussion, Gregg in 
an eloquent plea in support of his proposal maintained 
that one of the results of nonimportation would be to give 
an impetus to American manufacturing from which the 
entire nation would prosper. So long as the United States 
remained economically dependent on Great Britain, he 
argued, the former's political independence could not be 
complete. 5 He concluded the speech by conceding that 
he would be willing to yield his opinion if the House 
preferred "something more energetic" because he con-
sidered "unanimity . . . all important" to show their 
1 Irving Brant, James Madison: Secretary of State (Indianapolis, 1953), 
160-76, 254-56. 
2 Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United States 
1805-1812 (Berkeley, 1961), 69-72,84-95, 177-80; Roger Brown, Repub-
lic in Peril (New York, 1964), 16-17. 
3 Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 1st sess., 412. 
4 Ibid., 430-41. 
5 Ibid., 538-70. 
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enemies that "on all great national questions ... we are 
but one people."6 
When, at the president's request, a more moderate non-
importation measure was introduced, Gregg indicated his 
willingness to support it on the grounds that "a weak 
measure carried by a great majority will be more powerful 
than a strong measure carried by a small majority.''7 Pri-
vately he confided to William Jones that he would sup-
port any measure because a government that takes no 
action in the face of repeated aggressions against its 
rights "cannot long expect the support of the people."8 
Smilie wrote in the same vein to Albert Gallatin. "If the 
government does not do 'something,' " he warned, "it will 
lose the confidence of the people."9 
The action of the Pennsylvania delegation during the 
debate on nonimportation reflects a similar concern on the 
need for some action, and for party solidarity. On the 
rollcall votes taken on Gregg's resolution, the Pennsylvania 
delegation cast fifteen votes in its favor, with only one, 
Michael Leib, voting consistently against. Joseph Clay 
and James Kelly, when they voted, were not consistently 
on either side. However, when it became known that 
Jefferson preferred a less stringent substitute, the entire 
delegation, including Gregg and Leib, switched to sup-
port it and voted unanimously for its passage-all but 
Kelly, who did not vote.10 
In the subsequent debates on the embargo, the noninter-
course bill and Macon's bill No. 2, the same themes, with 
variations to fit the particular occasion, appeared again 
and again. Economic coercion is a viable alternative to 
6 Ibid., 549. 
7 Ibid., 743. 
8 Gregg to Jones, April 17, 1806, Jones Papers. 
9 Smilie to Gallatin, March 9, 1806, Gallatin Papers. 
10 Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 1st sess., 767, 823, 877, 
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war and fosters the development of domestic manufactur-
ing; administration measures must be supported by the 
party lest lack of unity be interpreted as a sign of weak-
ness; and measures to defend the nation's rights must be 
passed unless voters look for other leadership. 
As a coercive measure nonimportation proved a dismal 
failure. Passed on April 18, 1806, its application was 
delayed until December 14, 1807, and whatever effect it 
might have had on the belligerents cannot be deter-
mined.11 The Pennsylvania Republican press approved 
of the measure as an effective weapon against Great 
Britain and never failed to point out the impetus its en-
forcement would give to domestic manufactures. During 
the summer and fall of 1806 several newspapers began 
to show annoyance at the government's failure to enforce 
the act. The Washington Reporter attributed the delay 
to "Federalists and Merchants to whom profit means more 
than honor." The Carlisle Gazette condemned those who 
opposed enforcement and upbraided them as "short sighted 
men who cannot see the great advantages which may 
grow from temporary inconvenience."12 The Federalist 
press opposed nonimportation by relying on seemingly 
contradictory arguments. It maintained that nonimporta-
tion was a weak measure which would never cause our 
rights to be respected. On the other hand, it argued the 
measure was so restrictive that it seriously damaged our 
trade. The only positive suggestion made by the Feder-
alists was that Congress keep the law on the books but 
continue suspending its application thereby retaining a 
11 Herbert Heaton, "Non-Importation, 1806-1812," Journal of Eco-
nomic History, I (November, 1941), 187-98. 
12 Washington Reporter, May 17, May 31, June 2, June 22, July 6, 
July 27, Aug. 4, Aug. 25, 1806; Carlisle Gazette, May 20, May 27, June 
3, June 24, July 1, July 8, July 22, Aug. 5, Aug. 26, 1806; see also 
Pittsburgh Gazette, May 16, May 23, June 6, July 4, July 26, 1806; 
Philadelphia Aurora, June 17, June 19, June 23, July 11, July 24, July 27, 
Aug. 5, Aug. 9, Aug. 22, 1806. 
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club with which to threaten those who violated rights of 
the United StatesP 
Congress was soon deluged with memorials requesting 
repeal of the measure. One of these, from Philadelphia 
merchants, introduced by Joseph Clay, argued that the 
measure hurt their trade and served only to irritate Great 
Britain. Clay moved that the petition be referred to the 
Committee of Commerce and Manufactures and a long 
debate ensued. As with previous debates on similar peti-
tions those who favored referral argued that the petition 
should be given respectful consideration because of the 
constitutional guarantee of the right of petition. Those 
who opposed argued that referral would imply that Con-
gress was considering repeal of nonimportation, and 
retreating from the "high ground" it had taken by passing 
the measure. John Smilie stated that the extensive debate 
on the Philadelphia memorial gave it more significance 
than it deserved, or that Clay had intended when he 
introduced it. He concluded by asserting that the memo-
rial had been drawn up by "a party in favor of the British 
government to embarrass the operations of our govern-
ment." The motion to refer the petition lost 50-70, the 
Pennsylvania delegation siding with the majority by a 7-11 
division.14 
The failure of nonimportation to effect a change in 
British policy, and Britain's continued violations of Amer-
ica's maritime rights prompted many to demand, and the 
president to request, a more effective measure. To a Con-
gress called to meet earlier than usual, Jefferson submitted 
his proposal for an embargo on December 18, 1807. The 
president's message was referred to a committee of which 
Senator Gregg of Pennsylvania was a member. On the 
1:! Pittsburgh Gazette, June 7, June 21, June 28, Aug. 4, Aug. 18, 1806; 
Pennsylvania Gazette, May 5, May 12, May 19, June 2, June 16, July 14, 
July 28, 1806. 
14 Annals of Congress, lOth Cong., 1st sess., 961-82. 
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same day the committee reported a bill "laying an embargo 
on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the 
United States." Mter approving a motion by a vote of 
22-7 to suspend the rules requiring that a bill introduced 
into the Senate must be read three times on three separate 
days and defeating by a vote of 12-16 a motion to postpone 
consideration of the measure for one day, the Senate 
passed the embargo by a vote of 22-6. On every vote 
Gregg sided with the majority while Samuel Maclay, 
Pennsylvania's other senator, voted with the minority.15 
On December 22 the House, in secret session, began 
consideration of the Senate embargo bill. Neither the 
Annals of Congress nor the Journal of the House of Repre-
sentatives report any extended debate on the bill, but five 
rollcall votes were taken before the bill was finally passed. 
Of these, three were taken to defeat limiting amendments 
and two to defeat opposition delaying tactics. Of seven-
teen Pennsylvania congressmen attending on that day, 
eleven voted with the majority to defeat every amendment 
or delaying tactic, while only one, William Hoge, voted 
on every issue with the Federalist minority. On the final 
vote to pass the embargo as it was submitted, the Penn-
sylvania delegation split 12-5-1 in favor of passage. The 
Pennsylvania delegation provided more votes for passage 
of the embargo than any other delegation.16 
On December 27, 1807, the House began consideration 
of legislation to enforce the embargo. Debate on the en-
forcement legislation took more than a week with numer-
ous amendments, procedural votes, and attempts at delay 
introduced by the opposition. Only two members of the 
Pennsylvania delegation took part in the debate. Speaking 
against an amendment to exempt ships involved in the 
fisheries, William Milnor observed that although he had 
15 Annals of Congress, lOth Cong., 1st sess., 50-51. 
16 Annals of Congress, lOth Cong., 1st sess., 1217-22. 
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voted against the embargo, since it had been passed, he 
wished it to be "carried into full effect-that there should 
be no evasion." Furthermore, he argued, this amendment 
would expose the men of the fisheries fleet to impressment 
thereby defeating another purpose of the embargo-keep-
ing our ships in port in order to avoid incidents that might 
lead to war. Smilie took the floor after Milnor. He pointed 
out that everyone suffered to some degree because of the 
embargo, but that the measure was necessary to protect 
"our valuable national rights." Its effectiveness as an 
alternative to war would be blunted if any exceptions 
were made. If exceptions were made for the fishermen 
today, there would be justification for making other ex-
emptions tomorrow and the embargo would fail com-
pletely. 
During the debate numerous rollcall votes were taken 
and the Pennsylvania delegation voted much as it had 
during the embargo debate. Twelve members always 
voted with the majority against any exemptions, against 
any amendment weakening the enforcement measure and 
against any delaying tactic. Only one, William Hoge, 
always voted with the minority in support of such meas-
ures. The remaining five, though generally siding with 
the minority, cast some votes, on some issues, with the 
majority. On January 2, 1808, the enforcement bill passed 
the House, 73-22. With the exception of Hoge and Samuel 
Smith who did not vote, the entire Pennsylvania delega-
tion voted in favor of this measureP 
Throughout the remainder of the session the House 
considered numerous amendments to the embargo and 
the enforcement legislation and many memorials and 
petitions from various parts of the country desiring relief 
or exemption from the embargo laws. Congress, with the 
support of the Pennsylvania delegation, remained stead-
17 Annals of Congress, lOth Cong., 1st sess., 1244-55, 1269-71. 
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fast. Weakening amendments were invariably defeated, 
and no exemptions were granted. In the Pennsylvania 
delegation the division remained the same. Twelve mem-
bers voted always with the majority, Hoge always with 
the minority, while five members shifted from one side 
to the other.18 
One incident is particularly revealing. On January 4, 
1808, Mr. John Porter of Pennsylvania introduced a 
memorial from Philadelphia merchants praying that ships 
that had been loaded and had secured clearance papers 
before the passage of the act be "excepted from the gen-
eral embargo." Milnor and Smilie spoke in favor of 
Porter's motion to refer the memorial to the Committee 
of Commerce and Manufactures. On the question of 
referral the House decided 91-16 to refer the memorial, 
the Pennsylvania delegation voting unanimously in favor. 
One week later the committee, of which Porter was a 
member, reported unanimously against granting the mer-
chants' petition on the now familiar grounds that any 
exemptions would blunt the effectiveness of the embargo 
as an alternative to war and might result in incidents 
leading to hostilities. By forcing the nation to rely on its 
own resources, the embargo would also hasten American 
development and secure the economic basis necessary to 
make political independence a reality. The committee's 
report was referred to a committee of the whole where its 
recommendations were approved by a substantial major-
ity. The Pennsylvania delegation divided 14-4. The twelve 
who always voted with the majority were joined by James 
Kelly and Joseph Clay. Hoge was joined by Robert 
Jenkins, William Milnor, and Samuel Smith.19 
18 For rollcall votes on measures dealing with enforcement of the 
embargo, or petitions praying exemptions see Annals of Congress, lOth 
Cong., 1st sess., 1269, 1271, 1276, 1384, 2245, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263. 
19 Annals of Congress, lOth Cong., 1st sess., 1271-77, 1383-87; Journal 
of the House of Representatives, lOth Cong., 1st sess., 270-71. 
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Speaking in support of an addition to the enforcement 
legislation, Joseph Clay stated that he had not favored the 
embargo and had not voted for it (he was the absent 
member). However, he believed it to be everyone's duty 
to make the law effective once Congress committed itself 
to the principle of the embargo and he would therefore 
vote in favor of the enforcement measure. Smilie con-
tended that those who opposed the enforcement legisla-
tion were those who had opposed the embargo and hoped, 
by their opposition to this legislation, to make it ineffec-
tive. Had they forgotten, he asked the members, the 
precarious situation of the nation at the time of the 
original legislation? At that time, he contended, the na-
tion had but three choices, "either submit to all injuries, 
... go to war, or lay an embargo." Congress had chosen 
the last as the most desirable alternative calculated to 
secure the rights of the United States without resort to 
war. Those who opposed the embargo and the enforce-
ment legislation offered only war or submission, neither 
of which alternatives he was willing to accept.20 
The last important measure relative to the embargo 
undertaken during this session was a bill authorizing the 
president to suspend the embargo during the congressional 
recess if, in his opinion, conditions warranted such action. 
The debate began on April 8, 1808, when Congressman 
George Washington Campbell of Tennessee introduced 
such a resolution in the House. It was referred to the 
committee of the whole without a division where, on the 
next day, debate began in earnest. The debate continued 
until April 19 with many members taking part in the 
discussion, but not one delegate from Pennsylvania par-
ticipated. Part of the opposition, led by John Randolph, 
argued that the bill unconstitutionally delegated power 
to the president. A smaller group, headed by D. R. Wil-
20 Annals of Congress, lOth Cong., 1st sess., 1706, 1710. 
go Pennsylvania and the War of 1812 
Iiams, opposed the bill on the grounds that its passage 
might be interpreted by foreign powers as a sign of 
weakness. 
The proponents of the bill argued along two lines. One 
argument maintained that granting the president the 
power to suspend the embargo would impress upon the 
people that the measure had been forced on the adminis-
tration by Great Britain, not arbitrarily imposed by the 
government, and that only a change in British policy 
would justify removal of the embargo. The other argu-
ment maintained that since the embargo was a retaliatory 
measure to coerce the belligerents to alter their policy 
without war, the act should be suspended if the desired 
changes were effected. 
During the debate many amendments were introduced 
but all were defeated by sizable majorities. Only three 
votes are recorded, however. The Pennsylvania delega-
tion followed its established pattern. Those who habitually 
sided with the majority did so on each of the three amend-
ments, while Hoge and the waverers voted with the 
minority. The bill finally passed the House 60-36, with 
Pennsylvania dividing 12-2-4. The four not voting were 
all of the group without definite commitment. 21 
Thus, a review of the embargo debate shows quite 
clearly that a majority of the Pennsylvania congressmen 
accepted economic coercion as an alternative to war, and 
looked to the possibility of the benefits to be derived 
from the impetus it would give to domestic manufacturing. 
The votes of the Pennsylvania delegation reflect the con-
cern for party unity. The twelve representatives who 
always voted with the majority were all Republicans. 
Hoge, who was always with the minority, and James Kelly 
of Adams County were the only Federalists on the dele-
21 Annals of Congress, lOth Cong., 1st sess., 2066, 2083-2171, 2198-
2246. 
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gation. The party affiliation of the other four who vacil-
lated from one side to the other cannot be definitely 
determined. Samuel Smith was elected with Federalist 
support in Pittsburgh, but he ran on a coalition ticket of 
Federalists and disaffected Republicans. William Milnor 
of Philadelphia was the candidate of a Republican faction 
in the city and probably drew some Federalist support 
since the Federalists did not run a candidate in that 
election. Robert Jenkins was an "irregular" Republican 
"inclined to wander from the party line." He, Daniel 
Hiester, and Matthias Richards had been elected on a 
ticket sponsored jointly by Federalists and Constitutional 
Republicans from a district consisting of Chester, Lan-
caster, and Berks counties. William Findley, writing to 
former Congressman Joseph Hiester, referred to Samuel 
Smith and William Hoge as members "of a flying squad 
who called themselves republicans but on whom we could 
not depend unless that we knew several of them would 
almost always vote against us."22 
The same themes can be found in the Republican press 
of the state and in the correspondence of leading Penn-
sylvania Republicans. The Carlisle Gazette called the 
embargo a "judicious measure." It protected American 
property, preserved peace and neutrality, and would gain 
respect for American rights from those nations who 
violated them. It urged the people to rally to the govern-
ment and support the embargo in order to prove to the 
world "that republican government can protect the people 
and attain its ends by methods short of war."23 A cor-
respondent declared the embargo was fully justified al-
though it would create hardship. But he felt most of the 
22 Sanford Higginbotham, Keystone of the Democratic Arch: Pennsyl-
vania Politics, 1800-1816 (Harrisburg, 1952), 73, 119, 157, 173, 372; 
Paulson's American Daily Advertiser, Oct. 22, 1808; Findley to Hiester, 
April 9, 1808, Gregg Collection. 
23 Carlisle Gazette, Jan. 8, 1808. 
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inconveniences would have been inevitable since "all the 
belligerent nations being placed in a state of blockade 
. . . would have produced the same result; there is this 
difference in favor of the embargo. By it we preserve our 
seamen and property and we vitally affect the nations 
which have injured us."24 Both the Washington Reporter 
and the Pittsburgh Commonwealth argued that the em-
bargo would force a change in British policy and "cause 
our rights to be respected." Both papers urged everyone 
to support the law and the administration in order to 
prove that there are methods of coercion short of war. 
If the embargo did not succeed, more vigorous measures 
could be taken later.25 In Harrisburg, the editor of the 
Guardian referred to the embargo as a "strong measure," 
the only weapon "competent to procure us justice." The 
Cumberland Register called it "a necessary and proper 
measure .... Its utility is beyond doubt." 
The Philadelphia Republican press also supported the 
embargo in spite of the fact that its operation could be 
expected to injure the city's commercial interests. Duane 
had recommended an embargo as early as 1805. It would 
be an easy way to prostrate Great Britain and force her 
to respect American rights while it would avoid the threats 
to republican government inherent in the large military 
establishment and heavy burden of debt which a war, or 
preparations forwar, would entail. "A suspension of inter-
course," he argued, "would convert the whole West Indian 
interest in England, which is stronger than any other, into 
active enemies of the present ministry." He felt the em-
bargo would incite insurrections throughout Great Britain 
if it were continued, and that it would force that nation 
24 Carlisle Gazette, Jan. 29, 1808. 
25 Washington Reporter, Dec. 19, Dec. 26, 1807, Jan. 2, Jan. 17, 1808; 
Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Feb. 12, Feb. 26, March 2, March 16, 1808; 
Dauphin Guardian, Jan. 5, Aprilll, 1808; Cumberland Register, Jan. 26, 
1808. 
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to alter its policy toward America. The consequences of 
the embargo for the United States would be .,incalculably 
beneficial." He said that some inconvenience may arise 
from want of a market for America's produce, but that this 
would be momentary because America's own industry 
would expand rapidly to create a new market. If this 
policy leads to war, Duane asserted, war must be accepted . 
.,We have a long list of grievances . . . and must gain 
acknowledgment of our just and honest claims."26 In July 
1808, Duane reprinted a box from the Northampton 
Republican Spy which subsequently appeared in many 
Republican papers in the state. 
THE EMBARGO 
will produce temporary inconvenience; the loss of a 
few thousand dollars; and give a little more time to 
citizens who do not choose to turn their attentions to 
internal improvements. It will not starve anybody. 
On the contrary, the staple necessaries of life will be 
cheaper. 
A WAR 
will produce the loss of millions of dollars, burning 
and sacking of towns and cities, rape, theft, murders, 
streams of blood, weeping widows, hapless orphans, 
the beggary of thousands, the ruin of agriculture and 
an extensive depravation of morals. 
Citizens of the United States! Which do you choose?27 
John Binns shared these sentiments and praised the policy 
in his paper, the Democratic Press. He wrote to Roberts 
that the measure had everything to recommend it because 
after years of futile protest and abortive threats, "it is a 
mode of action. It manifests to Britain the importance 
26 Philadelphia Aurora, July 3, 1807. Philadelphia Aurora, Dec. 14, 
1805, May 26, July 3, 1807. 
27 Philadelphia Aurora, July 26, 1808. 
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of American benevolence. It asserts our rights and pre-
serves the peace."28 
After an initial burst of support, the Federalist press 
opposed the embargo, but even the opposition accepted 
the categories of the measure's proponents, and was never 
as partisan, violent or obstructionist as the opposition of 
New England Federalists. William Short wrote to Jeffer-
son that Federalists in Philadelphia "are not in sentiment 
with the insurgents of the North."29 In Philadelphia, 
Federalists supported temperate resolutions, "asserting 
loyal support to the union 'whatever may be the errours 
of the administration, and however severe the pressure 
which these errours may have occasioned.' "3° Federalist 
editors simply argued that the embargo was not an honor-
able alternative to war, and would not cause Britain to 
respect American rights. Even if it were to succeed, the 
cost would be too high. Before the embargo could have 
any effect on the nation's enemies, at least a year must 
elapse, wrote the editor of the Pittsburgh Gazette. In the 
meantime "the merchant must lay his ships up in his 
docks ... the planter and farmer destroy their super-
fluous produce. All will become bankrupt to no avail.'' 
England would be deprived of some necessities, but this 
would not cause a change in policy nor deter the fight 
against Napoleon.31 The Harrisburg Times warned that 
the embargo would "stagnate all trade and embarrass 
every portion of the citizens in the community.'' Its 
passage was an "admission of American weakness; that 
we cannot protect our trade and therefore are willingly 
28 Higginbotham, Keystone, 166; Binns to Roberts, Jan. 11, 1808, 
Roberts Papers. 
29 Short to Jefferson, Sept. 6, 1808, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 
ed. A. A. Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh (Washington, D.C., 1903), XII, 159. 
30 Cited in Higginbotham, Keystone, 239-40. 
31 Pittsburgh Gazette, Jan. 12, 1808; Paulson's American Daily Adver-
tiser, Dec. 24, 1807; J. Cutler Andrews, Pittsburgh's Post-Gazette ( Bos-
ton, 1936), 47. 
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giving it up." The Pennsylvania Gazette commented that 
"the policy of commercial restriction will ruin this country 
before it effects a change of policy" in France or England. 
It is not a "vigorous measure," but another attempt to give 
"inaction the color of activity."32 The virulence with which 
Federalists attacked the embargo must have been more a 
matter of political opposition to the Jefferson administra-
tion than of actual discomfort induced by economic 
privation. 
Republicans did not allow Federalist allegations to go 
unchallenged, especially after they received the news of 
the resolutions of the Massachusetts legislature urging 
defiance of, and noncompliance with, the embargo and 
the enforcement legislation. The Carlisle Gazette urged 
compliance with the embargo act which the United States 
had been "compelled to resort to in vindication of its 
rights and to induce the British government to refrain 
from the plunder and oppression of our citizens and 
property." Those who opposed the measure and urged 
noncompliance, argued the editor, were moved by narrow 
and personal interests, and refused to see the benefits 
the nation could derive from the act. If the act was 
obeyed, either England would be forced to change its 
policy, or the United States, compelled to rely upon itseH 
for necessities, would develop its industry more quickly. 
"By producing from our own resources what we should 
otherwise have carried our money abroad to obtain, we 
keep our money in circulation at home." This would lead 
to an increase in manufacturing which, in turn, would 
create an "industrial class" creating a new market for the 
farmer. Development of manufactures would force us to 
develop other resources and improve our transportation. 
This economic development would provide "new securi-
32 Pennsylvania Gazette, March 11, April 17, 1808; Harrisburg Times, 
Dec. 28, 1807, Feb. 29, 1808. 
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ties for our independence" and new "value and strength 
to our freedom." Most importantly, "foreign influence, 
the bane of free states, diminishes in proportion as the 
national confidence in its own resources becomes better 
known and more duly appreciated."33 
The Aurora also saw positive benefits to be derived. 
The happiness and security of the United States, wrote 
Duane, depended as much on the balance of its economy 
as on the republican balance of its government and its 
military strength. So long as the United States relied on 
foreign nations for any essential needs, the country could 
not be truly independent. It was, therefore, "gratifying to 
witness the good consequences which flow to our country 
from evil causes. The aggressions of Great Britain [which 
forced us to enact the embargo for] protection and 
retaliation will do more for us in twelve months than our 
own slow policy would have accomplished in 20 years." 
By forcing Americans to rely on themselves, Britain was 
underwriting the nation's independence.34 
To counteract the Federalist argument that the embargo 
would not affect Britain's economy, Duane published 
long extracts from British newspapers and the parlia· 
mentary debates to show that it was having the desired 
effect. He gave particular prominence to the memorials 
of British merchants petitioning Parliament to adjust itS 
differences with the United States so trade would be 
reopened. He published the complete text of Alexander 
Baring's An Enquiry into the Causes and Consequence$ 
of the Orders in Council of Great Britain Towards the 
Neutral Commerce of America. After the last installment 
he stated that if the British government sought more 
information from men like Baring instead of relying on 
the misinformation it received from Federalists, the differ· 
33 Carlisle Gazette, Nov. 28, 1808. 
34 Philadelphia Aurora, July 2, 1808. 
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ence between the two countries could easily be adjusted 
to the satisfaction of both nations.35 
Similar sentiments were expressed in the western part 
of the state. On March 6, 1809, the Washington Reporter 
condemned "mercantile characters . . . who depend for 
life and fortune on British goods." The embargo had 
helped the development of new industries as witnessed 
"by the many new establishments in this county." But the 
Reporter warned that England would use any means "to 
crush the American mechanic and manufacturer by under-
selling them." Those who were interested in the pros-
perity of their country rather than their own personal 
wealth would support all administration measures to keep 
the peace, defend the nation's rights, and foster economic 
development. 36 
The Pittsburgh Commonwealth, pointing to increase in 
domestic manufactures and the prosperity and growth of 
the city, praised the embargo for the impetus it gave to 
economic growth and condemned those who opposed 
such a beneficial measure because of "personal incon-
venience, party feeling or foreign attachment."37 
Support of the embargo and condemnation of Federalist 
opposition was not limited to the press. A public meeting 
of Republicans in Washington County passed resolutions 
condemning the "hireling writers of a desperate British 
faction who . . . advocate treason." The meeting de-
nounced Hoge for his votes in the House and blamed "the 
avarice of unprincipled speculators" for the failure of the 
embargo to force a change in British policy. The final 
resolution affirmed that because of the embargo "impor-
35 The publication of Baring's pamphlet begins on April 21, 1808, and 
continues, with interruptions, until the end of the month. Similar 
material appears regularly in the columns of the Philadelphia Aurora, but 
is particularly heavy in April and May, 1808. 
36 Washington Reporter, March 6, 1809. 
37 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Feb. 19, 1809. 
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taut progress in the establishment of domestic manu-
factories" has been made. In the same meeting a letter 
was sent to President Jefferson thanking him for his efforts 
to preserve the honor, peace, and independence of the 
country against foreign foes and "the worthless part of 
the community" who put their personal gain above the 
public welfare. The letter closed with a firm pledge to 
support the government if it became necessary to use 
force either to enforce the law or to secure the nation's 
rights.38 
In Philadelphia ten thousand people attended a meeting 
to support the national government and to condemn the 
Massachusetts legislature for its advocacy of treason. 
In his opening address William Jones referred to the 
embargo as a temporary measure which "must be super-
seded, either by the peaceful enjoyments of our com-
mercial rights and independence, or their maintenance 
at the point of the sword." The state attorney general 
then offered the resolutions adopted by the meeting. These 
denounced New England opposition to the embargo, 
endorsed the measure as an honorable alternative to war, 
and recognized the protection it gave to domestic manu-
factures. The final resolutions declared that if the embargo 
had been rigidly enforced "it would have ... prevented 
the necessity of a recurrence to any other means to ensure 
justice from the belligerent nations" and clarified the 
meaning of "other means" by approving preparations for 
war and pledging to support the government in any 
"action" it should take, should Britain continue to violate 
neutral rights.39 At a second meeting, a week later, eigh-
teen thousand persons declared their support of the resolu-
tions adopted by the earlier meeting and again pledged 
38 Washington Reporter, Feb. 27, 1809. 
39 Philadelphia Aurora, Jan. 25, 1809. 
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to support the administration's efforts to protect American 
rights.40 
In Pittsburgh a public meeting heartily endorsed the 
embargo and promised to support a war if the embargo 
did not win respect for American rights. In Harrisburg 
another meeting approved the embargo and promised to 
support any measure, including war, which might be 
adopted to uphold American rights.U Meetings which 
adopted similar resolutions took place in Erie, Lancaster, 
and Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The resolutions adopted 
at these public meetings state explicitly what the editorials 
and the press had already implied: that the embargo was 
an alternative to war and if it failed to be effective, war 
must be declared. 
Public officials reflected the same attitude. A significant 
debate over the adoption of an address to the president 
developed in the legislative session of 1807-1808. This 
address expressed support for the policies of the national 
government, and approved its conduct of foreign affairs 
in general and the embargo in particular. The address 
also condemned the conduct of Great Britain and pledged 
the legislature to support every administration effort to 
protect American rights. It closed with a tribute to Jeffer-
son's wisdom and patriotism which successfully "defended 
our rights and ... saved the nation from the scourge of 
war." Every Federalist effort to substitute resolutions that 
did not mention the embargo or condemn the conduct of 
France was easily defeated.42 
In the American State Papers there is a resolution sub-
40 Philadelphia Aurora, Feb. I, 1809. 
41 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Feb. 22, 1809; Carlisle Gazette, March 
3, 1809, copied the report of the Harrisburg meeting from the Dauphin 
Guardian, Feb. 28, 1809. 
42 Pennsylvania House Journal, 1807-1808, pp. 49-57, 86-91, 187-88; 
Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1807-1808, pp. 5-11, 81-91. 
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mitted to Congress by the Pennsylvania legislature dated 
December 23, 1808, approving of the embargo as "a meas-
ure ... calculated to induce an observance of our national 
rights without a resort to the horrors and desolations of 
war." If that pacific measure did not produce the desired 
effect the resolution promised to support whatever meas-
ures the government may take to preserve the nation's 
rights.43 In his opening message to the state legislature in 
1808, Governor McKean congratulated the people of Penn-
sylvania for the loyalty with which they had supported the 
federal government. The good-natured manner in which 
the state had suffered the inconveniences of the embargo, 
and the loyal pledges it had made to suffer even the incon-
venience of war were proof of the willingness of the 
citizens of the state to pledge, once again, their "Lives, 
Liberties and ... sacred honor to support the Declaration 
'that these states are, and of Right ought to be free and 
independent.' " William Shippen confirms the impression 
of popular support for the embargo. In spite of it, he 
wrote to a friend in Boston, "the people again seem to be 
attaching themselves to the Democratic Party."44 
The General Assembly, in its session of 1808-1809, 
passed a number of resolutions approving the policy of the 
national administration and pledging support of any future 
action it might take. The first set of resolutions was 
introduced by Jacob Mitchell, of Philadelphia. Because 
the critical situation of the government's relation to 
foreign powers "calls for all its energies, unanimity and 
patriotism," and because "in such times it is the duty of 
the constituted authorities to aid the common cause of 
the country," the General Assembly resolved that the em-
bargo was a "just and necessary effect of the French de-
43 American State Papers: Foreign Affairs, III, 294-95. 
44 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th series, IV, 650-51; William Shippen to 
Charles Bishop, Oct. 6, 1809, Shippen Papers, Library of Congress. 
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crees and British orders-as a measure of sound policy it 
meets with our decided approbation and as a means of 
preserving peace it is entitled to the support of all Ameri-
cans." The assembly then pledged to support "with united 
hearts and hands ... whatever measures may be resorted 
to in defense of our national rights . . . if the insolence, 
. injustice, violence, or depravity of any power compell 
us to war, we will war with all our hearts and all our 
strength." These resolutions were debated and sent to a 
committee which, a week later, reported them with minor 
verbal changes and one significant addition. "The ocean 
being the equal property of all nations we will never 
abandon or surrender its rights ... and our present tem-
porary embargo shall never be considered ... as an aban-
donment of our maritime rights." During the debate 
Federalists submitted substitute resolutions condemning 
the embargo "as an ineffective method of coercion in for-
eign affairs" and denouncing it as an abandonment of 
American rights "to free navigation of the seas." These 
Federalist resolutions were defeated by the same margin 
by which the Republican sponsored resolutions were 
passed: 72-20 in the House, 20-5 in the Senate. It is impos-
sible to discover the party affiliation of all the members 
of the General Assembly. Of those whose party affiliation 
is known, however, the vote was strictly on party lines. 
It should be noted, also, that not one of the representatives 
from the city or county of Philadelphia, on which the em-
bargo would weigh most heavily, ever voted with the 
minority.45 
When the legislature received official news of the Massa-
chusetts resistance to the embargo it considered an even 
45 The resolutions, votes, and a brief description of this debate are in 
Pennsylvania House Journal, 19th sess., 1808-1809, pp. 15-16, 35-38. 57, 
71-75; Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 19th sess., 1808-1809, pp. 82, 17-90, 
132-33. See also Higginbotham, Keystone, 183. 
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stronger set of resolutions denouncing as "enemies and 
traitors" any who sought to dissolve the Union. The House 
offered to furnish the federal government Pennsylvania 
militia if they should be needed to enforce the federal 
law in Massachusetts. These resolutions proceeded to a 
second reading on March 1, 1809, but no further action 
was taken probably because on that day Congress repealed 
the embargo.46 
Like the resolutions passed by the public meetings, the 
resolutions and debates in the state legislature indicate 
that Pennsylvania supported the embargo as an alternative 
to war, but viewed it as a temporary measure which, if 
unsuccessful, must be followed by hostilities. 
These public attitudes are also reflected in private 
correspondence. Jesse Higgins, a Republican newspaper 
editor, and Benjamin Rush, doctor, scholar, and leading 
citizen of Philadelphia, were men of different backgrounds 
and positions who mentioned the embargo often enough 
in their correspondence so that it is easy to trace the 
development of their attitudes. Writing to Jonathan Rob-
erts about Federalist opposition, Higgins maintained that 
the Federalists were simple obstructionists who made no 
positive proposals. "[The Federalists] know as well as we 
do that one of two evils presented itself to the acceptance 
of the American government, an embargo, or war; and 
they know as well that the least evil was chosen."47 In 
April he told Roberts that Baring's pamphlet proved the 
embargo "was much more effectual than a declaration of 
war." He said he "would not be surprised at hearing a 
recall of the British orders-in-council in very little time.''48 
46 Pennsylvania House Journal, 19th sess., 1808-1809, pp. 530-32, 
551-52, 583; Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 19th sess., 1808-1809, pp. 
236-39, 292-97. 
47 Higgins to Roberts, Jan. 19, 1808, Roberts Papers. 
48 Higgins to Roberts, April 27, 1808, Roberts Papers. 
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As the months passed and Britain's policy did not change, 
Higgins's letters reflect his growing frustration. He con-
tinued to insist that the embargo would change British 
policy. "No possible benefit can accrue to England from 
. . . her orders-in-council." The continuance of the 
embargo subjected this nation "to all the evils which 
destruction of commerce can produce and the most un-
happy attacks on our government from an unprincipled 
faction which seen [sic] to sacrifice ... everything in 
order to [gain] a recovery of power and to obtain revenge 
of the Governing party." The expansion of domestic man-
ufacturing and the steadfast support of all Republicans 
compensated in part for the destruction of commerce and 
the rejuvenation of the Federalists, but, Higgins warned, 
unless the orders-in-council were repealed quickly a new 
policy would be required. Subsequent letters indicate 
what the new policy would have to be because, he said, a 
"continuation of our pacific measures" would lead to 
Federalist gains. "Federal depravity and strength has 
attained a height I had not foreseen." Republican govern-
ment "can never be safe so long as there is a party so 
depraved as to place its interests above national honor."49 
Benjamin Rush feared particularly the increase in 
Federalist strength which he attributed to the embargo. 
"Great clamors are everywhere excited against the em-
bargo," he wrote to John Adams. "How different were the 
feelings and conduct of our citizens in 177 4. . . . The 
clamors originate ... chiefly among one class of citizens."50 
Later he expressed his belief that large numbers of Repub-
licans and all Federalists would support Clinton and 
Monroe, rather than Madison in the forthcoming presi-
49 Higgins to Roberts, June 28, July 3, July 5, July 22, Aug. 14, Aug. 
23, Aug. 30, Sept. 15, 1808, Roberts Papers. 
50 Benjamin Rush to John Adams, Feb. 18, 1808, in Herbert Butter-
field, Letters of Ben;amin Rush, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1951), II, 960. 
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dential election and the Federalist candidate for governor 
in the state elections.51 Andrew Gregg informed William 
Jones that when he had voted for the embargo he believed 
that "it was a powerful engine in our hands which . . . 
could not fail of producing the intended effect." Violations 
which made the embargo ineffective and British intran-
sigence, however, had "blunted its effect [and] weakened 
the confidence of the people in their government and in the 
administration." Britain, he was sure, had concluded that 
"we did not have the power to enforce our own laws, let 
alone conduct a war." He suggested that the government 
take measures to prove one or the other.52 
It seems clear that a majority of Pennsylvania Republi-
cans supported the embargo as an alternative to war, 
which would be supplanted by war if it did not achieve 
its intended goals. This was the policy urged by the 
Republican press and by the state legislature, and this was 
the mood of the Pennsylvania delegation when the second 
session of the Tenth Congress began on November 7, 
1808. Beginning in mid-October 1808, and continuing 
well into February 1809, Republican newspapers carried 
articles and editorials demonstrating the effectiveness of 
the embargo. These also urged Congress not to submit 
to the pressure of foreign governments or domestic factions 
which, under a variety of disguises, urged a policy of 
submission. Concurrently there were numerous articles 
urging increases in the military establishment and other 
preparations for war. The tone of the Republican press 
was quite clear. Congress must either extend the embargo 
and enact effective enforcement legislation, or abandon 
efforts at peaceable coercion and declare war. 
The state legislature approved resolutions to be sent 
51 Rush to Adams, July 13, Aug. 24, Sept. 22, 1808, ibid., 970, 976, 
983, 984. 
52 Gregg to Jones, April 10, 1810, Jones Papers. 
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to Congress, and thanked the members of both houses 
"who have adhered to the wise and dignified policy of the 
executive in voting against repeal of the embargo laws." 
The resolutions concluded by proclaiming that "a repeal 
of the embargo laws at this time would in our opinion be 
an abandonment of the rights of the nation and of the 
property of citizens of the United States."53 
On the third day of the session the Pennsylvania dele-
gation voted unanimously to consider a motion calling for 
repeal of the embargo and all enforcement legislation. 
From the subsequent debate it is clear that Federalists 
supported the resolution with the hope of embarrassing 
the administration and repealing the embargo, while 
Republicans hoped to defeat repeal or substitute some-
thing stronger.54 Having voted to consider the resolution, 
Smilie urged postponement of such consideration on the 
grounds that to consider the motion at that time, unless a 
substitute for the embargo were proposed would imply a 
willingness to surrender the independence of the country. 55 
For the next two months the Republicans defeated a 
barrage of Federalist attacks on the embargo, but they 
made no positive proposals of their own. Finally, on 
December 27, 1808, the House began consideration of a 
stringent enforcement measure. Debate on this bill was 
heated and lengthy with innumerable amendments, at-
tempts at delay, and procedural arguments. No member 
of the Pennsylvania delegation took an active part in the 
debate, but their votes show that they continued to adhere 
to the Republican majority and to their previous positions. 
The division in the delegation varied between 15-2 and 
13-4 (one member was absent), Robert Jenkins having 
joined Hoge in constant opposition. Kelly and Milnor 
53 Pennsylvania Hoose Journal, 19th sess., 1808-1809, pp. 32, 53. 
54 Annals of Congress, lOth Cong., 2d sess., 474-78. 
65 Annals of Congress, lOth Cong., 2d sess., 475. 
Io6 Pennsylvania and the War of 1812 
continued to shift from side to side. On the final vote 
passing the enforcement bill the Pennsylvania delegation 
divided 14-2 with Hoge not voting. 56 This measure proved 
to be the swansong of the united Republican majority. 
Defections among New England members and lack of 
executive leadership either from the lameduck Jefferson 
or the president-elect Madison caused a fragmentation 
of the party in Congress. Some Republicans continued to 
recommend strong measures to the extent of proposing a 
definite date for repeal of the embargo and the commence-
ment of hostilities. Other Republicans introduced weak 
measures going so far as to recommend unconditional 
repeal.57 No member of the Pennsylvania delegation took 
part in the debates, and many were absent or did not vote 
on numerous occasions. Considering the faithful atten-
dance of the Pennsylvania delegates at the first session 
of the Tenth Congress and their faithful attendance dur-
ing the latter part of the second session, their absence 
might be interpreted as a sign of disinterestedness in, or 
disgust with, the proceedings. When they did attend and 
vote, they lent their weight in favor of strong measures 
and against measures which would result in outright repeal 
without, at least, a face-saving substitute. The result of 
this confusion was the passage of the nonintercourse bill 
on February 27, 1809, by a majority of 81-40. Of the 
Pennsylvania delegation two were absent and six voted 
against the bill leaving ten to vote in its favor. Of the six 
who opposed the measure, three, David Bard, John Porter, 
and Robert Whitehill, had consistently supported the em-
bargo and enforcement legislation. It can only be assumed 
that they opposed the nonintercourse bill not because 
56 The debate on this bill is scattered between pages 915 and 1026 in 
the Annals of Congress, lOth Cong,. 2d sess.; there are over forty rollcall 
votes. 
57 The collapse of the Republican majority is excellently summarized in 
Perkins, Prologue to War, 179-83, 225-32. 
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they favored abandonment of the coercive system but 
because they viewed it as a bad substitute for the embargo. 
This was certainly the attitude of the Pennsylvania 
Republican press. 
The Washington Reporter was livid at repeal of the 
embargo and the record of the second session of the Tenth 
Congress: "Looking back at some of the acts of this session 
is painful and disgusting." Instead of preserving our honor 
and independence, "a weak imbicile congress reduc[ed] 
us to the abject state of colonists." Repeal of the embargo 
was an act of "submission of the most disgraceful kind." 
The only legitimate substitute for the embargo was war, 
but Congress produced a nonintercourse law which would 
prove to be totally ineffectual. "If the 11th Congress does 
not 'pluck up the drowned honor' of the nation" we would 
do best "to submit willingly to colonial status."58 Duane 
of the Aurora was incensed. Repeal, he believed, resulted 
from artificial panic created by New England Republi-
cans to whom reelection was more important than the 
preservation of national rights. The nonintercourse bill 
would be totally ineffective since those who violated an 
enforceable embargo would certainly violate this unen-
forceable measure. On the other hand, Britain, convinced 
that the United States was too weak and divided to defend 
its rights by any means, let alone a war, would trample 
on those rights with increased impertinence.59 
William Jones, who had supported the embargo whole-
heartedly, confident that it would soon be "superseded 
by measures of dignity and energy," feared that the action 
of Congress foreshadowed a Federalist triumph. He re-
quested that Republicans be informed of future legisla-
tion in order to prepare themselves for their humiliation 
58 Washington Reporter, March 13, 1809. 
59 Philadelphia Aurora, Feb. 8, Feb. 10, Feb. 12, March 1, March 4, 
March 7, March 11, March 14, 1809. 
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as "objects of derision for our credulity."60 It is clear that 
many Pennsylvanians considered nonintercourse a measure 
of retreat. 
The general lack of enthusiasm for the nonintercourse 
bill among Pennsylvanians reflects more than a willingness 
to substitute war for embargo. It reflects a very high 
degree of party loyalty. The ten members of the dele-
gation who voted for the bill were not unaware of the 
sentiments of their constituents or the attitude of the 
Republican press. From their earlier support of the em-
bargo, and from their subsequent support of strong meas-
ures, it is clear that they supported nonintercourse as a 
matter of party loyalty, not because they had any faith in 
the measure. They would have preferred something 
stronger if they had had a free choice. 
The press showed similar loyalty. Condemning the 
measure as an abandonment of national rights and honor 
on the one hand, it urged compliance with the measure 
and continued to pledge support to the administration. 
At the same time the newspapers pressed for military 
preparations and continued to demand action to protect 
America's maritime rights. 
In his message to the legislature Governor Snyder 
expressed regret that "all the measures which the wisdom 
and anxious patriotism of congress had produced," had 
failed to win respect for American rights. He hoped, 
however, the efforts of Congress would meet with general 
approval and that future efforts would excite "in every 
American's bosom a fixed and determined resolution to 
support the general government."61 Compared to the vig-
orous approval of the embargo in his earlier message, this 
endorsement of nonintercourse does little more than damn 
60 William Jones to William B. Giles (senator from Virginia), Feb. 4, 
1809, cited in Higginbotham, Keystone, 241. 
61 Governor's Message, Dec. 7, 1809, Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 
1809-1810, pp. 10-12. 
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with faint praise. The state legislature, which in the 
previous session had passed numerous resolutions specif-
ically expressing support for the embargo, passed none 
in support of nonintercourse, though it did pass some 
resolutions expressing general support for the policies of 
the national government.62 Significantly, these resolutions 
affirmed a willingness on the part of the General Assembly 
of Pennsylvania "in the name and on behalf of their con-
stituents" to cooperate with "the general government in 
all necessary measures" whenever "in the opinion of our 
national councils, an appeal to the patriotism and force 
of the American people becomes necessary."63 The House 
also passed resolutions approving the conduct of the gen-
eral government and pledging support in case of an appeal 
to arms. It indicated its attitude toward nonintercourse 
by resolving that "continued submission . . . cannot but 
create a suspicion that all are regardless of our rights, and 
careless of our fame."64 Whereas Pennsylvanians had 
actively supported the embargo because they believed it 
would be effective, they tolerated nonintercourse not out 
of conviction, but out of party loyalty. 
As the administration moved closer to submission by 
the adoption of Macon's bill No.2, Pennsylvania Republi-
cans clung even more tenaciously to the Republican ad-
ministration. In Congress, the Pennsylvania delegation 
opposed the measure until the very end, and when it 
became obvious that it would pass, voted in favor of it. 
The Republican press condemned the measure more se-
verely than they had condemned nonintercourse. Yet, 
when President Madison, pursuant to the provisions of 
the law, reimposed nonintercourse against Britain, the 
Pennsylvania press stoutly defended his action. 
62 See for example Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1809-1810, pp. 64-68, 
104-105; Pennsylvania House Journal, 1809-1810, pp. 17-20, 71-73. 
63 Pennsulvania Senate Journal, 1809-1810, pp. 104-105. 
64 Pennsylvania House Journal, 1809-1810, pp. 65-70, 180-81. 
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The Eleventh Congress opened its second session in 
May 1809. Almost immediately a contest developed 
between a group which wanted to repeal nonintercourse 
because of its ineffectiveness, and another which admitted 
the ineffectiveness of nonintercourse but wished to sub-
stitute either war or another total embargo. In between 
was a far larger group which did not know what it wanted. 
The ensuing debates affirm the observations of Congress-
man Samuel Taggart of Massachusetts who commented 
to his friend and pastor: "A more completely divided 
bewildered, disorganized set of men hardly exists. . . . 
The Senate and House act in such entire harmony that 
when one says I will the other says I won't." Senator 
Gregg wrote to Alexander J. Dallas that "not a single 
member of Congress ... appears to have formed a definite 
opinion as to the course to be pursued."65 Though an 
adequate description of Congress, this is not an adequate 
description of the Pennsylvania delegation. 
The debate on Macon's proposals is long and infinitely 
more complex than on the embargo or nonintercourse 
bills. Nothing of great value would be learned by tracing 
it minutely through both houses of Congress. In each 
house there were numerous amendments and a great deal 
of parliamentary maneuvering. The result was the passage 
by each house of totally different measures. Mter repeated 
conference committee recommendations had been re-
jected, both houses adopted the measure substantially 
as it had been originally proposed. The bill opened trade 
with both belligerents and provided, in effect, that if 
France repealed her decrees as they affected the United 
States, the president would reimpose nonintercourse 
65 Samuel Taggart to Rev. John Taylor, April 27, 1810, in "Letters of 
Samuel Taggart, Representative in Congress, 1803-1814," ed. George 
Haynes, American Antiquarian Society, Proceedings, new series, XXXIII, 
347; Andrew Gregg to A. J. Dallas, Dec. 4, 1809, Dallas Papers, 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
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against Britain. Likewise, if Britain repealed her orders, 
the United States would reimpose nonintercourse against 
France. In the more than fifty rollcalls that were taken 
during the debate, the Pennsylvania delegation showed 
remarkable consistency. Fourteen of the members voted 
in favor of every amendment which would have put teeth 
into the measure-amendments to double duties on goods 
imported from either belligerent, amendments to allow 
merchant ships to travel in convoys and arm in self de-
fense, amendments to prohibit French and British vessels 
from entering American waters. Two members, William 
Milnor and Robert Jenkins, always opposed the strength-
ening amendments. Daniel Hiester and Samuel Smith 
wavered, but sided much more regularly with Milnor and 
Jenkins. On the final passage of Macon's bill No. 2 the 
Pennsylvania delegation divided 10-7-1. Jenkins and Mil-
nor opposed, while Samuel Smith and Hiester who gen-
erally voted with them supported the measure. William 
Anderson and Adam Seybert, new members from Philadel-
phia, David Bard, William Crawford, newly elected from 
Gettysburg, and John Ross-all of whom had supported 
strong measures and all of whom, except Ross who did not 
run again, later voted for war in the Twelfth Congress, 
voted against the bill. Of these, Ross, Anderson, and 
Seybert participated in the debate. They supported Senate 
amendments providing for the arming of merchant ships 
because, according to Ross, the measure as passed by the 
House was not calculated to assert the honor and dignity 
of the nation. 66 In a second speech Ross asserted that only 
three courses were open to the nation. It must abandon 
commerce, suffer England to regulate it, or protect it by 
force. The first two courses, he argued, were dishonorable 
and Macon's bill did not provide for energetic measures. 
It was, in fact, nothing more than a "third edition" of the 
66 Annals of Congress, 11th Cong., 2d sess., 1267-73, 1441. 
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embargo based on the dishonorable principle that the best 
way to protect the nation's rights and commerce is to 
abandon them. America's experience with policy based 
on this principle proved that it was futile. It had not 
induced either belligerent to modify its policy. The United 
States suffered intolerable insults at the hands of the 
British, he concluded, and the time had come to abandon 
the principle of the embargo and to undertake strong 
measures. "I am for manly resistance and for declaring 
in our laws as well as speeches that the embargo ground 
is no longer tenable and that this nation will defend its 
rights, by force if necessary." 
Adam Seybert supported amendments imposing a heavy 
duty on British and French goods to give some measure 
of strength to a bill that otherwise dishonored the nation, 
and on the ground that such duties would foster infant 
industry. 67 
William Anderson opposed the bill because it entailed 
an abject surrender of the nation's rights, honor, and inde-
pendence. Those who supported the bill on the supposi-
tion that it would avert war, he maintained, were grossly 
mistaken. Submission to insult leads only to greater injury. 
American experience had shown that peaceful and con-
ciliatory measures on its part did not bring forth similar 
measures from Great Britain. On the contrary, the British 
cabinet read such measures as signs of weakness and was 
prompted into even more insulting measures. "I do myself 
deprecate war, and am as desirous of peace as any gentle-
man on the floor," he said, but rather than agree to this 
measure which can only be viewed as complete submis-
sion, he would "grant letters of marque and reprisal," and 
if necessary go further. "I would call forth the resources 
of the nation, present a firm front, sustain our honor, 
defend our rights and independence and not suffer them 
67 Annals of Congress, lith Cong., 2d sess., 1891-1900. 
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tamely to fall at the feet of a tyrant without a struggle."68 
It can only be assumed that these four Republicans who 
opposed the measure felt it was too weak and agreed with 
Thomas Gholson of Virginia who declared that the bill 
"held up the honor and character of this nation to the 
highest bidder."69 On the other hand, Smilie, who asserted 
that this bill is "on all hands ... acknowledged to be 
submission" and who favored letting the nonintercourse 
bill expire without any substitute in preference to passing 
Macon's bill, voted for it.70 Defending his about-face, 
Smilie observed that the House was divided into three 
groups: those who would do nothing, those who preferred 
"more energetic measures," among whom he counted him-
self, and those who wished to follow a moderate course 
by passing Macon's bill. Those who favored energetic 
measures, he argued, would gain nothing by allying them-
selves with those who would do nothing. On the other 
hand, by supporting the bill they gained time, gave Great 
Britain one more chance to change her policy, and did 
not deny themselves the possibility of supporting stronger 
measures in the future.n The only plausible explanation 
for this otherwise unexplainable behavior of Pennsyl-
vania's Republican delegation is that to some, party regu-
larity was a primary consideration, while others were 
willing to abandon the party standard to show their dis-
satisfaction with the administration's submissive policy. 
The fact that four of the Republican defectors were newly 
elected congressmen to whom the necessity for party 
regularity might not have become obvious lends some 
credibility to this conjecture. 
The press hardly took any notice of the passage of 
Macon's bill No. 2. The text of the law was printed in 
68 Annals of Congress, 11th Cong., 2d sess., 1325-28. 
69 Ibid., 1772. 
70 Ibid., 1643. 
71 Ibid., 1188-89. 
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all the Republican papers within two weeks of passage, 
but the editors on the whole were silent. In February 
1811, almost a year after the bill was passed, Duane re-
viewed the course of American policy which had brought 
us to "this unhappy state." In his summary he argued 
that under the circumstances, the embargo was the best 
policy that could have been adopted because it was a 
substitute for war. It would have achieved its intended 
goals if it had been continued, but a weak-willed adminis-
tration had abandoned it for a course which led ultimately 
to total submission. 72 
Macon's bill No. 2 set the scene for one of the most 
embarrassing and tangled diplomatic farces in the nation's 
early history. On August 5, 1810, President Madison 
received a note from the French foreign minister, the Due 
de Cadore, asserting that the French decrees, as they 
applid to American commerce, would be repealed as of 
the following November, if by that time Britain had 
repealed her orders, or the United States, in compliance 
with Macon's bill, had reimposed nonintercourse against 
Great Britain. When Congress passed Macon's bill it 
had not contemplated the possibility of such a conditional 
repeal of either belligerent's restrictive regulations. Al-
though the bill provided that the president must have 
concrete evidence of repeal, it did not specify what satis-
factory evidence was. Madison's acceptance of the Cadore 
letter at its face value led to charges of Francophilia, or 
more charitably, that he had allowed himself to be duped. 
The two most recent studies convincingly dispute these 
allegations. Irving Brant and Bradford Perkins contend 
that Madison was fully aware of the pitfalls of the French 
proposal, but decided to accept it in the hope of forcing 
England to repeal her orders.73 
72 Philadelphia Aurora, Feb. 7, 1811. 
73 Brant, Madison: The President, 1809-1812, pp. 207-21; Perkins, Pro-
logue, 246-53. 
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Whatever his motives, on November 2, 1810, Madison 
issued a proclamation stating that France had met the 
requirements of Macon's bill. If England did not revoke 
its edicts within three months, nonintercourse would be 
revived. 74 When England took no action, trade with that 
nation was closed on February 2, 1811. 
Pennsylvania Federalists were incensed by what they 
considered Madison's capitulation to France. Almost 
daily, articles in both the Pennsylvania Gazette and the 
Pittsburgh Gazette attempted to show that the French 
decrees had not been revoked. These articles generally 
contained letters or reports from sailors and ship captains 
who claimed they had been molested by the French since 
the announced date of repeal. These "proofs" are generally 
followed by statements to the effect that the administra-
tion must be dominated by French influence and that the 
purpose of economic coercion was to destroy commerce 
and vent the administration's hatred of England.75 The 
Pennsylvania Gazette also carried many articles on the 
progress of British manufactures. These began in the 
spring of 1810 and appeared often and in ever increasing 
detail until the end of February 1812. These features 
appear without comment, but are so conspicuous that one 
begins to wonder why they are included. The reason 
becomes obvious on October 30, 1811, in an article intro-
ducing excerpts from an English pamphlet reporting the 
progress of manufactures there. "The positive, and some-
times avowed object of the present rulers of the U. S. in 
their suicidal measures . . . having been to annihilate 
British manufactures and impoverish Britain; and Con-
gress about to convene to witness the effects of these 
measures and contemplate new ones," the Gazette pub-
74 American State Papers: Foreign Affairs, III, 392. 
75 Pennsylvania Gazette, Oct. 23, Nov. 6, Nov. 13, 1811, Jan. 8, Feb. 
5, 1812; Pittsburgh Gazette, Oct. 17, Oct. 24, Nov. 9, Nov. 19, Dec. 4, 
Dec. 11, Dec. 17, 1811, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 6, 1812. 
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lished the fact of British progress to show that American 
policy had been ineffective and that similar efforts in the 
future would be equally unavailing.76 
The Republican press rallied to the administration, and 
stoutly defended Madison's policy of accepting Cadore's 
note as evidence of French repeal and of reviving non-
intercourse against Britain. The Aurora strongly supported 
Madison's policy, though it had not particularly favored 
Macon's bill. The French, Duane asserted, had "unques-
tionably repealed their decrees" on the condition pro-
posed. "The condition is that we shall cease to import 
from Great Britain .... The law is clear and explicit and 
admits of no equivocation or alternation." By its very 
nature, Duane continued, Macon's bill is different from 
"normal domestic legislation which may be repealed or 
amended at pleasure .... The law is in fact, a convention 
with a foreign nation ... and its execution is ... as 
obligatory on our government as the most solemn treaty."77 
If the United States were to keep its word, "not one iota 
of merchandise from Great Britain or her dependencies 
can be admitted into the United States." In the past two 
years the progress of American manufactures "is not only 
incalculable but . . . incredible." Affirmation and con-
tinued application of policies that would force Americans 
to rely on domestic production would "in a few years ... 
place us in a situation really independent of all the nations 
of the earth."78 The Carlisle Gazette followed the same 
theme. The president had proclaimed that the French had 
revoked their decrees and in compliance with our own 
laws had revived nonintercourse against Britain. Macon's 
bill could not be amended because if "we once deviate 
from a compact, we lose our standing in the affairs of 
76 Pennsylvania Gazette, Oct. 30, 1811. 
77 Philadelphia Aurora, Jan. 9, Jan. 14, Jan. 23, 1811. 
78 Philadelphia Aurora, Aug. 1, 1811. 
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nations."79 Furthermore, Britain's policy toward the United 
States since French repeal exhibited "a mean, fraudulent, 
low, cunning" attitude. Britain had justified the orders-in-
council on the grounds of retaliation, but now that the 
French had repealed their decrees, the British refused to 
repeal their orders. The real reason for the British orders 
was their fear of American development in commerce 
and manufacturing. Their goal was to stop that growth 
before we became too serious competitors. How ironic 
that the very policy they followed had the opposite 
effect.80 
In his message to the legislature, the governor observed 
that "it is a matter of satisfaction to perceive that one of 
the belligerents has evinced a disposition to respect our 
neutral rights. . . . On the part of the other belligerent 
hardly a symptom appears to warrant an expectation of an 
amiable adjustment." The message concluded by again 
pledging Pennsylvania's support if the government were 
to decide that only force could secure the nation's rights.Bl 
The Commonwealth praised the governor's speech for 
expressing "that patriotic support of the general govern-
ment so often wanting among public men." The paper 
carried many articles about smuggling across the Canadian 
border, exulting whenever the merchandise was con-
fiscated. "This is as it should be-the laws ought to be 
rigidly enforced."82 
One correspondent expressed another theme that could 
be found regularly in the press. One of the impediments 
to forceful action had been the problem of whether we 
should wage war against all our assailants, or single out 
79 Carlisle Gazette, March 3, 1811. 
80 Carlisle Gazette, Aug. 23, 1811. 
8l Governor's message, Dec. 6, 1811, quoted in the Pittsburgh Com-
monwealth, Dec. 16, 1811. 
82 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Oct. 28, Nov. 4, Dec. 16, 1811, Feb. 11, 
March 24, 1812. 
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one enemy. That problem no longer existed. Napoleon's 
repeal of the French decrees had settled outstanding 
differences between the United States and France. Eng-
land, however, persisted in her outrageous demands, re-
fused to do this nation justice, and continued her usurpa-
tions. She was now the only enemy and America's "inde-
pendence, honor and patriotism demand satisfaction."83 
Reverting to its traditional 13-2-3 division, the Pennsyl-
vania delegation voted with the majority in Congress to 
deny all appeals for permission to import goods loaded 
or paid for before the president's proclamation, or before 
the reimposition of nonintercourse.84 
In the debate on the actions taken pursuant to Macon's 
bill No.2, Pennsylvania Republicans affirmed their attach-
ment to the principle of commercial coercion, but more 
particularly to the Republican administration. Having 
supported the embargo as an honorable alternative to war, 
they had acquiesced in the substitution of nonintercourse 
which, all agreed, was a much weaker measure. With less 
unanimity they had supported the even weaker policy 
of Macon's bill No.2. When that policy came under bitter 
Federalist attack-an attack much more legitimate than 
the assault on the earlier policies of the Republican admin-
istration-Republicans rallied stoutly to support the policy 
and the administration which pursued it although most 
of them had not approved of the policy and would have 
preferred a substitution of war for nonintercourse. 
The people of the state affirmed their support of the 
administration and their desires for stronger measures by 
their votes in the elections for the Twelfth Congress. 
William Milnor and Daniel Hiester, who had always voted 
differently from the rest of the delegation, and Samuel 
Smith and Robert Jenkins, who had often sided with them, 
88 "My Voice Is Still for War," Philadelphia Aurora, Sept. 9, 1811. 
84 Annals of Congress, 11th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 232, 441, 446, 
1354. 
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were not reelected. In their place Pennsylvania Republi-
cans sent Jonathan Roberts, Roger Davis, Abner Lacock, 
and William Piper, all of whom supported every move 
toward war in the Twelfth Congress. One congressional 
election is particularly instructive. Matthias Richards, 
who had served in the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses 
as a representative of a dissident Republican faction in 
Pennsylvania, was renominated by them in 1810. Regu-
lar Republicans put up their own candidate. The Fed-
eralists also put up a man. In September Richards pub-
licly withdrew his name, stating that a Republican split in 
the three-county district he represented might result in 
the election of three Federalists. Since all Republicans 
voted the same on national issues he felt he could prevent 
an intraparty fight by dropping out of the race.85 Richards' 
resignation in the interest of party harmony indicates that 
public sentiment was running in that direction. The final 
election results certainly reflect this sentiment. Of the 
eighteen representatives all but one were Republican and 
none of these had run on the platform or as the candidate 
of the state's dissident Republican faction. In the face of 
grave national problems the state Republican party, often 
divided on state issues, united to send to Congress a 
"pure" Republican delegation. In the elections for the 
state legislature, the results were equally indicative of the 
sentiment for party unity. The state House numbered 
seventy-two Republicans, seventeen Federalists, and six 
"nondescripts"; the senate, twenty-one Republicans, seven 
Federalists, and three "nondescripts."86 
85 Philadelphia Aurora, Sept. 22, 1810. Higginbotham, Keystone, 219. 
86 J.M.S. "General Abner Lacock," Pennsylvania Magazine of History 
and Biography, IV ( 1880), 202-209; William A. Russ, "Trends in the 
Pennsylvania Congressional Delegations," Pennsylvania History, X (Octo-
ber, 1943 ), 268-81; Binns to Roberts, Oct. 3, 1810, Roberts Papers; 
Philadelphia Aurora, Oct. 5, Oct. 10, 1810; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, 
July 2, Sept. 3, Sept. 10, Sept. 17, Sept. 24, Oct. 19, 1810; Higgin-
botham, Keystone, 220. 
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Pennsylvania's Republican congressmen could have lit-
tle doubt as to what was expected of them. The same 
papers that had defended the administration's policies 
against Federalist attacks urged the new Congress to 
adopt a more vigorous policy. Shortly after it opened 
its first session, the Twelfth Congress received a series of 
resolutions passed by the Pennsylvania legislature affirm-
ing that British policy "cannot but arouse the virtuous 
indignation of every friend of this nation"; that "when 
submission or resistance to the unjust demands of a 
tyrant are the alternative, the latter only can be chosen 
by the free men of America"; that in order to "repel aggres-
sion and obtain reparations [we will] vigorously exert all 
the powers which we possess to accelerate the accomplish-
ments of such military preparations as the wisdom of the 
national legislature may require." They concluded by 
pledging to support "an appeal to arms ... at the risk of 
our lives and fortune."87 
The attitude of the press is typified by one statement 
from the Pittsburgh Commonwealth: "Submission or resis-
tance seems to be our inevitable lot. And we should blush 
for the spirit of our country if a sentiment favorable to the 
former were suffered to be admitted to our councils. As 
to the mongorl [sic] state of resisting only on paper ... we 
believe the public heartily tired of it and fully ready for 
change." Preparations therefore must be made for war. 
England would then repeal or modify her orders. If not, 
"hostilities must ensue."88 
Pennsylvania's Republican congressmen did not disap-
point their constituents. During the Twelfth Congress 
they supported all preparatory measures, except some 
efforts to strengthen the navy, and ultimately cast sixteen 
votes for war. It seems quite clear that from the time 
87 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 586-88. 
88 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Jan. 7, 1812. 
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Jefferson proposed the first embargo as an alternative to 
war, until Madison proposed the embargo of April 1812 
as a precursor to war, Pennsylvania Republicans whole-
heartedly supported the administration even though they 
did not always approve of the substitutes for war which 
followed the original embargo. The divisions in the state's 
congressional delegation, the results of congressional elec-
tions, and the attitudes of the press indicate quite clearly 
that the state's support of the ineffectual efforts at com-
mercial coercion which followed the embargo were based 
not on faith in the effectiveness of the policies, but on 
loyalty to the Republican party. 
One other factor helps to explain Pennsylvania's support 
for the policy of commercial restriction: the belief that 
this policy would enhance the development of the state's 
manufacturing. Alone, this factor would not have won 
support for the policy, but it undoubtedly reinforced the 
support given as a matter of party loyalty. The extent to 
which the commercial policy of the administration and 
the subsequent war influenced the development of do-
mestic manufactures is the subject of some controversy, 
but there is much evidence to corroborate Victor Clark's 
generalization that "the isolation of the Republic during 
the period of non-intercourse and the war of 1812 stimu-
lated factory industry."89 
All of the standard statistical compendia include charts 
showing significant increases in the volume and value of 
domestic manufactures between 1807 and 1815.90 Rather 
than reproduce facts and figures culled from these works 
89 Victor Clark, History of Manufactures in the United States, 1807-
1860 (Washington, 1916), 235. 
90 See Timothy Pitkin, Statistical View of the Congress of the United 
States of America (New Haven, 1835), 261-62, 266-92, 302, 305; Anne 
Bezanson, Robert Gray, and Miriam Hussey, Wholesale Prices in Phila-
delphia, 1784-1861 (Philadelphia, 1936); Arthur Cole, Wholesale Com-
modity Prices in the United States, 1700-1861 (Cambridge, 1938), 25-
40, 138-49. 
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which were themselves compiled long after the event, 
the following paragraphs will present evidence, admit-
tedly impressionistic, to show that many contemporary 
Pennsylvanians believed the commercial policy of the 
government to be beneficial. 
In his report on manufacturers in 1810 Gallatin declared 
that the interference of the belligerents with American 
neutral trade and the commercial policy of the general 
government had "broken inveterate habits and given a 
general impulse to which must be ascribed the general 
increase of manufactures during the last two years." 
Capital and industry had been forced into other channels 
by this policy resulting in the increases he reported.91 
The press and people of Pennsylvania seem to have 
accepted Gallatin·s propositions. The United States Ga-
zette, a Federalist newspaper which might be expected 
to describe the effects of the embargo in the worst possible 
light, admitted that the overall effects for manufacturing 
were beneficial. It described in detail the sufferings of 
sailors and their families and of other groups which 
were adversely affected by the embargo, but concluded 
that "the Embargo has as yet produced comparatively 
little inconvenience in this city and neighborhood." While 
the winter had been hard, heavy construction provided 
jobs for eight or ten thousand men who had been thrown 
out of work by the embargo.92 The United States Gazette 
predicted a hard winter when frost ended the building 
boom, but gloried in the building boom of the summer.93 
The Philadelphia Price Current, a Republican paper, was 
even more direct. It published a lengthy article on 
Philadelphia manufactures "to prove that by the Presi-
dent's originating partial depravations, he had ultimately 
91 American State Papers: Finance, II, 430. 
92 United States Gazette, Oct. 8, 1808. 
93 Ibid., Oct. 22, 1808. 
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bestowed on his country immense and imperishable bene-
fits."94 
Shortly after the embargo was passed, Duane defended 
it on the grounds of its expected domestic effect. The 
measure, he said, would be a "wall of fire" behind which 
the United States could establish manufactures, develop 
its resources, develop means of internal transportation, 
and thus establish "that independence which is now only 
nominal." He called America's dependence on foreign 
commerce "a great curse" but said that now there is a 
golden opportunity to dispense with it by promoting 
domestic industries. 95 Assessing the effects of the embargo 
a year later, Duane asserted that "it greatly helped the 
development of manufactures to a degree yet unknown." 
He proclaimed that "the embargo has built or nearly built 
10,000 houses in this city. The embargo has erected 
two manufactories [sic] of shot ... which forever secures 
the circulation at home of about two hundred thousand 
dollars, hitherto sent abroad to pay for shot."96 Duane 
relied heavily on this argument. The embargo promoted 
manufactures not only because it forced Americans to rely 
on their own resources, but because it kept American 
capital at home. "The capital of merchants and monied 
men being withdrawn from commerce, has been appro-
priated to other purposes."97 At a dinner given in Carlisle 
to celebrate "the improved prospects" for industry, the 
diners celebrated the increase in manufactures and the 
embargo by drinking a toast to "the best mode of warfare 
for our country-the artillery of carding and spinning and 
the musketry of shuttles and sledges."98 
Addresses by the governor to the state legislature reflect 
94 Philadelphia Price Current, Oct. 25, 1808. 
95 Aurora, Jan. 6, 1808. 
96 Philadelphia Aurora, Sept. 1, 1808. 
97 Philadelphia Aurora, Nov. 3, 1808. 
98 Carlisle Gazette, Nov. 15, 1808. 
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the same belief. In his message to the nineteenth session 
of that body, Snyder admitted that the embargo had 
caused some distress, but the temporary hardships were 
not to be compared to the long-range benefits. The em-
bargo, he argued, "by forcing us to rely on our own re-
sources has accelerated the development of domestic 
manufactures which will provide that economic inde-
pendence without which political independence cannot 
endure."99 
The Pennsylvania house responded by passing resolu-
tions, with Federalist support, promising to use only items 
of domestic manufactures and by appointing a committee 
to consider what the state could do to aid manufactures. 
The same body passed a bill appropriating money "to 
relieve the distress of the seamen of Philadelphia" who 
had been deprived "of support and employ by the em-
bargo."100 
The following year Governor Snyder observed with 
satisfaction that "in proportion to the difficulty of access 
to, and commerce with, foreign nations, is the zeal and 
exertion to supply our wants by home manufactures. Our 
mills and furnaces are greatly multiplied; new beds of ore 
have been discovered, and the industry and enterprise of 
our citizens are turning them to the most useful purposes. 
Many new and highly valuable industries have been estab-
lished, and we now make in Pennsylvania various articles 
of domestic use, for which, two years since, we were 
wholly dependent upon foreign nations." After listing 
specific factories that had been established throughout 
the state, Snyder recommended to the legislature that it 
"devise means to encourage domestic manufactures."101 
In 1811 Snyder praised the skill and enterprise of the 
99 Pennsylvania House Journal, 19th sess., 1808-1809, pp. 19-22. 
1oo Ibid., 144, 187, 211. 
101 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 20th sess., 1809-1810, pp. 10-12. 
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artisans of the state who had "turned the potential eco-
nomic chaos which might have been expected due to the 
embarrassing state of our foreign relations to a great 
advantage" for the state by weaning Pennsylvanians from 
foreign commercial speculation and inviting their attention 
to the exploration of the internal resources of their state. 
This, he added, would lead to a great expansion of 
domestic manufacturing which in turn would convert the 
"transient calamity into a permanent, substantial national 
advantage."102 
Individuals attested to a similar belief. William Dalzell 
complimented Jefferson on the embargo which made 
possible rapid industrial growth on every hand, and 
expressed the hope that Congress would enact other legis-
lation to protect and encourage American industrial devel-
opment.103 
While not explicitly supporting the embargo, Nicholas 
Biddle gives an interesting account of the general indif-
ference to the measure by men of wealth. "You would 
hardly recognize Philadelphia, so much has it grown and 
improved," he wrote to a friend in Paris. "Your former 
acquaintances are here and prospering." Commenting 
on the political effects of the embargo, Biddle mentioned 
that it probably caused the larger Federalist vote in New 
England, and some other areas, but significantly does not 
mention Philadelphia or Pennsylvania. He concludes, "in 
all these matters I do not mingle. . . . I am occupying 
myself with my profession."104 
A delegation of merchants and laborers wrote Jefferson: 
"We behold in a temporary suspension of our commerce 
102 The governor's message is cited in Niles Register, Dec. 21, 1811, 
pp. 281-84. 
103 Dalzell to Jefferson, Feb. 10, 1809; Short to Jefferson, Aug. 27, 
1808, expresses the same sentiment. Both letters are cited in L. M. Sears, 
Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927), 216-19. 
104 Biddle to La Grange, Sept. 26, 1808, cited in Sears, Jefferson, 218. 
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an ephemeral and doubtful evil, producing a great grow-
ing and lasting good. We see arising out of this cause the 
prolific sources of our internal wealth explored and with 
industry and ability directed through channels which ... 
enrich our country with solid wealth and make her more 
independent and wealthy."105 Jefferson responded by 
thanking them for their support and commending them 
for their farsightedness in seeing the long range benefits 
that might derive.106 
Charles Ingersoll's description of Philadelphia provides 
an excellent insight into contemporary attitudes: 
Who walks the street of Philadelphia, and sees, not-
withstanding, a twelve-month stagnation of trade, 
several hundred substantial and elegant houses build-
ing, and the labouring community employed at good 
wages, who reads at every corner advertisements for 
workmen for factories of glass, of shot, of arms, of ho-
siery and coarse cloths, of pottery and many other 
goods and wares; who finds that within the last year 
rents have risen one-third and that houses are hardly to 
be had at these prices, ... in a word, who perceives, 
wherever he goes, the bustle of industry and the smile 
of content; who, under such circumstances, that is not 
too stupid to perceive and too prejudiced to believe 
when he does perceive, can doubt the solid capital of 
this country?107 
When added to the evidence denying depression pre-
sented earlier in this study, these comments suggest 
strongly that Pennsylvanians were greatly interested in 
105 Delegates of the Democratic Republicans of the City of Philadel-
phia to Thomas Jefferson, March 1, 1808. The letter is found in the 
Philadelphia Aurora for March 4, 1808. 
106 Jefferson to Democratic Citizens, March 20, 1808, Jefferson Writ-
ings (Lipscomb edition), XII, 17. 
107 Charles J. Ingersoll, A View of the Rights and Wrongs, Power and 
Policy of the United States of America (Philadelphia, 1808), 49. 
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the development of domestic manufactures and believed 
that the embargo was a positive measure to that end. The 
acceptance of commercial coercion as a viable alternative 
to war; the sense of party loyalty which led Pennsylvanians 
to continue supporting measures of commercial coercion 
when it had become obvious that they were no longer 
alternatives to war but substitutes for action; and the 
belief that long range economic benefits would accrue 
to the state and the nation from the policy explain to a 
large extent the state's support for the commercial policy 
of the Republican administrations. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Party Solidarity as 
a Motive for War 
The policy of commercial coercion, whatever its domestic 
effects, did not achieve the intended result. British and 
French violations of American neutral rights continued 
without abatement. Moreover, the changes in the method 
of commercial coercion were beginning to convince many 
people that the purposes for which the policy had been 
initiated had changed. The embargo of 1807 had been 
proposed as an alternative to war. The people had 
accepted it as such and defended it on the ground that it 
was a forceful measure. Macon's bill No.2 seemed more 
a substitute for action, a face-saving device designed to 
appease domestic opposition and to give the appearance 
of having done something while in reality doing very 
little. Those Americans who felt that the nation should 
effectively protect its rights concluded that the measure 
had humiliated their country.1 
In the months between the adjournment of the Eleventh 
Congress and the embargo of April 1812, there occurred 
a noticeable change in public attitudes. Pennsylvania 
newspaper opinion, the attitude of leading Republicans 
in the state, and the composition of the state's delegation 
to Congress indicate clearly that all had concluded that 
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commercial coercion had failed; only two alternatives 
remained-war or submission, and only the former was 
acceptable. 
In the summer and fall of 1811, the state's Republican 
newspapers were filled with denunciations of the policies 
of the Eleventh Congress, condemnations of Federalists 
to whom they attributed both the failure to reach an 
agreement with England and the failure of Congress to 
take forceful action to protect American rights, and 
demands that the new Congress "stop debating and act." 
Reviewing the proceedings of the Eleventh Congress, 
William Duane was unhappy with the result. "We wish 
that they had followed a different course. It should have 
been an energetic course, and should, ere this, have issued 
in peace or war." Congress had not followed such a course, 
Duane contended, because "Anglo-men" had successfully 
diverted its attention. By preventing Congress from tak-
ing necessary action in national affairs, these men "hoped 
to destroy public confidence in our government." Once 
this was achieved "federalism or something quite as bad 
will soon follow." The next Congress should not allow its 
attention to be diverted. It must take energetic action to 
preserve American rights and thus restore "the confidence 
of the people in their government," and respect in the 
world for republican institutions.2 
The editor of the Carlisle Gazette argued that the pub-
lication of Federalist newspapers which "give the British 
government the impression that we are divided at home 
and therefore cannot act vigorously abroad" had foiled all 
efforts to reach an agreement with that country. If war 
1 Bradford Perkins' chapter dealing with the actions of the Eleventh 
Congress which passed Macon's bill No. 2 is aptly entitled "America's 
Humiliation"; Prologue to War (Berkeley, 1961), chapter seven, 223-60. 
See also D. R. Anderson, "Insurgents of 1811," American Historical As-
sociation, Annual Report, I (1911), 167-76. 
2 Philadelphia Aurora, April 6, 1811. 
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should result, Federalists would have no one but them-
selves to blame. Taking a slightly different approach, the 
Pittsburgh Commonwealth contended that Federalist op-
position to effective measures short of war had forced this 
nation to its present position, and that "there is now no 
alternative to war or submission."3 The Philadelphia 
Aurora proclaimed that "the time has come to do away 
with party disputes and unite behind the government for 
self-preservation." Continuance of the present policy 
"will lead to the complete disgrace of America." 
Like most other Republican papers, the Aurora covered 
the clash between the President and the Little Belt in 
great detail. It drew from the incident the obvious lesson 
that forceful action was much more effective than negotia-
tion. But it drew another lesson that, in Duane's mind, 
was much more important. The public's favorable reac-
tion to the clash, Duane asserted, was proof that the people 
would support the government if it would take firm action 
to protect the nation's rights.4 
It was against this background that Pennsylvania con-
gressmen left for Washington in October 1811. The 
Pennsylvania delegation to the Twelfth Congress con· 
tained eight new members. With the exception of the 
delegations sent to the Second and Fourth congresses 
this was the highest percentage of new members in any 
Pennsylvania delegation prior to the War of 1812. Taking 
into consideration the increases in the size of the delega· 
tion, this was also the highest percentage of new members 
until 1832.5 More significant than the size of the change 
was the nature of the change. Joseph Hiester, Robert 
3 Carlisle Gazette, Aug. 16, Oct. 7, 1811; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, 
July 11, 1811. 
4 Philadelphia Aurora, May 27, June 3, June 6, June 9, Aug. 8, Sept. 
19, Sept. 21, Sept. 23, 1811. See also Dauphin Guardian, June 4, 1810, 
July 12, 1811. 
li William A. Russ, "Trends in Pennsylvania's Congressional Delega-
tions," Pennsylvania History, X (October 1943 ), 282. 
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Jenkins, William Milnor, and Samuel Smith, all of whom 
had voted so often with the minority in the Eleventh 
Congress were defeated. John Rea and Matthias Richards, 
who had generally supported the administration, did not 
run. Of the new members, all but James Milnor were 
Republicans, and all but he and William Rodman were 
warm supporters of the administration, and ultimately all 
but those two joined the rest of the delegation in voting 
for war.6 
Not much is known about all the new members, but 
what is known indicates clearly that the basic issues in 
the election were the necessity for vigorous action by the 
government and the candidates' willingness to support 
the administration. Discussing the forthcoming state 
elections, a correspondent who signed himself "My Voice 
Is Still for War" argued that it was essential for the safety 
and honor of the nation to return large Republican majori-
ties both to the state house and to Congress. "There is a 
certain class," he claimed, "who express a contempt for 
the nature of our government. It is calculated, so they 
say, only for smooth water and favorable gales:-but when 
the surge rises and the tempest roars it will be dashed on 
the rocks or swallowed in the quicksands." This was not 
true. It was this class of men who had prevented the 
government from taking effective action in the past be-
cause they "place profit above liberty." Elect a Congress 
founded in public sentiment and the nation's enemies, at 
home and abroad, would see that Americans would will-
ingly endure the hardships of war. They "will regard no 
expense when liberty is at stake."7 
Two contests underline these issues. In an eight-county 
6 The election of 1810 is discussed, but very unsatisfactorily in chapter 
nine of Sanford Higginbotham, Keystone of the Democratic Arch ( Har-
risburg, 1952), 213-20. 
7 Philadelphia Aurora, Sept. 25, 1811. This letter is widely reprinted 
in the Republican newspapers of the state. 
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district in western Pennsylvania, which had been repre-
sented by Samuel Smith in the Tenth and Eleventh con-
gresses, a warm contest developed between Abner Lacock 
and Adamson Tannehill, both Republicans. Smith's con-
stant opposition to administration measures had aroused 
so much opposition that he was not renominated. 8 The 
major issue in the nominations of Lacock and Tannehill 
was whether Allegheny County, the most populous county 
in the district, should have a preponderant voice in the 
nomination of the district's congressmen or whether all 
the counties should have an equal voice. Unable to 
settle the issue, both men were presented to the people. 
Tannehill was nominated by Allegheny County Republi-
cans, Lacock, by a Republican convention called by the 
other seven counties. The election turned on the men's 
support for vigorous measures and their party regularity. 
The Republican press in the area, including the news-
papers of Allegheny County supported Lacock because 
of the strong proadministration position he had taken as 
a member of the state legislature. They also cited his 
efforts on behalf of militia reform. The Federalists did 
not put up a candidate. There was some mention of 
supporting Smith, but nothing came of it. In September 
the Federalist Pittsburgh Gazette destroyed whatever 
chance Tannehill might have had by coming out in his 
favor. Abner Lacock carried every county in the district 
except Allegheny and won the House seat by over four 
hundred votes. Elected as a "war candidate," Lacock 
while in Congress "took a bold stand for war measures ... 
and stood nobly by the Democratic administration of 
James Madison."9 
8 For attacks on Smith see Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Aug. 7, Aug. 
14, Sept. 19, Sept. 26, Oct. 3, 1810; Washington Reporter, July 9, July 
16, Aug. 1, Aug. 8, 1810. These papers also carry attacks on Smith 
from other newspapers in the district. 
li J.M.S., "General Abner Lacock," Pennsylvania Magazine of History 
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In the three-county district made up of Chester, Lan-
caster, and Berks counties Republican factionalism re-
sulted in the nomination of two Republicans, the incum-
bent Matthias Richards and John Hyneman. When the 
Federalists put up a candidate of their own, Richards 
withdrew from the contest. In a public letter reprinted 
in the Aurora Richards explained his withdrawal by point-
ing out that a division in Republican ranks might result 
in the election of Federalist candidates which would be 
bad for the country. Since all Republicans voted the same 
on national issues, and since it was important that admin-
istration forces have a large majority in Congress, he felt 
he should drop out of the race to assure a Republican 
victory.10 The virtually unanimous support which the 
other new Republican congressmen gave to the adminis-
tration in the Twelfth Congress indicates that similar con-
siderations prompted their nomination and election. 
When Congress met in November 1811, there was no 
general agreement on what policy should be followed. 
"The House wants men to take the lead," Jonathan Roberts 
wrote to his brother. He did not know "whether to say 
we shall have bold and great measures or not." The 
president's message urging Congress to put the United 
States in "an armor and an attitude demanded by the 
crisis" pleased Roberts, but what he considered congres-
sional tardiness infuriated him: "We have been four days 
in session and the whole business has been the organiza-
tion of the House, receiving the message and documents 
and appointing one standing committee." For him such 
delay was impossible. The president's message "is as 
and Biography, IV (1880), 202-209. The discussion of this election is 
based on a close reading of the Pittsburgh Commonwealth, the Pittsburgh 
Mercury, the Pittsburgh Gazette, and the Washington Reporter for the 
summer and fall of 1810. See also Harry Houtz, "Abner Lacock," West-
ern J>er;nsylvania Historical Magazine, XXII (1939), 171-87. 
10 Philadelphia Aurora, Sept. 26, 1810. · 
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important as could have been anticipated and yet we 
throw away a day before the smallest step is taken to put 
it in a train of consideration."11 
Roberts's strictures were too harsh. The time which to 
him seemed wasted was put to good use by the war-
minded men who had been elected to the Twelfth Con-
gress. At a Republican caucus on November 3 these men, 
commonly dubbed "war hawks," nominated Henry Clay 
of Kentucky as Speaker of the House. The following 
day Clay, who had made a reputation as a war man while 
sitting in the Senate in the previous session, was elected 
Speaker by a vote of 75 to 44. Pennsylvania Republicans 
provided 15 votes for him, and none voted against him.12 
Clay used his position to assure that the House would 
act favorably on the president's recommendations. He 
packed the important committees with war hawk majori-
ties, and appointed prominent war hawks to the chairman-
ship of the important Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs, 
Naval Affairs, and Ways and Means committees. 
While the Foreign Affairs Committee considered the 
president's message, Republicans in Pennsylvania praised 
the manly attitude it displayed and urged Congress to 
act quickly, favorably, and decisively on his recom-
mendations. It was intended "to redeem the public mind 
from despondence and restore the nation to confidence 
in itself and faith in its government," wrote Duane. Con-
gress must quickly decide upon action to implement the 
president's message, "or resign itself to submission."13 
Governor Snyder praised the president's message in his 
opening speech to the state legislature and urged the 
members to prepare the militia for impending hostilities. 
11 Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, Nov. 9, Nov. 11, 1811, 
Roberts Papers. 
12 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 330. Bernard Mayo, 
Henry Clay, Spokesman of the New West (Boston, 1937). 
13 Philadelphia Aurora, Nov. 7, 1811; Washington Reporter, Nov. 13, 
1811. 
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He pledged the support of Pennsylvania should the 
government find it necessary to wage war to support the 
"honor and independence of our beloved country." James 
Milnor, the only Federalist in the Pennsylvania delega-
tion, hoped that the federal paper in Philadelphia would 
not adopt the tone of those in Boston, because that would 
prompt Republicans to even greater efforts to enact the 
president's proposalsY 
On November 29, the Foreign Affairs Committee sub-
mitted its report. Stating that the period had arrived 
when "it is the sacred duty of Congress to call forth the 
patriotism and resources of the country," the committee 
condemned Britain's past hostilities and recommended 
war preparations. These included bringing the regular 
army to full strength, raising fifty thousand additional 
volunteers, arming merchantmen and outfitting existing 
warships.15 In the voting on the resolutions of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, the Pennsylvania delegation was vir-
tually unanimous. There were five resolutions presented. 
On four of them not one Pennsylvania representative cast 
a negative vote. Robert Brown, John Smilie, Robert 
Whitehill, and William Rodman voted against the fifth 
resolution asking the president to put existing naval 
vessels into commission. 
Roberts was quite satisfied. The committee's proposals 
"will go into effect and they must speedily lead to war," 
he wrote to his brother the day after the report was 
submitted. A week later he was even more certain. "Con-
gress will declare war against Britain if she does not do 
us justice before we rise. I shall vote for it."16 The Penn-
sylvania delegation solidly supported the committee re-
14 Pennsylvania Archives, 4th series, N, 746-49; James Milnor to S. 
Bradford, Dec. 10, 1811, Bradford Collection, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania. 
15 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 373-77. 
16 Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, Nov. 30, Dec. 8, 1811, 
Roberts Papers. 
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port. The House voted on six resolutions submitted by 
the committee and the Pennsylvania delegation never pro-
vided less than fourteen affirmative votes. On five of the 
rollcalls they voted unanimously in favor of the resolutions. 
By December 19, all the resolutions had been passed by 
large majorities. Some hoped that effective preparations 
for war would force Britain to relent. However, this does 
not justify the accusation that they were bluffing. Hoping 
to prevent war by preparing for it, they were quite willing 
to fight if Britain did not relent. In a speech made later in 
the session Smilie stated explicity that he had supported 
preparedness legislation in the hope that the men and 
arms provided for would not be used, but he "would now 
go to war." Manuel Eyre wrote Congressman Findley 
that he, like Findley, hoped that preparation would avert 
war, but was prepared to fight if Britain did not relent. 
Even Roberts stated that he "would be exceedingly glad 
to remain at peace. The Federalists seem sanguine the 
orders-in-council will be revoked-! confess I hardly allow 
myself to hope it."17 
Reporting public opinion in Franklintown, Pennsyl-
vania, Richard Leech told Roberts that his feelings were 
in accordance with the report of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee and that he thought most of his fellow citizens 
favored it also. The war seemed "just and necessary for 
the preservation of everything dear to free men." Duane 
was delighted with the report. Finally the legislature 
had proposed forceful measures "to defend the rights and 
honor of the nation" and to impress "those skeptics who 
doubted the ability of a republican government to function 
in period of adversity." The state legislature passed 
resolutions approving the recommendation of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee and pledging to give full support to 
17 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 1592; Manual Eyre to 
William Findley, Jan. 12, 1812, Gallatin Papers; Jonathan Roberts to 
Matthew Roberts, Jan. 25, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
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military preparations of the national government and 
complete support if Congress declared war.18 
However, submission and approval of the report did not 
implement it. The effort to enact its proposals into law 
produced a heated and prolonged debate. From Novem-
ber 1811 until April 1812, Pennsylvania congressmen and 
their constituents alternated between exhortation and 
frustration. William Findley was the first Pennsylvanian 
to speak to the committee's recommendations. On Decem-
ber 24, 1811, he spoke in support of the resolutions 
authorizing increases in the militia. "The aggressions and 
bad faith of the British government and the recommenda-
tions of the President," he said, "were the foundations of 
the resolutions before the House .... If it is an advantage 
to a nation to have justifiable cause for war, the United 
States have possessed that advantage" for many years. 
"Consulting what we have thought expedient we have 
borne a testimony against these injuries by every practical 
restriction short of hostility." Since all peaceful efforts 
had come to naught, it was time to resort to more ener-
getic modes of resistance. On January 10, 1812, Findley 
again asserted that war or submission were the only 
remaining alternatives. The latter was impossible. "I 
want to engage in war . . . in such a manner as we can 
support it with honor." 
William Crawford, a representative from Adams County 
just east of the Appalachians, also concluded that there 
was no alternative to war. Further submission would 
destroy the Republican party and besmirch the image of 
republican government everywhere. But, he wrote to 
Madison, "even among those who have only the same 
objects in view, so much diversity of sentiment prevails; 
that some means to unite their views and their efforts 
18 Leech to Roberts, Dec. 27, 1811, Roberts Papers; Philadelphia 
Aurora, Dec. 17, 1811; Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1811-1812, pp. 9-12; 
Pennsylvania House Journal, 181lcl812, pp. 104-10. 
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appears essential to the immediate preservation of the 
government."19 
Jonathan Roberts took the same position on the floor 
of the House as he had taken in his letters to his brother. 
Preparation for war, he said early in the debate, was a 
policy "on which we have no choice but to act" because 
circumstances are such that there is "no alternative but 
vigorous preparation for resistance, or ... unconditional 
submission." Two months later he made the same point. 
The Republican administrators had "with long continued 
and unceasing efforts ... sought to avoid war." Britain's 
intransigence had left submission to a doctrine of absolute 
recolonization as the only alternative to war.20 While the 
other Republican members of the Pennsylvania delegation 
did not make any significant speeches during the debate, 
their votes indicate that they favored war preparations. 
The diversity of sentiment of which Crawford spoke 
prevented Congress from enacting the proposals of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee into law. During the long 
winter of debate, it sometimes seemed as if the obstruc-
tion of the Federalists, the open opposition of Randolph 
and his allies, and the quibbling of the moderates would 
retard preparations, dampen the ardor of the people, and 
ultimately stop the move toward war. Clay's adroit 
leadership prodded Congress on, and preparatory meas-
ures slowly were passed. Ultimate success was fore-
shadowed by passage of the Additional Army bill. Presi-
dent Madison had requested an addition of ten thousand 
men to the regular army. In the Senate antiadministra-
tion forces led by Giles raised the figure to twenty-five 
thousand in an effort to embarrass the administration. 
This large increase aroused opposition in the House where 
19 Crawford to Madison, March 28, 1812, quoted in Roger H. Brown, 
The Republic in Peril: 1812 (New York, 1964). 
20 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 502-505, 903. See also 
Roberts' letter toP. Hollingsworth, April 11, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
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it was argued that such a large force was too expensive 
and a potential danger to civil liberties. When a com-
promise was offered providing that officers would not be 
commissioned or paid until the troops they were to 
command had been recruited, the moderates accepted, 
and the bill passed, 90-35. Pennsylvania voted 14-2-2 with 
Rodman and Smilie opposing and Milnor and Whitehill 
not voting.21 The Senate rejected the House compromise, 
and the House receded from its amendments and accepted 
the Senate version.22 
The debate on the Additional Army bill set the style 
for all subsequent debates on preparedness legislation. As 
each bill was introduced it faced Federalist obstruction, 
the opposition of antiadministration Republicans, and 
was often stalled by regular Republicans who urged 
caution, raised constitutional questions, or showed great 
concern over expense. Debate was followed by compro-
mise, and additional measures became law. To those who 
were committed to war the pace seemed very slow. 
Pennsylvania Republicans urged their congressmen to act 
quickly and decisively.23 
Complaining bitterly about Congress's hesitation, Fox 
begged Roberts to unite the party. "We [Republicans] 
cannot all think alike, but a party must act by a system, 
21 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 617. 
22 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 718. 
23 The only available correspondence is that of Jonathan Roberts. 
There is much evidence to suggest, however, that the correspondence he 
received circulated among other members of the delegation, especially 
Lacock, Smilie, and Robert Brown. See Jonathan Roberts to Matthew 
Roberts, Nov. 9, 1811, in which Roberts expressed great satisfaction at 
having Lacock as a roommate. He states that they exchanged informa-
tion. In the same letter he expressed "sincere respect" for Smilie. "I 
feel more inclination to be confidential with him." On May 23, he stated 
specifically that he had circulated a letter among members of the dele-
gation. Smilie, Findley, and Crawford lived together and certainly 
exchanged information. Findley to Eyre, Feb. 4, 1812, Gallatin Papers. 
For the position of antiadministration Republicans, see Norman K. 
Risjord, The Old Republicans (New York, 1965), particularly chapter 
five. 
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or it must give way to that which will. It is folly to be 
splitting hair at a time like the present. We want 'the 
long push, the strong push, and the pull altogether,' of 
the whole Republican phalanx."24 Congress need not fear 
that the people will not support a war. "Let the Republi-
cans there act their parts well-the people always sound 
at heart will go hand in hand."25 This from a man who 
wrote a month later, "I find my wishes lead still toward 
peace. And those wishes are stronger as the time ap-
proaches in which I fear a war must come." The war must 
come because there was "no mode in which the govern-
ment can preserve the peace of the country and support 
its honor,'' and because of the "open attack and probable 
success of the Federalists" if past policies were con-
tinued.26 
This is a point made by many other correspondents. 
Believing that the United States had ample justification 
for war, that continuation of the policy of commercial 
coercion could only lead to further insults and loss of 
honor, many Republicans feared that if effective measures 
to protect American rights were not taken soon, the people 
would abandon the party and seek other leadership. 
Roger Brown contends that one of the impulses to war 
was the desire to show that a republican form of govern-
ment could maintain itself in time of peril. Evidence to 
support this thesis in Pennsylvania is scanty. There are 
some indications in many of the quotations cited above 
that there was concern for the reputation of republican-
ism. During the war one of the arguments occasionally 
used to defend continuation of the war after repeal of 
the orders-in-council was the necessity to prove that a 
republican government could wage a successful war. On 
the other hand, it seems probable that concern for the 
24 Findley to Eyre, Feb. 4, 1812, Gallatin Papers. 
25 Fox to Roberts, Feb. 2, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
26 Fox to Roberts, March 10, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
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electoral welfare of the Republican party was an impor-
tant consideration in many minds. The calls for party 
unity, the many warnings that failure to act would result 
in losses in the next election, undoubtedly influenced 
many members of Pennsylvania's delegation and con-
tributed to the remarkable unity of the state's congress-
men. 
Commenting that the passage of the April embargo 
had ended all speculation "as to war or no war," Roberts's 
most regular correspondent stated that "how the Republi-
can party will be upon the final question is a subject of 
great solicitude .... The New York election begins on 
Tuesday next: the result will be of prime importance." 
If the Federalists made significant gains, the government 
would have to exert itself to regain the confidence of the 
people.27 John Binns, the editor of the Democratic Press 
in Philadelphia, excoriated the Federalists who had led 
the opposition to a bill authorizing a government loan. 
In Philadelphia they had used "the basest schemes, . . . 
misrepresentations, the vilest artifices" to oppose the loan. 
They are a "cursed band of factious aristocrats" whose 
"conduct ought to invigorate every heart that loves our 
principles and our country." He concluded, "I tell you sir 
a war is necessary to purge the country of this foul and 
wicked stuff." Referring to the forthcoming presidential 
election, he asserted, "if we declare war soon, we shall 
have all the electoral votes." He made the same point 
two days later. "A declaration of war is indispensable to 
preserve our government. The honor of the nation and 
of the party are bound up together, and both will be 
sacrificed if war be not declared." Nothing but a declara-
tion of war would "disarm" the Federalists and "invigorate 
our friends." If war is not declared soon, "evil must 
follow. If it be done good invaluable must result."28 
27 Fox to Roberts, April 25, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
28 Binns to Roberts, May 3, May 5, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
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The Aurora, in whose columns Duane generally opposed 
Binns on state issues, held the same views. Federalist 
opposition to administration measures was ample evi-
dence, Duane argued, that there is a British faction in 
the United States. In time of war their patriotism would 
overcome their selfishness, or they would be crushed. On 
the other hand, if the United States "continue the present 
course, the people will lose confidence in their government 
and pride in their nation." Their apathy and lethargy 
will allow the British party to come to power. "Such an 
event will spell not only the end of our independence, 
but the end of our freedom as a people." In the same 
vein Eyre suggested to Roberts that "moderate Federalists 
who are men of fortune and character ... and are willing 
to offer their services," be given positions in the army. 
Their efforts should be accepted, he wrote, because such 
positions would "wean them from their party and would 
ultimately promote the welfare of the republican govern-
ment." Federalist opposition to bills to strengthen and 
prepare the militia for hostilities, Duane contended a few 
months later, was not based on financial reasons, as their 
leaders claimed. Distrustful and fearful of the people, 
Federalists will oppose any measure that will give the 
people power-military or political. They fear that the 
public armed with the ballot or gun will prevent them 
from taking power. Since their only hope for gaining 
power rests on Britain's ability to destroy our republican 
institutions they opposed any measure which will enable 
the people to defend their country. The United States 
must go to war if for no other reason than to break the 
British faction and assure the continuation of republican 
rule.29 
Federalist attacks on the administration and the hesita-
29 Philadelphia Aurora, Jan. 6, March 12, 1812; Eyre to Roberts, April 
19, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
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tion of Congress have "a tendency to weaken the energies 
of the party," Thomas Rogers told Roberts. "Let us 
therefore go to war. A war will prevent all clamors except 
from tories and we will know how to dispose of them. 
For my part I think war the only honorable course for 
Congress to pursue." When war was not declared by the 
end of May, Rogers told Roberts that a Republican meet-
ing "declared their conviction of the necessity of it. ... 
My opinion is the sooner the better, for you may rely on 
it the people are becoming tired of the suspence [sic] they 
have been in for some time."30 Another local Republican, 
John Connelly, demanded vigorous action to prove "to 
domestic and foreign enemies that Republicans are fully 
competent to direct the helm of state in peace or war." 
If war were declared before the summer he "would have 
no doubt of Madison's election .... Decisive measures 
has [sic] now become necessary."31 A man who claimed 
to be "a simple constituent" believed he was "expressing 
the feelings of the great majority" when he remarked that 
lately "Federalists ... speak with more confidence against 
the government but this cannot be more than temporary." 
Vigorous action on the part of the government would 
quickly reverse the Federalist onslaught.32 
On May 20 a meeting of Norristown Republicans sent 
Roberts and Brown a set of resolutions expressing confi-
dence in the administration and demanding vigorous 
action. Federalist strength, the resolutions warned, was 
growing rapidly in the district, and if some action were 
not taken soon "their future success would be assured." 
Roberts circulated the petition among the members of 
the Pennsylvania delegation. "Many pleasantries were 
indulged in .... The voice of 12,000 citizens will have its 
BO Rogers to Roberts, May 16, June 1, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
31 Connelly to Roberts, May 21, May 26, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
32 William Slade to Roberts, May 11, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
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weight."33 In June, Fox asked Roberts for a retort to 
Federalist taunts. Commenting on the Senate's lengthy 
closed session, he warned Roberts that "people will lose 
confidence in the government and the system if Congress 
does not act soon."34 Another correspondent informed 
Roberts that "the Republican party highly approve the 
determined stand of Congress, but many are surprised at 
the tardiness." He asked whether new blood might not 
produce more haste and suggested a change in leadership. 
"If Republicans do not produce bold men and bold 
measures" the people might easily succumb "to the blan-
dishments of the Federalists.''35 
Just before the declaration of war Richard Leech wrote 
a long, doleful letter which epitomized the feelings of 
many Republicans. 
It is impossible for me to describe my present feelings 
and apprehensions-for about a week past I have been 
in daily expectation that the deed of deeds was done 
-the war machine put into active motion. This deed 
and this alone can save the character of the demo-
cratic party and of the nation .... Though the House 
of Representatives has covered itself with glory, I 
am told the Senate has or will put this country to open 
shame .... Is it possible that a government can have 
the respect and confidence of its own citizens [if it 
does nothing] more than talk about its independence 
and its rights.36 
These urgings reenforced the predispositions of the 
state's congressmen. None of them took an active part 
in the debate, but they all supported the preparedness 
33 Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, May 23, 1812, Roberts 
Papers. 
34 Fox to Roberts, June 16, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
35 Isaac Anderson to J. Roberts, May 13, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
36 Leech to Roberts, undated, but obviously written after June 12 and 
before the declaration of war. Roberts Papers. 
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measures as they came before the House. On January 10, 
the day after it passed the Additional Army bill, the 
House began to consider the bill for raising fifty thousand 
volunteers. Republican moderates as well as outright 
opponents raised the serious question of whether the 
president could, without specific constitutional authoriza-
tion, order the militia beyond the borders of the United 
States. For almost a month the House debated subtle 
constitutional points. After debating numerous amend-
ments, defeating attempts at delay, and presenting coun-
ter-proposals, the bill passed without mention of the presi-
dent's authority. Pennsylvania voted 14-0-4.37 
Bills relating to the navy were not as successful. With-
out much opposition the House passed a bill for outfitting 
existing ships, but traditional Republican antipathy to a 
large navy caused the defeat of a bill to add twelve ships 
of the line and twenty frigates to the navy. The most 
common arguments were that the addition was too expen-
sive and that even with more ships, the fleet would be 
inadequate to contend with Britain's navy. By a close 
vote of 62 to 59 the bill failed on January 27. All the 
Pennsylvania Republicans voted for the measure. Defeat 
of the naval addition was only a minor setback. Other 
preparations continued. Ordnance bills, provisions for 
coastal defenses, and some reorganization of the war 
department were slowly hammered out and passed by 
the House. Pennsylvania congressmen supported all of 
these measures overwhelmingly. Yet a majority for war 
was still uncertain. Hope of favorable news from England 
and determined opposition to Gallatin's program for 
financing the war prevented the final step from being 
taken. 
Gallatin proposed to finance the war by loans, a doub-
ling of the import duties, and, in violation of sacred 
37 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 800. 
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Republican principle, direct taxes and excise taxes. Each 
of these measures was debated at length. Direct taxes 
had a particularly rough going since many congressmen 
who would vote for taxes opposed any tax that weighed 
heavily on their own constituents. After much urging 
and some compromise the financial program finally passed. 
On February 25 a bill calling for an $11 million loan 
passed 92-29, with Pennsylvania congressmen dividing 
15-3. On March 4, the House approved resolutions im-
posing direct taxes to be enacted into law when war was 
declared. The Pennsylvania delegation divided, 12 in 
favor, 1 opposed, 3 abstaining.38 None of the Pennsyl-
vania congressmen took an active part in the debate, but 
by their votes they revealed their commitment to prepara-
tion for war, to war itself, and to party regularity. Legisla-
tive initiative was not enough. The next step had to 
come from the president. 
On April1, 1812, in an enigmatic one-sentence message, 
President Madison recommended to a closed session of 
Congress the immediate enactment of a general embar-
go.39 There has been some controversy concerning the 
president's motives in recommending the measure and the 
purposes it was to serve.40 Ardent supporters of the meas-
ure declared it to be a step toward war. Its purpose, 
supposedly, was to allow American vessels to return safely 
to port before war was declared. Others saw it as another 
effort at economic coercion and were not convinced that 
it would be followed by war. Still others saw the embargo 
as a final threat. If Britain could be convinced that this 
38 Excellent summaries of the preparedness legislation can be found 
in Harry L. Coles, The War of 1812 (Chicago, 1965), 16-26, and Mayo, 
Henry Clay, Spokesman of the New West, 385-465. 
39 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 1587. 
40 See Perkins, Prologue, 384-89; Irving Brant, James Madison: The 
President (Indianapolis, 1956), 424-32; Brown, The Republic in Peril: 
1812, pp. 99, 103. 
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embargo was to be the last American effort short of war, 
she might change her policyY 
The congressional debate gives some credence to all of 
these views. The majority of the Pennsylvania delegation, 
the Republican press, and leading politicians within the 
state accepted the embargo as America's last effort short 
of war. In the first hours of the debate Adam Seybert stated 
that he felt pledged to go to war and that he was in favor 
of an embargo as a precautionary measure and precursor 
to war. Smilie followed immediately, telling the House 
that the embargo was intended as a war measure. At the 
beginning of the session he said he "was not so warm for 
war ... but ... would now go to war-if we now recede 
we shall be a reproach among all nations."42 Fourteen 
separate rollcall votes were taken in the House on the bill 
laying an embargo. In the Pennsylvania delegation four-
teen were in favor of the embargo; these voted against 
any effort to postpone consideration of the measure and 
against any proposal that would agree to the laying of an 
embargo, but postpone its application. Two members, the 
Federalist James Milnor and William Rodman, were 
opposed to the embargo and when they voted they 
approved of all efforts at delay and voted against the 
measure. Whitehill, who in the previous two sessions had 
always sided with the majority in his delegation, cast one 
dissenting vote favoring postponement of debate on the 
embargo bill for one day. William Piper, a new member 
on the delegation, supported every effort at delay, but 
voted for the bill. 
A bill laying an embargo for sixty days passed the 
House by a vote of 70-41 on the day the president 
41 The House debate on the April embargo is in the Annals of Con-
gress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 1587-98, 1601-15. The senate debate is in 
the same volume, 187-94. 
42 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 1592. 
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requested it. The Pennsylvania delegation supported the 
bill 16-2, the same vote by which it supported the war 
later. The Senate made a series of amendments to the 
bill, the most important of which extended the embargo 
to ninety days. To prevent a stalemate between the House 
and the Senate such as that which had so seriously crip-
pled Macon's proposals in the previous Congress, House 
Republicans concurred with the Senate amendments by 
large majorities. Federalist delaying tactics caused eleven 
rollcall votes to be taken. The lines in Pennsylvania had 
been drawn on the original measures. Sixteen voted with 
the majority on every issue (in one rollcall Whitehill's 
vote is not recorded), while Milnor and Rodman voted 
with the minority. 
In Pennsylvania, Republicans applauded the embargo 
and viewed it, as their representatives had, as a prelude 
to war. On April 4, the editor of the Aurora speculated 
on what action Congress might be taking behind closed 
doors. If war were being proposed, Duane suggested that 
Congress consider the advisability of a preliminary em-
bargo. Two days later the Aurora reported approvingly 
the passage of the embargo, calling it "the harbinger of a 
manly contest for essential rights perseveringly trampled 
upon by the British government." Duane hoped that 
Congress, having learned from past mistakes, had made 
adequate provisions for enforcement because even at the 
brink of war there were still those who placed "personal 
profit above the honor and independence of their country." 
The navy, he suggested, should be used to enforce the 
law: "If it cannot be used to command the respect of 
foreign nations it may be used to command the respect of 
our own citizens."43 
The Carlisle Gazette argued that the embargo just 
passed was not war, and did not inevitably lead to war, 
43 Philadelphia Aurora, April 6, April 7, 1812. 
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but would have to end in war or in an honorable adjust-
ment with the belligerents. The advantages of the em-
bargo as pointed out by the editorial were that it protected 
men and property already in port; it warned ships at sea 
to return home for safety; and it informed foreign powers 
that the time had arrived for the wrongs they had inflicted 
on the United States to be redressed. The Gazette con-
cluded that if the nation's wrongs were not redressed a 
failure to go to war after the expiration of the embargo 
would be dishonorable.44 The Pittsburgh Commonwealth 
saw "the determination of the country to defend its rights 
at length expressed in the provisionary measure of an 
embargo."45 
The Federalist press took surprisingly little notice of 
the measure. The Pittsburgh Gazette and the Pennsyl-
vania Gazette both published the text of the law and in 
each there are letters predicting a serious decline in farm 
prices. Both papers criticized the embargo. The Pitts-
burgh Gazette called the bill a substitute for action taken 
by a "timid administration too weak to act and too embar-
rassed to retreat." The Pennsylvania Gazette simply 
argued that like its predecessor, this embargo would not 
achieve its intended results and would be harmful to the 
United States alone.46 
Correspondents of Jonathan Roberts all approved the 
measure. John Connelly said the embargo had "for its 
object and end the honor, dignity and independence of 
our country." Edward Fox informed Roberts that the 
embargo, and the war he assumed would follow, would 
be highly beneficial. It would establish a national char-
acter, protect the nation's commerce, increase its manu-
factures, and wean the country from European particu-
44 Carlisle Gazette, April 17, 1812. 
45 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, April 14, 1812. 
46 Pittsburgh Gazette, May 1, 1812; Pennsylvania Gazette, April 15, 
1812. 
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larity. Edward Stiles told Roberts that "it is the general 
wish and sentiment in the democratic ranks that Congress 
will now go on and not attempt to trace back those steps 
they have taken ... to have their insulted country's rights 
respected." Manuel Eyre felt war should be declared 
before the embargo expired, otherwise "the people will 
not believe in war." Jones believed that the embargo 
and subsequent war would develop internal resources and 
manufactures, and put the United States in a better 
bargaining position in the future.47 
An exchange of letters between Congressman Roberts 
and an Easton miller, Paschal Hollingsworth, provides 
an interesting summary of the development of Republican 
thinking. Hollingsworth had written to Roberts and Con-
gressman Robert Brown condemning the April embargo 
as "highly detrimental" and saying that "inevitable ruin 
results." In answering the letter Roberts admitted that 
the embargo and war would cause some private embar-
rassments. He argued, however, that failure to resort to 
war without a previous embargo "would work greater 
evil." In justifying the war, to which the embargo was 
but a prelude, Roberts cataloged American grievances: 
impressment, the seizing of American vessels in American 
waters, the interdiction of commercial intercourse, at-
tempted subversion, negotiation in bad faith. In every 
instance this nation had attempted negotiation or methods 
of peaceful coercion-to no avail. "We have no choice 
but open war or submission to a doctrine of absolute 
recolonization." If the embargo caused undue hardships 
on the millers of Easton it is because "they have become 
victims of a delusion" produced by the minority in Con-
gress that this nation would not protect its interests. 
47 Connelly to Roberts, April 25, 1812, Fox to Roberts, May 4, 1812, 
Edward Stiles to Roberts, May 30, 1812, Manuel Eyre to Roberts, May 
2, 1812, William Jones to Roberts, May 27, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
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Roberts concluded by telling Hollingsworth that "we 
owe very much, if not entirely, our necessity to go to war 
to you and those who think like you. . . . A belief on the 
part of Great Britain that she has many partisans in 
America who are able to divide and paralyze our councils 
... has invited and encouraged her aggressions."48 
Pennsylvania's reaction to the April embargo shows that 
the people of the state were ready for war. Their con-
gressmen did not disappoint them. The Pennsylvania 
delegation was the second largest in the House, consisting 
of eighteen members. Sixteen of them voted regularly 
with the majority of the House. In many cases the united 
support of the Pennsylvania delegation was the margin of 
passage of many measures. The following charts show 
clearly the united support which Pennsylvania congress-
men provided for Republican measures generally and for 
the war and preparations for war in particular. 
These figures indicate a high degree of party regularity. 
Two recent studies by empirically oriented political sci-
entists who concerned themselves with the problem of 
party regularity conclude that any legislator who votes 
with the majority of his colleagues between 63 and 71 
percent of the time can be considered a party regular.49 
The sixteen Pennsylvania representatives who voted for 
48 Both Hollingsworth's and Roberts's letters are printed in the Phil-
adelphia Aurora, April20, 1812. There is a copy of Hollingsworth's letter 
as well as a draft of Roberts's reply in the Robert' Papers. 
49 Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York, 
1960), 143; Fred I. Greenstein, The American Party System and the 
American People (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), 79. Matthews arrived 
at his 63 percent figure by studying the Senate, Greenstein arrived at 71 
percent by studying the House. Neither makes the argument explicitly, 
but there is a strong implication in both works that the percentage in 
the House is higher because of the larger membership and shorter terms 
in that body. The large membership requires greater party cohesion 
if anything is to be accomplished. The shorter terms, and the general 
fact that representatives are not as well known by their local constituents 
as senators, makes strong party identification an important asset for 
representatives at election time. 
CHART !-Votes of Pennsylvania Delegation on All Rollcall Votes, Twelfth Congress, First Session 
Votes with Votes with Votes with Votes with %with %with 
Majority of Majority of Minority of Minority of Majority of Majority of Not .... 
Name Congress Delegation Congress Delegation Congress Delegation Voting I..JJ ~ 
William Anderson 150 149 37 35 80.21 80.98 12 lolj David Bard 122 132 28 16 81.33 89.19 49 ~ 
Robert Brown 146 164 39 18 78.92 90.11 14 ~ ~ 
William Crawford 148 150 43 38 77.49 79.79 8 "' c..:: Roger Davis 144 147 28 22 83.72 86.98 27 B"' ~ William Findley 155 156 28 24 84.70 86.67 16 ~ 
.... John Hyneman 142 157 34 16 80.68 90.75 23 ~ 
Abner Lacock 151 160 39 27 79.47 85.56 9 ~ ~ Joseph Lefever 115 111 32 35 78.23 76.03 52 ~ 
Aaron Lyle 163 176 36 20 81.91 89.80 0 ;;:. 
James Milnor 55 46 74 82 42.63 35.94 70 ~ 
William Piper 140 151 34 21 80.46 87.79 25 ~ Jonathan Roberts 157 173 38 19 80.51 90.10 4 ~ 
William Rodman 76 78 87 83 46.62 48.45 36 
-Q.. Adam Seybert 133 142 45 35 74.72 80.23 21 
....... 
John Smilie 137 151 36 21 79.19 87.79 26 Oo 
....... George Smith 143 144 31 27 82.18 84.21 25 ~ 
Robert Whitehill 125 140 46 29 73.10 82.84 28 
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war were all well above either figure. Their percentage 
with the majority would be even higher if one eliminated 
from the calculation six votes cast with the minority by 
most of the members when the House voted against 
moving the United States Military Academy from West 
Point, New York, to Carlisle, Pennsylvania. All of the 
Pennsylvania representatives who voted on questions 
relating to this move voted in favor of it but were always 
in the minority. These six votes partially explain the 
higher percentage of unanimity within the delegation. 
The figures in column 6 indicate great cohesiveness within 
the delegation. It cannot be asserted that this unanimity 
was achieved by conscious efforts by the members, or 
that they were even aware of it. It may be inferred, 
however, that the people of Pennsylvania elected repre-
sentatives of like minds who voted together with remark-
able regularity, and gave a high degree of support to the 
Republican majority. 
The raw figures from which the above chart was com-
piled provide another significant index to the delegation's 
regularity. In the 199 rollcall votes taken in the first 
session of the Twelfth Congress, a majority of the Penn-
sylvania delegation voted with the Republican majority 
165 times. A majority of the delegation voted with the 
minority in only 31 instances, while it divided evenly on 
three occasions. In percentage terms a majority of the 
Pennsylvania delegation voted with the Republican major-
ity 82.91 percent of the time. Since there are no similar 
studies of other delegations, comparisons are impossible. 
From what is generally known of the makeup of the 
House in this period, however, one could argue that no 
other delegation was as united, or gave such support to 
the Republican party. 
Although he voted so infrequently that the figures lose 
much of their meaning, the votes of James Milnor (not 
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to be confused with William Milnor of the Eleventh Con-
gress), the only Federalist on the delegation, provide a 
good contrast to the regularity of the Republican con-
gressmen. He voted with the majority only 55 times or 
42.63 percent, 32 percent less than the lowest ranking 
Republican, Adam Seybert. Milnor explained early in the 
session that he would oppose all preparedness legislation 
because he did not believe it would "deceive Great 
Britain . . . and enduce [sic] a revocation of the orders" 
and he was not convinced that the Republicans really 
intended to go to war. 
The behavior of William Rodman is difficult to explain. 
He was "an early adherent to the Jeffersonian school of 
politics" and had a sense of party loyalty. In 1804 he 
had declined renomination to the state senate stating 
that at the time of his first election "circumstances made 
it necessary for every Republican to contribute his services 
in such a way as his fellow citizens might requre; and I 
did not then hesitate to serve." When a serious split 
developed in the state Republican party between the 
followers of McKean and Snyder, Rodman sided with 
the Snyder faction which was much more friendly and 
loyal to the national organization. He ran for Congress 
in 1808 but was defeated by a slate loyal to the McKean 
faction. He was one of the Republican electors who voted 
for Madison that year. He was a Quaker, but this does 
not seem to have been a decisive consideration as he had 
accepted a commission in the state militia, and had 
participated actively in the supression of Fries rebellion. 
The only other known fact is that he was in bad health 
during most of the session. 
Republican leaders in the district could not explain his 
action. A local party leader, George Harrison, responding 
to Roberts's request for information about Rodman com-
mented: 
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I can state explicitly that I do not know that any per-
son or persons may have written to or influenced him 
in a departure from his colleagues and the majority 
in Congress in the measures pursued. I cannot even 
form a probable conjecture, nor do I at present know 
any person who is likely to possess the information 
you ask. I have conversed with several of my neigh-
bors who knew him intimately with myself and who 
entertain the highest opinion of his democracy and 
strict integrity [who] are at a loss to account for his 
conduct. ... I have such an opinion of his integrity 
that until the contrary appears, shall believe that no 
improper motive actuated him [sic]. 
Thomas Rogers told Roberts that "his friends in Bucks 
County are as much dissatisfied with him [Rodman] as 
we are here." Referring to a set of resolutions sent from 
his constituents to himself, Brown and Rodman, Roberts 
said "they pleased General Brown exceedingly," while 
Rodman "betrayed some emotion, but showed no contri-
tion." When the petition was circulated among other 
members of the delegation "many pleasantries were in-
dulged in and some severe things said to [Rodman]." 
None of this, of course, provides an explanation, but it 
does show some of the reaction to Rodman's erratic 
behavior. Roger Brown, who made a thorough study of 
antiwar Republicans "puzzled over Rodman ... and tried 
to find something on him but never got enough to venture 
an analysis." The only available explanation is that made 
by Charles Henry Jones in A Memoir of William Rodman. 
According to Jones, "Rodman reluctantly felt himself 
called upon to differ with his party. Long association 
and community of principle had attached him to its 
organization, but he had strong conscientious convictions 
which refused to be controlled by party discipline. . . . 
He was far from being a full believer in the Quaker 
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doctrine of non-resistance .... But there were occasions 
when his judgment seemed to be influenced by their 
doctrines. It was not this particular war .... It was aggres-
sive warfare in the abstract."50 
The people's opinion of the actions of their representa-
tives may be inferred from the fact that the three members 
of the Twelfth Congress who were not reelected to the 
Thirteenth were Milnor, Rodman, and Joseph Lefever. 
The last of these had the second lowest percentage of 
voting with the majority in the Twelfth Congress ( 78.23) 
and supported DeWitt Clinton in the presidential election 
of 1812. 
If the votes of the Pennsylvania delegation in every 
rollcall taken in the House indicate a noteworthy inci-
dence of party regularity, an examination of ten specific 
rollcall votes on selected issues demonstrates that their 
support for war was even more regular than their support 
for Republican measures generally. 
In the chart below, the votes marked 1 to 10 are: 
1. On a motion by John Randolph of Virginia that 
"under existing circumstances it is inexpedient to 
resort to war."51 
2. On passage of the bill authorizing the president 
to call up fifty thousand volunteers.52 
3. On the bill to authorize the president to call out 
the militia. 53 
50 Milnor to Bradford, Dec. 10, 1811, Bradford Collection. On Rod-
man's health and Quaker connections see Jonathan Roberts to Matthew 
Roberts, Nov. 9, Nov. 30, 1811, March 8, 1812, Rogers to Roberts, Dec. 
1, 1811; other references are to George Harrison to Roberts, May 21, 
1812, Rogers to Roberts, May 10, 1812, Jonathan Roberts to Matthew 
Roberts, May 23, 1812, Roberts Papers. For Brown's study of antiwar 
Republicans see Republic in Peril, chapter eight, "Antiwar Republicans," 
131-57. His comments on Rodman are in a letter to the author of this 
work, Aug. 22, 1964. 
51 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 1470. 
52 Ibid., 1021. 
53 Ibid., 547. 
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4. On the first four resolutions of the Foreign Af-
fairs Committee (this includes four separate rollcall 
votes).54 
5. On passage of the war loan bill.55 
6. On agreeing to the sixth resolution of the For-
eign Affairs Committee which would allow merchant 
ships to arm in their own defense.56 
7. On the bill to bring the army to authorized 
strength. 57 
8. Agreement to all tax resolutions.58 
9. On the April embargo.59 
10. To postpone indefinitely the question of ad-
journment.60 
If support for war preparations can be interpreted as 
support for war itself, the chart shows that the Pennsyl-
vania delegation as a body and each congressman had an 
extraordinary record of support. Excluding the votes of 
Milnor and Rodman, who voted against the declaration of 
war, no member cast more than two votes against prepara-
tory measures. Seven members supported all ten measures 
while six cast only one opposition vote. Looking at the 
figures from a slightly different direction provides yet 
another index of unanimity. Again excluding Rodman and 
Milnor, the Pennsylvania delegation supported six of the 
ten issues unanimously and cast more than two votes in 
opposition only once. 
Issues 11, 12, and 13 are chosen because they particu-
larly reflect party regularity in that they are party matters. 
11. On a seat contested by John P. Hungerford 
and John Taliaferro of Maryland. Hungerford was a 
54 Ibid., 419, 545-47. 
115 Ibid., 1092. 
r>6 Ibid., 565. 
57 Ibid., 617. 
58 Ibid., 1155. 
59 Ibid., 1598. 
6o Ibid., 1341. 
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CHART II-Votes of Pennsylvania Delegation on Selected 
Rollcall Votes, Twelfth Congress, First Session° 
Name 1 2 
Anderson W W 
Bard W 
Brown W W 
Crawford W W 
Davis W W 
Findley W W 
HynemanW W 
Lacock W W 
Lefever W 
Lyle W W 
Milnor A A 
Piper W W 
Roberts W W 
Rodman A A 
Seybert W A 
Smilie W 
Smith W W 
Whitehill W W 
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W-vote cast with majority; A-against; blank-not voting. 
"This chart confirms the findings of Reginald Horsman's article "Who 
Were the War Hawks?" Indiana Magazine of History, LX (June 1964), 
121-36. Using a similar method, but analyzing different votes, he also 
shows a high degree of unanimity in the Pennsylvania delegation. 
t On one of the four rollcalls Rodman was absent. 
Quid who had supported Monroe in 1808. Taliaferro 
was a "regular" candidate.61 
12. To override a presidential veto on a bill re-
organizing the judiciary. Again all the voting mem-
bers voted with the majority to sustain the veto.62 
There is no rollcall on the original bill, but a motion 
to reconsider passage of the bill the day after it 
passed indicates that eight of those who voted to 
sustain the president's veto had voted for the bill.63 
61 Ibid., 395. 
62 Ibid., 1278. 
63 Ibid., 1197. 
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13. A procedural vote to uphold a decision of the 
Speaker on an issue not related to the war. The Penn-
sylvania delegation voted unanimously to do so.64 
14. The war vote. 65 
This is a remarkable record of regularity in support of 
war measures and party issues. The votes indicate that 
among members of the Pennsylvania delegation there 
was either a habit of party regularity or strong pressures 
to be regular. Whatever else might have prompted them 
to support the war, both the habit and the pressure of 
party loyalty were significant factors. 
The action of the state's two senators during the war 
debate, and public reaction to it, also indicates a high 
degree of concern with party regularity. 
The Senate debated the declaration of war passed by 
the House for over a week. Senator Michael Leib, of 
Pennsylvania, a leader of an antiadministration faction 
called the "Invisibles," supported every effort to defeat 
the declaration of war, to amend it drastically, and, when 
these efforts failed, to postpone it. 66 Senator Andrew 
Gregg, a more regular Republican, who had supported 
administration preparedness legislation earlier in the ses-
sion, also supported the antiwar group. Their motives 
are not completely clear. Leib was closely associated in 
state politics with Duane of the Aurora. The two led 
a Republican faction which was opposed to Governor 
Snyder and both were hostile to Secretary of the Treasury 
Gallatin who used his influence to deny Duane and his 
faction federal patronage.67 Leib undoubtedly hoped to 
embarrass the administration, thereby paving the way 
64 Ibid., 1466. 
65 Ibid., 2322. 
66 John Pancake, "'The lnvisibles': A Chapter in the Opposition to 
President Madison," Journal of Southern History, XXI (1955), 17-37; 
Dictionary of American Biography, XI, 150. 
67 Higginbotham, Keystone, 72-74, 162, 229, 276; Brown, Republic in 
Peril, 111. 
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for the nomination of DeWitt Clinton whose election 
would benefit him in his domestic factional battles. 68 
Gregg's opposition was not based on such a clearly political 
basis. It will be remembered that as congressman in 1806 
he had proposed a stringent nonimportation bill only to 
see a much more lenient measure adopted. He had also 
supported the embargo and the nonintercourse bill, and 
had reluctantly voted for Macon's bill No. 2. In 1809, at 
the beginning of the first session of the Eleventh Congress, 
he complained to Samuel Stewart of the "great diversity 
of sentiment in Congress" and concluded that "we will 
not strike the first blow. The door for an adjustment of 
our differences by negotiation will be kept open, should 
our adversaries be disposed to settle them in that way; 
but if they are determined on war I expect they will be 
resisted by a spirit becoming such a nation as ours." By 
the spring of 1811 he had become totally disenchanted 
with the policy of economic coercion and what he con-
sidered lack of vigor in the administration.69 He opposed 
a declaration of war in June 1812 because he believed the 
nation was not prepared, and doubted the administration's 
willingness or ability to wage war effectively. In a letter 
published in the Aurora he stated, "To declare war now 
... is tantamount to a paper blockade, for we are totally 
unprepared . . . to carry such a declaration into effect." 
He favored an adjournment of Congress until the fall to 
allow time for effective preparation.70 
In the Senate, Leib had begun his delaying tactics in 
April when he successfully extended the sixty-day embar-
go approved by the House to ninety daysY Thomas 
68 Rogers to Roberts, June 14, 1812, Jonathan Roberts to Matthew 
Roberts, June 7, 1812, Fox to Roberts, June 24, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
69 Gregg to Jones, April 8, 1811, Jones Papers; Gregg to Samuel 
Stewart, Dec. 22, 1809, Gregg Collection. 
70 Philadelphia Aurora, June 16, 1812. 
71 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., lst sess., 187-89. 
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Rogers opposed this maneuver. It was obviously "intended 
to divert the attention of the government from a declara-
tion of war," he wrote Roberts. "If the embargo had been 
adopted as the President and the lower House wished, for 
sixty days, we would now be acting in earnest.''72 During 
the war debate Leib at first took only a small part, letting 
Giles and Smith carry the burden of opposition though 
he always supported them. Gregg, in fact, played a larger 
role in the first days of the debate. On June 10, two 
days after a select Senate committee had reported a war 
bill, Gregg proposed an amendment to substitute letters 
of marque and naval reprisals for war. These passed by 
a margin of 17 to 13, Gregg and Leib voting with the 
majority. On June 12 both senators voted for a resolu-
tion made by John Pope, of Kentucky, which would 
have included France in the declaration. Gregg's reso-
lutions were brought up again in the same day, but 
this time lost on a tie vote, Gregg and Leib again voting 
in favor of them. On June 15, Leib and Gregg voted for 
two measures which would have delayed a declaration for 
varying lengths of time, but both were defeated by the 
Senate by the narrow margin of two votes. In a last 
desperate effort Leib introduced a proposal very similar 
to Gregg's of June 10. It authorized immediate maritime 
war against Great Britain and later, at a specified future 
date, against France if she did not provide unequivocal 
evidence that the Napoleonic decrees had been repealed. 
This proposal was defeated by a narrow margin and by 
a vote of 19 to 13 the Senate passed the war bill reported 
by the committee to a third reading and it passed the 
Senate on June 17. Gregg and Leib voted in favor of the 
war declaration. 73 
72 Rogers to Roberts, June 1, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
73 The senate debate is in the Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 1st 
sess., 265-98. There is an excellent summary in Perkins, Prologue, 
411-14. 
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In view of their earlier opposition to war, their votes in 
favor of the declaration of war can only be explained in 
terms of party considerations. Gregg was described as "a 
man of strong party predilections . . . [who] invariably 
manifested a strong sense of national pride."74 According 
to Roberts, when the final issue came his party ties led 
him to support the war. This was not necessarily a simple 
matter of loyalty, however. Gregg had gubernatorial 
ambitions and knew that he had to vote for war if he 
hoped for Republican support for his ambitions.75 Leib's 
action is more difficult to assess. Given his constant oppo-
sition to the administration, any future political ambitions 
he might have had could be served only by Madison's 
defeat. A vote for war would not erase his past actions. 
He was thoroughly disliked by many of his colleagues. 
Roberts believed he deserved to be tarred and feathered 
and "kicked and scuffed by every honest" man. "If he 
says three words to me I'll take pains to kick him." Lacock 
and Brown had the same low opinion of him, and many 
other administration men in the delegation felt the same 
way. Binns told Roberts that Republicans of Philadelphia 
were "anxious and angry" with Leib. "Wagers not a few 
are laid on Leib's vote." Rogers probably came closest to 
explaining his vote in one terse sentence. Leib, he said, 
was "compelled by the sentiment of the people to vote 
for war." Leib had acted similarly before. In 1808 he 
had reluctantly supported Snyder's candidacy for the gov-
ernorship of Pennsylvania because "the current of popular 
sentiment was too strong" to overcome and he "therefore 
determined to drift with the tide."76 Leib explained his 
74 Dictionary of American Biography, VII, 595-96. 
75 Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, June 17, 1812, Roberts 
Papers. 
76 H. M. Jenkins, Pennsylvania, Colonial and Federal (Philadelphia, 
1903), 187; Michael Leib to Caesar A. Rodney, Aug. 1, 1808, Gratz Col-
lection. 
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support for Snyder as an effort to heal "a serious schism in 
the Republican party." Leib himself substantiated Rogers' 
statement when he explained that he had voted for war 
"because my constituents . . . would have made a noise 
if I had not."77 Although this cannot be called party 
loyalty, or party regularity, it certainly indicates that 
considerations of party politics, particularly the need to 
retain party support, prompted both senators to vote for 
a war they did not want at a time they did not want it. In 
Philadelphia Federalists were "so embittered" that a visi-
tor to that city feared "that the first blood that flows may 
very possibly be shed in civil strife." But Pennsylvania 
Republicans rejoiced at the news that Congress had de-
clared war. Their immediate reaction and their longrun 
support for war reflects the same attitudes they had held 
in the days preceding the declaration. "The news . . . 
cheered me," wrote Rogers to Roberts. "If it is true the 
Republic is safe and we must now rally to the standard." 
The Federalists "are completely humbled and our friends 
here are extremely pleased with the result." Referring to 
the fall elections, he opined that "the Federalists will be 
stopped short." Roberts told his brother, "the declaration 
of war is a great point gained." Newspapers carried many 
reports of county meetings and printed their addresses to 
the public and toasts drunk at Fourth of July celebrations. 
These varied in length and style, but the theme was always 
the same. Independence, which had been declared in 
1776, had been threatened by British violations of Amer-
ica's neutral rights. The heroes of 1776, now at the helm 
of government, were exhibiting the same spirit in defend-
ing the independence they had helped achieve. Sum-
marizing the causes of the war, these addresses stress 
77 Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, June 12, June 17, 1812, Binns 
to Roberts, June 19, 1812, Rogers to Roberts, June 21, 1812, Roberts 
Papers; Higginbotham, Key8tone, 255. 
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maritime grievances and mention Britain's efforts to create 
internal dissension and her stated ambition to reduce the 
United States to colonial status. They conclude by assert-
ing that war was just and necessary to protect the nation's 
rights and to redeem its honor, and by pledging support 
to the president, the government and republican institu-
tions. Two toasts were particularly common. "Manu-
factures-let us teach the British we can do without theirs, 
by manufacturing for ourselves" and ·-rhe Pennsylvania 
delegation in the legislature of the United States who 
stood at their posts and declared the existence of a war-
May we do our duty as well as they have done theirs."78 
Governor Snyder's first message after the declaration 
of war is a good summary of Pennsylvania's reaction. In 
it he said that the accumulated wrongs and repeated 
injuries inflicted upon the United States by Great Britain 
had compelled Congress to declare war to maintain the 
nation's independence. The Pennsylvania legislature, he 
said, had ••for many years, session after session, approved 
the measures of the general government and declared 
that they and their constituents would zealously support 
all its determinations which promised relief. . . . These 
determinations are now tested." He hoped that the legis-
lature would rejoice with him that ••the day of fruitless 
negotiation and unavailing resolves [had] passed away." 
He devoted more than half of his message to a ·'subject 
... important to our real and practical independence ... 
home manufactures." He said he did not wish to express 
hostility to commerce, but "it must be acknowledged that 
the embarrassments under which the general government 
78 F. H. Gilbert to Sarah Hillhouse, June 20, 1812, Alexander-Hillhouse 
Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina 
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina). Rogers to Roberts, June 21, 1812, 
Roberts Papers. One can find addresses and toasts like those described in 
virtually any issue of any Republican newspaper. The toasts quoted are 
from the Washington Reporter, July 27, 1812. 
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has for many years labored has principally, if not exclu-
sively originated in circumstances connected with com-
merce." The present war provided "a favorable oppor-
tunity . . . to foster and encourage the establishment of 
our own manufactures . . . which secure the real inde-
pendence of our country."79 In a set of forthright resolu-
tions the Pennsylvania legislature expressed similar senti-
ments in approving the war resolution. "After the injustice 
of Great Britain had by long continued practice acquired 
the name of right; after the forbearance and negotiating 
policy had assumed the appearance and acquired the name 
of cowardice-War is reluctantly, unavoidably, but deci-
sively declared," the legislators stated in the preamble to 
the resolutions which stated: 
I. That the declaration of war against . . . Great 
Britain . . . is the result of solemn deliberations, 
sound wisdom and imperious necessity. 
2. That the sword being drawn would never be 
sheathed till our wrongs are redressed. . . . 
3. That we pledge our complete support to what-
ever measures the wisdom of the national legislature 
may adopt. 
6. That the promptness, zeal and wisdom with 
which the governor . . . executed the military orders 
of the President . . . entitle him to the gratitude of 
this General Assembly, and of the nation.80 
The immediate reaction of the people of Pennsylvania 
to the declaration of war contains all the themes which 
had prompted them to desire war: concern for the national 
honor and the nation's independence; the belief that the 
United States' reliance on Britain for manufactured goods 
somehow limited the nation's independence and that the 
79 Pennsylvania House Journal, 1812-1813, pp. 16-26. 
so Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1812-1813, pp. 29-31. 
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road to complete independence lay in the development 
of domestic manufactures; the concern for the welfare 
of republican institutions and of the Republican party. 
These same attitudes sustained the people of Pennsylvania 
during the two and a half years of the war to which they 
gave their complete support. 
CHAPTER SIX 
Pennsylvania at War 
During the war Pennsylvania Republicans gave their 
support to the efforts of the national government. They 
insisted that the war must be fought to a military con-
clusion; they cooperated as fully as possible with the 
national government's efforts to enlist men; and they con-
tributed generously to the financial support of the war. 
In justifying continuation of the war after news of the re-
peal of the orders-in-council and military defeats prompted 
a demand for an immediate negotiated settlement, Penn-
sylvanians expressed attitudes quite similar to those which 
had led them to support the declaration of war. 
The British Parliament repealed the orders-in-council 
five days after Congress declared war, but news of the 
repeal did not reach the United States until late July. 
Immediately there were demands for a cessation of hostili-
ties and for negotiations to end the war.1 Republicans 
believed that repeal of the orders did not eliminate the 
causes for war. The press interpreted the repeal as a trick 
to turn the United States away from war and began to 
insist that Great Britain must satisfy this country on all 
outstanding issues. William Duane told his readers that the 
"vague terms in which the repealing order was couched" 
and the reservation by the Prince Regent of his " 'right' to 
revive the orders when he might think fit" were sufficient 
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grounds for rejection of the offer. There were still other 
causes for war which repeal of the orders did not satisfy: 
the system of paper blockades, impressment of American 
seamen, the security of the American flag, and the rights 
of neutral commerce. "The war will be prosecuted, till it 
produces a peace grounded upon the removal of all the 
causes of difference and full satisfaction of the injuries 
hitherto suffered." 
Jonathan Roberts told his brother that repeal of the 
orders was not satisfactory evidence of any basic change 
in British policy. Like Duane, he referred to the condi-
tional nature of the repeal order and insisted that Britain 
would have to satisfy the United States on other issues, 
particularly impressment. John Connelly, Fox, John Binns, 
and other correspondents made the same point in their 
letters to Roberts. Rush wrote Ingersoll that he was happy 
that the United States "took up arms in a just cause," and 
said, "I am for going on like men notwithstanding old 
England or new England and if we do fall before both 
or either to fall at least like resolute men doing their duty." 
The war, he continued, provided Republicans with a 
magnificent opportunity. The disaffected must support 
the war "or put themselves in open opposition." In either 
case "the cause is strengthened." A Republican meeting 
in Pittsburgh resolved "that they approve of the manly 
and dignified ground which the government of the United 
States has assumed in manifesting its determination to 
maintain those rights by the sword, a just respect for 
which it has failed to procure by negociacion [sic]." The 
meeting went on to condemn attempts to sow discord 
among the people and the demands for peace "when only 
one cause has been satisfied." The resolutions concluded 
by urging the people to support Madison and Gerry and 
1 Pittsburgh Gazette, Aug. 12, 1812; Pennsylvania Gazette, Aug. 14, 
1812. 
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condemning those who would destroy the confidence of 
the people in their government to gain personal power, 
office or fortune.2 
Another reason given for continuing the war in spite of 
repeal of the orders-in-council was suggested by Roger 
Brown as a cause of the war-the necessity to establish 
the ability of a republican government to wage war suc-
cessfully and, incidentally, of the Republican party to 
manage a war. Although there is not enough evidence to 
build a thesis around this point, such sentiments were 
expressed often enough to suggest that these considera-
tions played a role in determining Republican attitudes 
toward the war. Arguing against an end to the war in 
July 1812, Duane implored the people to support the gov-
ernment, urged young men to enlist, and encouraged 
militia units to volunteer for federal service because a 
military victory would prove to the world the vitality of 
Republican government. Jonathan Roberts told his brother 
that any end of the war before American arms had proved 
themselves in battle would be "a precursor to the over-
throw of the republic and its government." After the 
early defeats sustained by American forces in the fall of 
1812, Republican leaders informed Roberts that even on 
favorable terms a peace before some military victories 
would discredit the nation in the eyes of the world, and 
the administration in the eyes of the people. Binns warned 
Roberts not to succumb to any offers of peace before the 
end of the year. There would be congressional elections 
in the fall and the presidential election to consider. Even 
serious negotiation with Britain, he warned, would ruin 
2 Philadelphia Aurora, Aug. 20, 1812; Jonathan Roberts to Matthew 
Roberts, Nov. 14, 1812, Connelly to Roberts, Oct. 17, 1812, Bills to 
Roberts, Oct. 23, Nov. 11, 1812, Roberts Papers; Rush to Ingersoll, Oct. 
22, Nov. 17, 1812, Ingersoll Papers. For the expression of similar 
attitudes see Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Aug. 29, Sept. 5, Sept. 12, 1812; 
Pittsburgh Mercury, Aug. 25, Sept. 1, Sept. 24, 1812; Washington Re-
porter, Aug. 28, Sept. 4, 1812; Carlisle Gazette, Sept. 19, Sept. 26, 1812. 
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Republican chances in the fall elections and assure "the 
success of Federalists or their friends." On the other hand, 
if the president prosecuted the war vigorously the people 
would support him even in the face of military reversals.3 
In the first days of its session the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture passed resolutions which called on the administration 
to prosecute the war until Britain satisfied the United 
States on all outstanding issues, pledged the support of 
the state to the war, and denounced the refusal of Con-
necticut and Massachusetts to supply their quota of 
militia. In April the legislature debated similar resolutions 
confirming its belief that the war was just, and once again 
pledged its support.4 Major Isaac Roach of the Second 
Regiment of the United States Artillery explained in his 
journal that he had enlisted because "it had become a jest 
and a byword in England that this country could not be 
kicked into war," and he felt it was necessary to show the 
world not only that the United States would fight, but that 
it could fight. Captain Stanton Scholes, who served with a 
militia unit on the Canadian frontier stated that a desire 
to repudiate the slurs on the nation's honor had prompted 
him and many of his comrades to volunteer for militia 
duty.5 These and similar sentiments continued to be 
expressed during the entire course of the war. 
These attitudes, and Pennsylvania's devout support of 
3 Philadelphia Aurma, July 9, July 11, July 12, July 16, July 23, 1812; 
Rogers to Roberts, Oct. 19, Nov. 2, 1812, Fox to Roberts, Oct. 23, 
Nov. 4, 1812, Binns to Roberts, Sept. 14, Sept. 24, Oct. 3, Oct. 11, Oct. 
19, Nov. 3, 1812, Roberts Papers. See also Gallatin to Madison, Aug. 8, 
1812, in The Writings of Albert Gallatin, ed. Henry Adams (Philadel-
phia, 1879), I, 523. Jefferson to Wright, Aug. 8, 1812, in The Writings 
of Thomas Jefferson, ed. A. A. Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh (Washington, 
D.C., 1903), VIII, 184. For the military history of the war see H. L. 
Coles, The War of 1812 (Chicago, 1965). 
4 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1812-1813, pp. 29-35, 75-79; Pennsyl-
vania House Journal, 1812-1813, pp. 29, 89-97. 
5 "Journal of Major Isaac Roach," Pennsylvania. Magazine of History 
and Biography, XVII ( 1893); Diary of Captain Stanton Scholes, Western 
Pennsylvania Historical Society, Pittsburgh. 
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the war and of James Madison's administration, were 
expressed very clearly in the elections of 1812. The most 
important contest, of course, was between James Madison 
and DeWitt Clinton for the presidency. Concurrently, 
Pennsylvania voters had to elect a new congressional dele-
gation, now expanded to twenty-three members, ninety-
five members of the state House of Representatives, and 
nine state senators. The war and its conduct were the 
central issues in the campaign, and the results were an 
impressive victory for James Madison and war. 
On May 29, 1812, ambitious New York Republicans, 
long resentful of Virginia's domination of the party, nomi-
nated DeWitt Clinton to oppose Madison in the fall 
elections. There was little hope of winning western or 
southern support for his candidacy, but Clinton's chances 
of winning were good if an alliance could be formed 
between New England Federalists and middle state Re-
publicans. The chances of getting the support of Pennsyl-
vania Republicans were slim. On March 7, Republicans 
in the Pennsylvania legislature "nobly and independently 
declared unanimously in favor of the re-election of Mr. 
Madison." The legislature had pledged the state's twenty 
electors to Madison, and the state "will decidedly accord 
in sentiment."6 
Clintonians made strenuous efforts to win the support 
of Pennsylvania Republicans, but did not attract anyone 
of great influence. They did manage to create a vocal, 
although ineffective, organization devoted to Clinton's 
candidacy. This body was organized at a secret meeting 
in Lancaster in August 1812, at which Congressman Joseph 
Lefever presided. The meeting issued an address to the 
people of Pennsylvania urging them to support Clinton. 
It also urged Republicans in favor "of an honorable peace" 
to hold similar meetings in support of Clinton, and, it 
6 Dorothie Bobbe, DeWitt Clinton (New York, 1933), 184-87; Binns 
to Smilie, March 19, 1812, Gallatin Papers. 
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appears, launched a journal dedicated to Clinton's elec-
tion. The Pennsylvania Farmer, which began publication 
in August 1812, carried little advertising and virtually no 
local news. Its columns were filled with public addresses 
and letters favorable to Clinton, the resolutions and 
addresses of county meetings which had supported Clin-
ton, and detailed descriptions of American military de-
feats. Beginning in September, it printed under its mast-
head one of these biblical quotations: "The Way of Peace 
they know not and there is no judgment in their doing" 
or "Wherefore Brethren look ye out among you men of 
honest report whom we may appoint over this business." 
It ceased publication in February 1813.7 
The public addresses in favor of Clinton, the resolutions 
of Clintonian county meetings, and the columns of the 
Federalist press, the Pittsburgh Gazette, the Pennsylvania 
Gazette, and the allegedly independent Pennsylvania 
Farmer express the issues on which antiadministration 
Republicans (and Federalists who supported them) placed 
their hopes. The most common charges made against 
Madison were the unconstitutionality and corruptness of 
nomination by congressional caucus, the Virginia domi-
nance of the Republican party, and the inept conduct of 
the war. Warnings concerning heavy taxation to pay for 
the war and charges that Madison declared war at the 
behest of Napoleon, thereby involving the United States 
in an alliance with France, were also common. 
The resolutions of a meeting of York County Republi-
cans, typical of similar resolutions by pro-Clinton meetings 
all over the state, contain all of these charges: 
Because he has precepitately [sic] and rashly urged 
Congress to declare war at a time when the country 
7 The best report of this meeting and of the probable connection 
between Clintonians and the Pennsylvania Farmer is in the Pittsburgh 
Commonwealth, Sept. 5, 1812. 
Pennsylvania at War I7J 
was unprepared with the means of carrying it to 
success. 
Because the inauspicious circumstances under 
which the war was commenced and the weakness 
with which it has thus far been conducted furnish no 
flattering pre-sage that the same councils will bring it 
to a speedy and honorable termination. 
Because Mr. Madison is devoted to a Southern 
policy which is hostile to commerce and consequently 
discouraging to agriculture the two great sources 
from which Pennsylvania derives her prosperity. 
Because Virginia has already had the presidency 
twenty years out of twenty four-and now claims it 
again-thus endeavoring by usage to establish a 
perpetual right to furnish incumbents for that high 
office. 
Therefore this meeting resolves to concur with the 
Republicans of the state of N.Y. in the nomination of 
DeWitt Clinton-not more distinguished for his talents 
and patriotism than for his adherence to republican 
principles; yet unlike Mr. Madison, he is a friend to 
peace and commerce. 8 
A meeting in Dauphin County announced that Madison 
had been nominated by an unconstitutional caucus "pol-
luted by executive influence, official influence and foreign 
influence." The defeats sustained by American arms 
proved the inability of the Madison administration to 
conduct the war successfully. Virginia had had every 
president but one since the establishment of the nation and 
it was time to break her monopoly.9 This charge was but-
tressed by appeals to state pride. Pennsylvania had not 
received its fair share of high federal offices and had been 
neglected in the military appointments following the 
declaration of war. A correspondent in the Pittsburgh 
8 Pittsburgh Gazette, Sept. 18, 1812. 
9 Pennsylvania Farmer (Lancaster), Aug. 26, 1812. 
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Gazette suggested that perhaps Pennsylvania's support 
of "Virginian administrations" had been so constant that 
they were taking it for granted. A vote for Clinton in this 
election might regain for Pennsylvania a just share of 
federal offices. Meetings of Clinton Republicans in York, 
Lancaster, Nazareth, Bucks, and Luzerne counties depre-
cated the paucity of Pennsylvanians in federal office and 
nominated Jared Ingersoll, the father of Charles J. Inger-
soll of Pennsylvania, a Republican representative in the 
Thirteenth Congress, to be Clinton's running mate. Prob-
ably to exploit this dissatisfaction Clinton accepted him.10 
Defending Lefever against the charge of being an 
apostate, the Farmer argued that he was an "honorable 
man" entitled to the thanks of every true American. "He 
voted for war. He did so under a sincere conviction that 
it was right. He has not changed his opinion." But "hav-
ing seen the gross misconduct of Madison and his ministers 
he has had the honesty publicly to speak of it" and demand 
an end "to a flimsily disguised Southern aristocracy who 
wish still longer to lord it over their northern brethren."11 
Inept conduct of the war was another common charge 
made against Madison, but the very way in which this 
issue was handled by Clinton's supporters attests to the 
strong Republican support for the war in Pennsylvania. 
They denounced the incompetent generals Madison had 
appointed, hinting darkly that the appointments were 
political. They commented on the disastrous effects of 
the war on commerce, suggesting that the destruction of 
commercial interests was a prime purpose of the war. 
They censured Madison for forcing a declaration of war 
before the country was prepared, and demanded that he 
dismiss the incompetent members of his cabinet who were 
10 On the nomination of Ingersoll, see Irving Brant, James Madison: 
Commander-in-Chief, 1812-1836 (Indianapolis, 1961), 106. The quota-
tion is from the Pittsburgh Gazette, Sept. 4, 1812. 
11 Pennsylvania Farmer, Sept. 2, 1812. 
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blamed, equally with him, for American defeats. Clinton, 
they promised, "would soon retrieve the loss by wisdom 
in council and vigor in execution." In its formal endorse-
ment, the Pittsburgh Gazette supported Clinton because 
his election promised "a vigorous prosecution of the war 
and a determined character in the relations of peace." 
Clinton's supporters in Pennsylvania attacked the war 
from many directions but never the war itself, as did his 
supporters in other areas.12 
Pennsylvania Republicans took Clinton's challenge ser-
iously, aware that the results would have national impor-
tance. The Aurora, which on the whole was strangely 
quiet during the campaign, refused to give Madison a 
formal endorsement until late October. At issue in the 
election was the question of "whether the principles of 
the declaration of independence shall be upheld by the 
people; whether a war for our republican form of govern-
ment ... shall receive the support of the people."13 Richard 
Rush told Charles Ingersoll that the election "is a great 
cause, and if it succeeds gloriously, as I trust it will, will 
do wonders for our posterity as well as the nation at 
present. It will break the bones of the monster, British 
influence." Rush asked Ingersoll to make the Pennsylvania 
results known as quickly as possible, because a republican 
majority there would influence the results in other states. 
"An influential Maryland democrat assured me they (the 
Pennsylvania results) will have a favorable effect upon 
the election in Maryland .... Mr. Cutts of Massachusetts 
... is afraid we will lose N. H. though thinks we should not 
if the favorable results of the Pennsylvania election was 
[sic] known beforehand."14 
12 Pennsylvania Farmer, Sept. 2, 1812; Pittsburgh Gazette, Sept. 11, 
1812. For the conduct of Clinton's campaign in other areas see Dorothie 
Bobbe, DeWitt Clinton (New York, 1933), 182-88, 190-96. 
13 Philadelphia Aurora, Oct. 13, 1812. 
14 Rush to Ingersoll, Oct. 1, Oct. 29, 1812, Ingersoll Papers. 
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Support for Madison in Pennsylvania was overwhelm-
ing. Fourteen of the state's delegation to Congress at-
tended the caucus which renominated him in May 1812, 
and all voted for him. Of the five who were absent, wrote 
Roberts, "Crawford pleaded sickness and Whitehill pro-
fesses concurrence. Lefever and Seybert will go along." 
Of Leib he said, "his heart is with Clinton, but he was 
forced to attend the caucus and vote for Madison or be 
set down as a malcontent without the means of mischief. 
Judge Anderson [Congressman William Anderson of Penn-
sylvania] tells me he professes a wish to unite with the 
Clinton faction-on what basis I know not." Gregg, he 
said, "has become more affable and the Senators and 
Representatives from Pennsylvania may yet act with 
concert."15 Lefever, as has been shown, led the Clintonian 
organization and Leib openly supported Clinton in the 
fall. The fact that he voted for Madison's nomination, 
however, is indicative of the strength of public sentiment, 
given Leib's demonstrated proclivity for drifting with the 
tide. Rodman did not attend the caucus and was defeated 
as a Clinton candidate for Congress. Even before Madison 
had been nominated by the caucus, Republican members 
of the state legislature met on March 7, 1812, prepared an 
electoral ticket, and all pledged their support to him.16 
During the campaign, Pennsylvania Republicans, with 
the notable exception of Duane, stoutly defended Madison 
against the charges made by the Clintonians, worked 
hard to prevent further divisions in the party, and in the 
end gave him a large majority on election day. To the 
charge that nomination by congressional caucus was un-
constitutional, they countered that the Constitution pre-
15 Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, May 20, 1812, Roberts 
Papers; Niles Register, II (May 23, 1812), contains the entire proceed-
ings of the caucus. 
16 Philadelphia Aurora, March 28, 1812; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, 
April 7, 1812; Charles H. Jones, A Memoir of William Rodman (n.p., 
1867), 37. 
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scribes no method for nomination, therefore no method 
could be constitutional or unconstitutional. If the objec-
tion to congressional nomination is the undue influence of 
a particular group or section, Pennsylvania Republicans 
replied that nominations made by the legislature of one 
state are "equally worthy of condemnation. The members 
of Congress, representing all states and parts of the Union, 
are certainly better qualified to express the wishes of the 
nation; being thoroughly acquainted with the nation's 
problems, they are better qualified than a state legislature 
to assess its needs."17 
Answering a letter sent him by a correspondence com-
mittee of Adams County which urged him to support 
Clinton, Congressman Crawford denied the validity of 
the committee's constitutional objections to the method 
of Madison's nomination on the same grounds as had 
the Mercury. If nomination by congressional caucus is 
unconstitutional, he asked, how can nomination by a state 
legislature be constitutional. If nomination by congres-
sional caucus was objected to because of the alleged undue 
influence of Virginia, does not nomination by state legisla-
tures present the possibility of collusion among particular 
states to keep the presidency for themselves. He accused 
the Clintonians of "the manufacturing of artificial issues" 
to distract the people and to divide them "during a crisis 
of such magnitude ... when the very existence of republi-
canism itself may be at stake." This consideration alone 
"will prevent any citizen who wishes to give his support 
to a continuance of those governing principles from aiding 
or abetting you in your present scheme." He concluded 
by urging them to give up their plan and unite behind 
Madison.18 
17 Pittsburgh Mercury, Sept. 17, 1812. 
18 Crawford's letter is printed in the Pittsburgh Mercury, Sept. 17, 
1812, the Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Sept. 19, 1812, and the Washing-
ton Reporter, Sept. 23, 1812. 
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To the charge of French influence in the administration, 
Madison's supporters countered with evidence of Fed-
eralist support for Clinton which, in effect, meant British 
influence in his favor. In a front page article in very large 
print the Pittsburgh Commonwealth announced that a 
caucus of the Federalist party in New York City had 
decided not to nominate a candidate of their own, but to 
support "that candidate of the two already in nomination, 
whose success would best promote the objects of their 
party." The caucus had decided to "give preference to 
Mr. Clinton." The Federalists who attended this meeting 
were told by one of their members that "Clinton has 
declared that all political connection between himself 
and the Democratic party has ceased and would not again 
be renewed." The Commonwealth was so sure of these 
charges that it concluded the report with the statement: 
"This fact can be established by a court of law if neces-
sary."19 In the minds of most Republicans, Federalist sup-
port of Clinton was enough to damn him. The connection 
between the Federalists and the British was assumed to be 
so well established that it was hardly mentioned. "The 
condition of the bargain offered by the Federalists and 
embraced by the Clintonian party were . . . that in the 
event of the election of their candidate a cession of hostili-
ties against the British should take place within twenty 
four hours." The Commonwealth stated that "in addition 
Federalists had been promised abundant patronage, had 
been promised that the capital would be moved to New 
York or Philadelphia, and that a hereditary Senate would 
be established."20 
Clinton's promises to prosecute the war to a victorious 
conclusion should not be taken seriously, warned the press. 
"In the west where there is and has been an honorable 
19 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Oct. 27, 1812. 
20 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Oct. 6, 1812. 
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display of national spirit ... Mr. Clinton is recommended 
as a friend of war-he is to carry it on with vigor-in the 
East he is presented as a friend of peace." One needed 
only examine the nature of Clinton's support, stated the 
Carlisle Gazette, to know that his promises of vigorous 
prosecution would not be kept. His supporters were men 
"who can truly be denominated nothing better than dis-
orderly." Hardly had war begun when they began "to 
cry for peace, come of our honor and national character 
what will." The Commonwealth stated that Federalist 
obstruction to peaceful methods of coercion had forced 
the United States to war and now they opposed it. The 
defeats of the United States sustained in the summer and 
fall could not be attributed to incompetence on the part 
of the administration but they could be attributed easily 
to Federalist opposition to preparedness legislation and 
the Federalist obstruction of the war effort. "The present 
administration is pledged to fight this war to an honorable 
conclusion" and to "retrieve the lost honor and indepen-
dence of the nation." Only the election of James Madison 
would assure "that the war will be fought to a successful 
conclusion."21 
Madison's prospects were heightened by the great 
efforts made by all Republican factions to unite behind 
Madison and the war effort. John Spayd, the candidate 
of the anti-Snyder faction in the gubernatorial elections 
of 1808 is known to have attended unification meetings in 
Berks and York counties, and in Philadelphia, where he 
urged unity not only in the presidential election, but also 
in the congressional elections and in state and local races. 
In Philadelphia William J. Duane, son of the editor of the 
Aurora, and Alexander J. Dallas, a leader of the anti-
2l Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Sept. 15, Sept. 22, Oct. 6, Oct. 13, 1812; 
Pittsburgh Mercury, Sept. 17, Sept. 24, Oct. 14, Oct. 22, 1812; Carlisle 
Gazette, Sept. 18, Sept. 25, Oct. 7, Oct. 14, 1812. 
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Snyder faction, worked hard to unite the city's Republi-
cans. Finally, the Aurora, which had called for united 
support for war, but had maintained a studied silence 
concerning the election, came out for Madison. On 
October 13, Duane replied to "some upbraidings and 
reproaches, and not a little abuse" which he had received 
"for not taking a more vigorous part in the election" with 
the statement, "let very well alone." He predicted 145 
electoral votes for Madison and a maximum of 73-New 
York, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland ( 5), and Ken-
tucky (3)-for Clinton. On October 17, he formally 
endorsed Madison. 
Factional politics were confused in Pittsburgh. There 
was a personal struggle for party control between the 
editors of the Commonwealth and the Mercury and be-
tween the groups represented by each faction. The groups 
agreed in supporting Madison and the war, but there was 
a difference of opinion concerning state and local offices 
and the congressional candidate. Ultimately they were 
able to unite behind a unified ticket. This alliance must 
have been rather shaky, however, because the Federalists, 
hoping perhaps to capitalize on Clinton's candidacy, but 
obviously encouraged by the Republican split, offered 
their own ticket for the first time since 1808. Pittsburgh 
Federalists confined themselves to attacks on the conduct 
of the war and never condemned the war itself. This is 
indicative of the strength of prowar feeling in that area.22 
These efforts to achieve party unity must have been 
successful because the election produced an impressive 
Republican victory. In the state elections on October 13, 
Republicans won 77 of 95 seats in the Pennsylvania House 
and 6 of 9 races for the state Senate. In the congressional 
22 This discussion is based on an analysis of the Philadelphia Aurora, 
the Pittsburgh Commonwealth, and the Pittsburgh Mercury for the 
Republican side and the Pittsburgh Gazette and the Pennsylvania Gazette 
for the Federalist side in the late summer and fall of 1812. 
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elections Republicans won 22 of 23 seats. The lone 
Federalist to win was John Cloninger whose victory can 
be attributed in large measure to a Republican split in 
Dauphin County, which resulted in two candidates being 
nominated. 23 
In the presidential contest the Republicans won a 
complete victory, claiming all of Pennsylvania's 25 elec-
toral votes. Madisonian electors won their races by an 
average margin of 20,000 votes. The importance of these 
results cannot be overestimated. They assured the admin-
istration a large delegation pledged to support its program 
in the Thirteenth Congress. They assured the national 
government of the continued cooperation of the state of 
Pennsylvania and, most importantly, they insured Madi-
son's reelection. He won with a total of 128 electoral 
votes to 89 for Clinton. Had Pennsylvania voted the other 
way, Clinton would have won by 11 votes.24 
The Aurora viewed these results as proof that the people 
of Pennsylvania approved of the war and were determined 
to fight to maintain "their rights, their freedoms and the 
independence of their nation." The results also proved 
that a government "dependent on the people can be sure 
of their support when circumstances force it to adopt 
measures which cause temporary misery." The Pittsburgh 
Mercury stated that the election "has terminated in a 
manner becoming the character of the nation." Richard 
Rush was elated by the results. The election, he admitted, 
was "pretty close work, and Pennsylvania as usual, carries 
the nation on her back." Madison's victory was so impres-
23 Cloninger served for only a few months, resigning in the spring of 
1813. He was replaced by Edward Crouch, the candidate of the regular 
Republicans in the regular election. H. M. Jenkins, Pennsylvania, 
Colonial and Federal (Philadelphia, 1903), 194. 
24 The average for Madisonian electors was 48,946; for Clintonian 
electors 29,056. For the election results see Philadelphia Aurora, Nov. 
20, 1812, and Edward Stanwood, History of the Presidency (New York, 
1892), 104. 
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sive, he concluded, that "the British faction must be for-
ever quiet." Madison's victory in Pennsylvania can in 
large measure be attributed to the united Republican sup-
port for the war. Having submerged factional differences 
in order to give united support to measures of economic 
coercion, having demanded and strongly supported a 
declaration of war, Pennsylvania Republicans were un-
willing to desert the administration which had begun the 
war which they had demanded. In the words of Henry 
Adams, "once more the steadiness of Pennsylvania saved 
the administration. "25 
The state of Pennsylvania expressed its support for the 
war not only by providing the administration with twenty-
two congressmen who would support its measures in Con-
gress, and by providing the commander-in-chief with the 
margin of victory in his election, but by very sincere efforts 
to cooperate with the government by contributing men 
and money to the war effort. 
In his opening message to the twenty-third session of 
the state legislature, Governor Snyder pledged the state's 
support of the war effort and painted an overly optimistic 
picture of the military situation. He declared that the 
nation's frontiers were secure and that the enemy had 
found it expedient to depart. The privations of the nation 
had not been "at all proportional to what was expected; 
much less have we suffered the manifold calamities which 
the fears of the timid or the treachery of the factious 
had pourtrayed [sic]." The military reverses suffered in 
the summer and fall were not due to weakness or incom-
petence, but to the fact that "for thirty years . . . the 
attention of the government and of our people [was] solely 
directed to cultivate the arts of peace." Defeats and 
25 Philadelphia Aurora, Oct. 21, 1812; Pittsburgh Mercury, Nov. 5, 
1812; Washington Reporter, Jan. 18, 1813, expresses the same sentiments. 
Rush to Ingersoll, Nov. 14, 1812, Ingersoll Papers. 
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reverses should be expected in all wars and the United 
States should not expect to be exempted. Because the 
American people have more at stake than any other people 
on earth, "they will unshakingly and undismayed ... meet 
misfortune."26 This optimism is indicative of Pennsyl-
vania's attitude toward the war. 
The legislature responded to the message by passing 
resolutions praising the governor's patriotism and his 
prompt compliance with the militia requisitions of the 
national government during the recess of the General 
Assembly. The same resolutions applauded the many 
volunteers who had responded to the governor's request, 
enabling him to fill the requisition without having to 
resort to a draft of the militia. It also adopted resolutions 
appealing for continuation of the war until all outstanding 
issues were settled and again condemned Massachusetts 
and Connecticut for their obstructionism.27 More sub-
stantially, it passed a bill authorizing the governor to 
subscribe one million dollars to the new government loan, 
ordered the governor to supply Pennsylvania troops serv-
ing on the Northwest frontier with adequate clothing, 
and provided for a bonus of twenty dollars to any volun-
teers who would serve two months beyond the term of 
their enlistment. 28 
Throughout the entire war Governor Snyder made every 
effort to cooperate with the national government in its 
efforts to organize the state militia into an effective fight-
ing force. Every requisition made of Pennsylvania was 
met, first by volunteers and later by militia drafts. The 
26 Pennsylvania House Journal, 1812-1813, pp. 21-32. 
27 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1812-1813, pp. 35-49; Pennsylvania 
House Journal, 1812-1813, pp. 89-97. 
28 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1812-1813, pp. 183, 202, 209-17, 347-
49, 643-46; Pennsylvania House Journal, 1812-1813, pp. 459, 490-97, 
500-502; Pennsylvania Archives, 4th series, IV, 828, 9th series, V, 3289-
95, 3348-65. 
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ineffectiveness of the Pennsylvania militia was the result 
of the confusion in the state's militia laws and the unbe-
lievable lack of coordination between state and national 
officials. Snyder and his predecessor, McKean, were aware 
of the confusion of the state's militia laws and every 
one of their opening messages to the legislature called for 
sweeping revisions. Every session of the legislature from 
1808 to 1814 debated the issue and some minor changes 
were made, but the state militia was never competently 
organized. 
Failure to provide for the proper arming, disciplining, 
and staffing of the state militia were, according to the 
governors, the most serious defects of the state's militia 
laws. The laws also did not provide for statewide uni-
formity in the organization of units. These problems might 
have been overcome had there been some coordination 
between the state and national governments. All of 
Snyder's efforts to cooperate proved futile and the four-
teen thousand Pennsylvania militia which were ultimately 
detached to federal service contributed little to the war 
effort because of the confusion. Three problems, particu-
larly, prevented effective use of the militia. 
As soon as Pennsylvania militia were ordered into fed-
eral service a question arose as to who was responsible 
for the paying and equipping of the men. The national 
government argued that state militia detached to federal 
service should come fully equipped, and that the govern-
ment was under no obligation to provide for them until 
the men arrived at the place to which they had been called 
and passed to the command of a United States com-
mander. Governor Snyder, on the other hand, held that 
it was the responsibility of the national government to 
outfit troops in its service and that the state should be 
reimbursed for any material which state militia brought 
with them when they entered national service. 
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The first state troops called into federal service faced 
this problem. The government asked Snyder for two 
thousand troops to rendezvous at Meadville and Pitts-
burgh and to proceed to Buffalo. The detachment had 
been filled from those militia companies who had re-
sponded to the governor's call of the previous May for 
volunteers. The officers of these companies informed the 
governor that because they lacked arms, ammunition, 
and equipment they were unprepared. The governor 
responded that he had assumed they were prepared when 
he had accepted their offer. He told them he had no 
material at his disposal and suggested that they collect 
whatever equipment was available-using muskets when 
rifles were unavailable-and attempt to borrow equipment 
from companies that had not been ordered up. He then 
wrote officers of other militia companies in the area asking 
them to contribute equipment to supply the detachment 
going to Buffalo. Once the troops arrived at Meadville 
the problem became more complicated. State law pro-
hibited the governor from paying for supplies in advance, 
and the national government refused to provide them until 
the men left the state. The governor suggested to com-
pany commanders that they buy supplies on their own 
account and promised that they would be reimbursed by 
the state. These problems were not solved during the war 
and constantly hampered effective use of the militia.29 
29 James Trimble (deputy secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania) to Cochran, Sept. 21, 1812, Snyder to Kelso, Sept. 15, 1812, 
Trimble to Thomas, Sept. 16, 1812, Snyder to Eustis, Sept. 5, 1812, 
Boileau (secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania) to deputy 
quartermaster general of the United States, April 1, 1813, Pennsylvania 
Archives, 2d series, XII, 617, 621, 646, 916. The issue becomes even 
more clouded if the relations between the state government and its sup-
pliers are considered. There are many letters in the Pennsylvania 
Archives indicating that suppliers requested payment from the state, 
were directed to the national government, which refused to pay and 
redirected the collectors to the state. See for example Boileau to Eben-
ezer Denny, Sept. 5, 1812, April 1, 1813. 
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A variation to this problem concerned the payment of 
the men and the disposition of arms that the militia 
brought with them into federal service. Congress had 
provided for the distribution of arms to the states accord-
ing to a prescribed quota. What happened when state 
militia equipped with arms provided by the national gov-
ernment was called into national service? Snyder believed 
that "arms removed from the jurisdiction of the state" 
should be replaced to enable the state to arm new militia 
units. The secretary of war did not accept this argument 
and refused to replace the equipment. Governor Snyder 
let the men and arms go without too much protest, only 
to find that future requisitions could not be easily met 
because the state militia was not armed. Every time a 
detachment of state militia was called into federal service 
this argument began anew; it was never permanently 
solved.30 The problem concerning pay was the same. 
The state insisted that the national government assume 
responsibility for payment of the men as soon as they were 
called, or when they reached the rendezvous. The national 
government refused to pay until the men joined the regu-
lar forces and came under command of a United States 
commander.31 
The effectiveness of the Pennsylvania militia was fur-
ther limited by differences in the command structure be-
tween it and the regular forces. In Pennsylvania volunteers 
were allowed to elect their officers up to the regimental 
level; officers for drafted militia were appointed by the 
governor. When volunteer units were combined with 
drafted units for detachment to national service the 
problems of command became almost insurmountable. 
30 See Boileau and Snyder to Monroe, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d series, 
728-37. 
31 Boileau to Samuel Cooper, March 7, 1814, Boileau to Col. James 
Fenton, May 24, 1814, "To the U. S., therefore, you are to look for your 
monthly pay," Pennsylvania Archives, 2d series, XII, 711-19. 
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Volunteers claimed they retained the right to elect their 
officers, even though in service of the national govern-
ment, and refused to serve under appointed officers. In 
most instances the problems were solved on an ad hoc 
basis after repeated urgings by the governor, but no 
permanent solution was ever produced and command 
problems continued to hamper the effectiveness of the 
militia. The case of six hundred volunteers sent to assist 
with the defense of Philadelphia provides a case in point. 
In offering them Snyder told Monroe that the men had 
volunteered "under the impression that they would be 
commanded by officers of their own choosing" and that 
they "would not readily submit to a consolidation of 
companies, or any organization that would divest them 
of their privileges." He wrote to the elected commanders 
of the unit urging them to cooperate fully with federal 
officers in Philadelphia.32 Even if differences over equip-
ment and pay were solved, there remained the problem 
of integrating the Pennsylvania militia and its officers into 
the national forces. The command structure of the militia 
was entirely different from the command structure of the 
federal service, causing untold difficulties for United 
States commanders. General Harrison wrote to Snyder 
almost pleading for changes in Pennsylvania's militia laws 
to permit effective integration of the state's forces. The 
major problem was that Pennsylvania militia officers com-
manded units which were commanded by lower ranking 
officers in the regular service. When attached to regular 
army units, Pennsylvania officers refused to accept the 
lower ranks specified by federal regulations. Finally at 
Snyder's request, the General Assembly passed a law 
ordering Pennsylvania officers to "assume the rank to 
32 Snyder to Monroe, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d series, XII, 7 41. See 
also the correspondence between Raguet, Biddle, and General Bloomfield 
(United States commander in Philadelphia), 722-25. 
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which ... they are entitled" by the laws of the United 
States, but this did not completely solve the problem.33 
It is not surprising that the Pennsylvania militia was 
ineffective. The few letters of John Patterson, a private 
in the state militia serving on the northern frontier, show 
the effect of the confusion on the common soldier. Three 
themes stand out in his letters to his wife. He promised 
to send money when he was paid and he always said 
he would be paid soon. He complained of marching and 
countermarching which made no real progress and inti· 
mated that he and the other men believed that the com· 
manders did not know their own minds. Finally, he com· 
plained of the lack of provisions and the inadequacy 
of arms.34 
That as a fighting force the Pennsylvania militia was 
ineffective cannot be denied. However, the legislature 
and the governor attempted to cooperate. Pennsylvania 
contributed more militia to the federal service than any 
other state, and at the end of the war collected $188,900 
from the federal government for expenses incurred in 
providing militia.35 
The state's efforts to cooperate in the financing of the 
war proved more successful. Secretary of the Treasury 
Gallatin planned to finance the war by borrowing, without 
resort to any additional taxation.36 The state and the 
33 Snyder to Armstrong, April 1, 1813, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d 
series, XII, 619. See also the correspondence between Boileau and 
General Winder, General Meade, and Secretary Armstrong, Pennsylvania 
Archives, 2d series, XII, 643. 
34 "Letters of John Patterson, 1812-1813," Western Pennsylvania His· 
torical Magazine, XXIII (1940), 99-109. Edward J. Wagner discusses 
all of these problems in great detail in "State and Federal Relations 
During the War of 1812" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State 
University, 1963). 
35 American State Papers: Military Affairs, 511. 
3 6 The financing of the War of 1812 is an extremely complicated sub· 
ject. It is handled best in Alexander Balinky, Albert Gallatin, Fiscal 
Theories and Policies (New Brunswick, 1958). Also useful are Raymond 
Walters, Albert Gallatin (New York, 1957), and Davis R. Dewey, Finan-
cial History of the United States (New York, 1920). 
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citizens of Pennsylvania contributed money generously to 
all the government loans. The first war loan, offered in 
May 1812, failed dismally, but the failure cannot be 
attributed to Pennsylvania. In its twenty-second session 
the state legislature passed a law authorizing banks in 
which the state held stock to subscribe to government 
loans to the value of state-owned stock in the bank. The 
state pledged to pay interest and principal if the national 
government defaulted. Under provisions of this law Penn-
sylvania banks contributed $1,432,800 to the $11 million 
loan of 1812. Individuals in Philadelphia added another 
$407,000 bringing the state's total subscription close to 
$2 million. If other states had contributed proportionately, 
the loan would have been oversubscribed. Pennsylvania 
would have subscribed even more if Gallatin could have 
arranged terms with Stephen Girard. 
Girard had recently opened a bank in Philadelphia, 
and when the loan was announced he agreed to subscribe 
$1 million. His explanation for making this offer is instruc-
tive because it reflects the attitude of the business com-
munity generally. Among personal reasons for subscribing 
to the loan, he believed it to be a good investment. His 
capital would be placed "at interest with perfect security." 
He also hoped to gain "the personal consideration which 
will attach to a citizen being of assistance to the govern-
ment at this time and to such an extent." Patriotic lending 
was good business. Although the $1 million was never 
subscribed by Girard because certain details could not be 
arranged, his offer indicates confidence in the government 
and a willingness to support the war. 
The loan of 1812 was never fully subscribed. Eyre 
attributed the failure to the exertion made by the presi-
dent and trustees of the first Bank of the United States 
to keep people from subscribing to the loan. "There 
are a few Federalists here who have acted independently 
and honorably, and have given encouragement to it." He 
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also believed that the loan had not been fully subscribed 
because the people were not yet convinced that war 
would be declared. Had that step been taken "the loan 
would have been filled without difficulty."37 The same 
session of the legislature which authorized banks to sub-
scribe to the government loan also directed the governor 
to pay immediately any direct tax levied by the national 
government during its recess. Neither of these bills 
aroused any opposition.38 
In the following year ( 1813) the legislature authorized 
the governor to subscribe $1 million in the name of the 
state to the $16 million loan authorized in February. 
Governor Snyder delegated John Binns and David Ache-
son to raise the funds in Philadelphia. With little difficulty 
they raised the entire amount in a few months.39 When 
the books on this loan were closed, it, too, was under-
subscribed by more than $10 million. The government 
reopened the books in April and Stephen Girard, heading 
a consortium that included John Jacob Astor and David 
Parish, subscribed for the more than $10 million that had 
not been subscribed in the first offering. A third loan, for 
$7,500,000, offered in September 1813, was oversubscribed 
by more than $5 million, with banks and individuals in 
Pennsylvania again contributing generously.40 The legis-
lature also pledged all revenues from taxes on auction 
37 Pennsylvania House Journal, 1811-1812, pp. 430, 452-54, 718; Pen~ 
sylvania Senate Journal, 1811-1812, pp. 325, 376, 402-404; Pennsylvania 
Gazette, May 6, 1812; Stephen Girard Papers, Letters Received No. 464, 
American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia (1942), 29-55; Eyre to 
Roberts, May 2, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
38 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1811-1812, pp. 242-44, 478-515; Penn-
sylvania House Journal, 1811-1812, pp. 584, 593-94, 704-706. 
39 Snyder to Binns and Acheson, March 13, March 31, April 5, 1813, 
Pennsylvania Archives, 2d series, XII, 636, 637, 645. See also Pennsyl-
vania Archives, 4th series, IV, 810-11, 829-30. For the legislation see 
Pennsylvania House Journal, 1812-1813, pp. 207-10, 214. 
40 American State Papers: Finance, II, 467. Kenneth L. Brown, 
"Stephen Girard's Bank," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biog-
raphy, LXVI (January 1942), 29-55. 
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sales to the building of two ships of war to be given to the 
national government.H 
The continued failure of American arms in 1813 aroused 
some resentment for the conduct of the war, but this 
resentment expressed itself not in demands for a cessation 
of hostilities, but in demands for more vigorous prosecu• 
tion.42 This attitude can best be seen in Republican 
reaction to the Czar's offer to mediate between the United 
States and Great Britain. The Pittsburgh Mercury ap-
proved of the American government's speedy acceptance 
of the offer, holding it up as another example of the 
administration's desire for an honorable peace. It warned, 
however, that the possibility of mediation should not lead 
to a diminution of the war effort. The British would not 
give up their "haughty pretension" until the United States 
proved itself in battle and the Czar's efforts could not 
produce a peace compatible with American honor until 
the nation's armies showed some success. The Common-
wealth was much more cautious. Britain's earlier actions 
had proved she could not be trusted. "Peace concluded 
on honorable terms ... is a consummation devoutly to be 
wished," but to begin negotiations without some assur-
ances would only arouse the Federalists to "more ardent 
efforts to gain peace at any cost." The Commonwealth 
suggested that as the country undertook negotiations it 
should redouble its efforts in the field. Duane's sentiments 
were mixed. He first noted the offer without comment, 
gave cautious approval a few days later, but turned com-
pletely against the project when he learned that Gallatin 
was to be the chief negotiator. 
In the Pennsylvania legislature the selection of two new 
senators to replace Gregg and Leib brought forth similar 
41 Pennsylvania House Journal, 1812-1813, pp. 207-10, 214. 
42 Philadelphia Aurora, March 8, March 9, March 11, April 6, April 8, 
April 14, May 13, 1813; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Feb. 23, Feb. 24, 
Feb. 27, April 21, 1813. 
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sentiments. In February 1814, without holding a caucus, 
the Republican members of the legislature nominated and 
easily elected Jonathan Roberts to fill the vacancy created 
by Leib's resignation. There was little debate, but what 
comments were made stressed Roberts's loyalty to the 
administration, his support of the declaration of war, and 
his vigorous prosecution of it.43 
In December 1812, the legislature had elected Abner 
Lacock to fill Gregg's seat. There was some opposition 
of his nomination and election, but none of it was based 
on his strong support for the administration and the war. 
The leader of the opposition was William J. Duane, son 
of the editor of the Aurora, and a leader of the anti-Snyder 
faction when he was a member. Duane received the 
support of Pittsburgh Republicans who still resented 
Lacock's victory over Tannehill in 1810.44 Those senti-
ments indicate that despite the bleak military situation 
the people of Pennsylvania remained convinced of the 
wisdom of the war, and of the necessity to fight it to a 
military conclusion. 
The prosperity which the war brought to Pennsylvania 
may account for its popular support. Pennsylvania farm-
ers received good prices for their products and Pennsyl-
vania suppliers found a good buyer in the armed forces, 
both state militia and federal troops. In November 1813, 
flour sold for $6.28 a hundredweight. Before the war a 
barrel of flour had brought only $10.24 (a barrel contains 
196 pounds of flour). Potatoes sold for $0.75 per bushel; 
43 Pennsylvania House Journal, 1814-1815, pp. 21, 44-49; Pittsburgh 
Commonwealth, April 7, April 15, April 21, 1813; Pittsburgh Mercury, 
April 22, 1813; Philadelphia Aurora, April 3, April 7, April 9, April 15, 
April 16, April 17, 1813. For similar expressions see Washington Re-
porter, May 3, 1813, Carlisle Gazette, April 19, 1813. 
44 For a biographical sketch of Lacock see Dictionary of American 
Biography, X, 521-22. On Lacock's proadministration stand see Binns to 
Roberts, Nov. 13, 1812. On his election as senator see Pennsylvania 
House Journal, 1812-1813, pp. 40-41, 53-55. 
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hay brought $20 per ton. The letters in the Denny-O'Hara 
collection indicate that the firm was doing an excellent 
business supplying troops. Occasionally it had more 
orders than it could fillY' This prosperity even affected 
the Federalists. Rogers wrote Roberts that their defeat in 
elections did not disturb the Federalists. "They do not 
care about elections so long as flour is so much in de-
mand."46 
Manufacturing also made great strides. The Philadel-
phia papers contained numerous offers to sell domestically 
manufactured goods, advertisements seeking skilled work-
men, and notices for the sale of lots suitable for factories. 
The existence of a wartime boom was confirmed bitterly 
by the Pennsylvania Gazette. "The War-Hawks are thriv-
ing and fattening upon the hard earnings of the industrial 
and peaceable part of the community. Many who eigh-
teen months since were starving . . . have become sleek 
and fat."47 
Whether because of the economic boom consequent 
upon the outbreak of the war, or the continued conviction 
that the national honor and the future of the Republican 
party required the prosecution of the war to a successful 
military conclusion, Pennsylvania Republicans gave the 
war strong support and continued to back the administra-
tion of James Madison. Pennsylvania richly deserves to 
be called "The Keystone in the Democratic Arch." 
45 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, Nov. 3, 1813, Jan. 4, Feb. 5, March 8, 
1814; Arthur H. Cole, Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United States 
1700-1861 (Cambridge, 1938 ), 141. 
46 Rogers to Roberts, Nov. 1, 1812, Roberts Papers. 
47 Oct. 14, 1813. 
Conclusion 
The sixteen votes provided by Pennsylvania for the decla-
ration of war constituted not only the largest vote in 
favor of war from any delegation in Congress, but the 
highest percentage of any of the large delegations. This 
overwhelming support for the declaration of war was not 
an isolated instance. From 1807 to 1812 Pennsylvania's 
Republican congressmen gave equally strong support to 
the administration's efforts to substitute economic coercion 
for war and strongly defended Jefferson's and then Madi-
son's foreign policy. The editorials in the state's Republi-
can press, the resolutions of the state's General Assembly, 
the speeches of the governor, and the results of congres-
sional and presidential elections indicate that the people 
of Pennsylvania also approved of the policies of the 
national government and endorsed the position of their 
congressional delegation. When Congress finally did de-
clare war the people of Pennsylvania supported the war 
effort as staunchly as they had supported the declaration 
of war and opposed every effort to end the war before a 
military victory had been won. 
Pennsylvania's support cannot be explained by applying 
the western and economic causes associated with the work 
of Julius Pratt, George Rogers Taylor, and Margaret 
Latimer. The evidence shows that there was no land 
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hunger in Pennsylvania, no desire to annex Canada, and, 
except as a continuation of a long-existing demand to 
annex Florida, no particularly new desire for that ter-
ritory. Certainly there is no evidence to indicate that 
Pennsylvania participated in a sectional bargain with any 
area for the acquisition of territory. At best, Pennsyl-
vanians supported the invasion of Canada and Florida 
for tactical reasons, hoping to use any victories there as 
negotiable items at the conference table. Neither is there 
any indication that Pennsylvanians were overly concerned 
about Indian depredations on the frontier. The evidence 
also shows that Pennsylvania did not suffer an economic 
depression in the prewar years. The commercial sector 
of the economy did, indeed, sustain serious losses because 
of the commercial policy of the national government, but 
on the whole such losses were temporary. Most com-
mercial men successfully shifted their capital to other 
areas with profit to themselves and benefits to the com-
munity. Domestic manufacturing in Pennsylvania in-
creased significantly during the period, and tremendous 
strides were taken in the development of internal im-
provements. This expansion provided a good area for 
capital investment and sufficient employment for those 
who would otherwise have become unemployed as a 
result of cessation of commerce. Meanwhile agricultural 
prices remained high and the revenues of the state in-
creased annually. 
The more recent research of such diplomatic historians 
as Bradford Perkins, Reginald Horsman, and Roger Brown 
offer a more plausible explanation. Britain's violations of 
American neutral rights hurt American pride much more 
deeply than they hurt the American pocketbook. A 
scanning of the newspapers and correspondence of the 
period strongly suggests that considerations of national 
honor contributed substantially to the formation of Penn-
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sylvania attitudes. The constant reiteration of phrases 
such as "the independence of the nation must be main-
tained," "the people have honor and pride and are willing 
to defend them," and the many references to national 
honor occur too regularly to be taken lightly. References 
to British actions as "debasing," "degrading," and "in-
sulting" indicate that the nation's pride was hurt. Particu-
larly interesting is the constant conjunction on the words 
"honor" and "independence." There is no evidence to 
show that any Pennsylvanian actually feared that Amer-
ica's existence as an independent nation was really threat-
ened in any political or physical sense. More accurately, 
the phrase "honor and independence" implies that a nation 
which allows its honor to be defiled and its flag to be 
disgraced, which does not actively defend its rights against 
usurpation and its ships against molestation, will never 
be considered as an equal power in world affairs either 
by the other nations of the world or by its own citizens. 
This idea was sometimes expressed in the more prose-
lytical sense as the need to prove to a world of monarchs 
and tyrants that a republican government could defend 
its rights and protect its people. To those Pennsylvanians 
who viewed the Federalist minority not only as anti-
Republican, but as antirepublican, the need to prove the 
ability of republican institutions was also a consideration. 
The evidence from Pennsylvania does not warrant the 
conclusion that the need to prove the viability of republi-
canism was a major cause of the war. However, it does 
warrant the addition of such considerations to the broader 
thesis that considerations of national honor did play an 
important role in developing war sentiment in Pennsyl-
vania. 
The hope, or belief, that the policy of commercial 
restriction would benefit the state economically by giving 
an impetus to domestic manufactures and the presumption 
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that war would speed the process of economic develop-
ment were also factors which determined the attitudes 
and actions of Pennsylvanians. 
Partisan considerations help to explain Pennsylvania's 
strong support of the war and the Republican administra-
tion which declared and fought it. Since the "revolution" 
of 1800, Pennsylvania had, in fact, been the cornerstone 
of the Republican edifice. Within the state the party was 
intermittently torn by factional disputes, but it always 
united on national issues to support the policies of the 
Republican administration and to send Republicans to 
Congress. The votes of the Pennsylvania delegations to 
the Eleventh and Twelfth congresses show a great con-
cern for party regularity and a remarkable record of sup-
port of administration measures. 
In addition to the habit of party regularity, concern for 
the future success of the party also motivated many 
Pennsylvania politicians. Their correspondence reveals 
a concern at the revival of Federalist strength and agita-
tion both in the state and in the nation. Many were 
convinced that the people had tired of the peaceful 
methods of the government and wished to settle the na-
tion's international difficulties, one way or another, with-
out further ado. They concluded that if the administra-
tion did not act quickly and decisively, the people would 
look elsewhere for leadership. To avert election losses 
they urged war. 
The relative importance of any of these factors is impos-
sible to assess. All necessary conditions, in the words of 
John Stuart Mill, are "equally indispensable." It is pos-
sible, however, to give primacy to one particular factor, 
and Britain's violations of American neutral rights must 
be accorded this position. Without impressment and the 
orders-in-council America's honor would not have been 
put to the test; the ascendancy of the Republican party 
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would not have been threatened, the nation's economic 
dependence on Great Britain would not have been so 
obvious, and war would not have been necessary. As it 
was, Britain's maritime policy aroused a configuration of 
feelings, attitudes, and fears which only a war could 
satisfy. 
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Madison in 1812, 175, 181 
Say, Benjamin: elected to Congress 
in 1808, 56 
Schoals, Stanton: volunteers for 
militia, 170 
Scull, John: opposes Embargo of 
1807, 26 
Seybert, Adam: opposes annexa-
tion of Canada, 9; supports war, 
70, 71; supports Embargo of 
of 1812, 72, 147; votes against 
Macon's Bill #2, 111; mentioned, 
112, 154 
Shippen, William, 100 
Smilie, John: opposes annexation 
of Canada, 9; condemns attack 
on Chesapeake, 52; supports war, 
69, 70, 136; supports Embargo 
of 1812, 72, 147; votes for non-
importation bill, 82; supports 
Embargo of 1807, 87, 88, 89, 
105; supports Macon's Bill #2, 
206 Index 
113; votes against naval expan-
sion, 135; votes against army 
increase, 139; shares correspon-
dence with Roberts, 139n; sh:ues 
lodgings with Findley and Craw-
ford, 139n; mentioned, 83, 85 
Smith, Samuel: opposes Embargo 
of 1807, 87, 88; not a party 
regular, 91; votes for Macon's 
Bill #2, 111; not reelected to 
Congress in 1811, 118, 131, 132 
Snyder, Simon: denies Indian 
threat, 15; describes state's pros-
perity, 37, 39; elected governor 
in 1808, 55; supports war, 58, 
67, 68; approves national policy, 
134, 182, 183; attempts to im-
prove state militia, 184; men-
tioned, 108, 124, 154, 162, 164, 
185, 186 
Somerset county: prosperity in, 35 
Spayd, John: urges party unity, 
179 
Stewart, Samuel, 160 
Styles, Edward, 150 
Tannehill, Adamson, 132, 192 
Taylor, George, 25, 45, 194 
United States Gazette, 122 
Venango County: land available 
in, 10 
\Varren County: land available in, 
10 
Washington Reporter: condemns 
British intrigue among Indians, 
15, 16; condemns attack on 
Chesapeake, 52; doubts success 
of Erskine negotiations, 59, 61; 
advocates war, 68, 69, 71, 80; 
supports Embargo of 1807, 84, 
92, 97, 107 
Whitehill, Robert: votes against 
nonintercourse, 106; against na-
val expansion, 135; supports 
Embargo of 1812, 147; supports 
Madison in 1812, 176 
Wright, David, 51 
York County: public meeting 
opposes Madison, 174 
